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Border Warfare in Pennsylvania


**DURING THE
REVOLUTION**

**Presented to the Faculty of Philosophy of the
University of Pennsylvania**

By LEWIS S. SHIMMELL

**In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**





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PENNSYLVANIA


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*NOTE.—In the treatment of the Border Warfare on the subsequent pages, the same geographical outline has been followed each year as is found in the year 1775.

Border Warfare in Pennsylvania during the Revolution.

WHETHER the English Colonies in America would have escaped the horrors of two decades of border warfare, had not the royal arms of France been nailed to trees in the Ohio Valley nor the monogram of King George been pasted on Colonial documents of business, is of course problematical. It is especially so in Pennsylvania, where Indian wars had been unknown before the middle of the 18th century. Yet it is fair to presume that the one great cause of Indian hostility everywhere—extension of white settlements—would have brought the tomahawk and scalping knife to the frontier of Pennsylvania had there been no French or Revolutionary War. It is true, the French incited the Indians to aggression after the peace of Aix la Chapelle; but those intrigues succeeded by reason of the hope held out that the hunting grounds usurped by the English should be restored. While Christian Frederick Post was on his mission, 1758, of withdrawing the Ohio Indians from the French interest, the chiefs said to him at Fort Duquesne¹ :

“Before you came they had all agreed together to go and join the French, but since they have seen you they all draw back, tho’ we have great reason to believe you intend to drive us away and settle the country, or else why do you come to fight in the land that God has given us.”

Post replied that the English did not intend to take the land from them, but only to drive the French away. They said they knew better; that they were informed so by one

¹ Thompson's *Alienation of the Indians*, p. 153-154.

2 *Border Warfare in Pennsylvania.*

of the greatest English traders and some justices of the peace ; and that the French told them much the same thing, namely :

“ That the English intend to destroy us and take our lands from us, but that they are come only to defend us and our lands.”

The chiefs further said to Post :

“ ’Tis plain that you white people are the cause of this war ; why don’t you and the French fight in the old country, and on the sea ? Why do you come to fight on our land ? This makes everybody believe you want to take the land from us by force, and settle it.”

If other evidence were needed to prove that the Indians allied themselves with the French after 1750, largely because they hoped thereby to repress the tide of English occupation beyond the Alleghenies, it could be found in Pontiac’s conspiracy. Pontiac’s conspiracy had various causes¹ ; but what contributed most to the growing discontent after the French were defeated in America, was the Indian belief that the English would cut them off entirely and possess themselves of their country.² The Delawares and the Shawanese, the ancient friends of William Penn, in particular, had been roused to the highest pitch of exasperation by the white settlements fast extending up the Susquehanna and to the Alleghenies, eating away the forest like a spreading canker. The Yankees from Connecticut, by their threatened occupation of the Wyoming Valley, gave great umbrage to the Six Nations.³ The erection of the frontier forts had given offense, too, and the Six Nations asked to have them pulled down, and kicked out of the way.⁴ At a conference in Philadelphia, August, 1761, an Iroquois Sachem said :

1 “ Ponteach ” in Appendix B, Parkman’s *Conspiracy of Pontiac*.

2 Parkman’s *Conspiracy of Pontiac*, p. 156.

3 Minutes of the Conference of the Six Nations at Hartford, 1763.

4 Parkman’s *Conspiracy of Pontiac*, p. 157.

"We, your brethren of the Six Nations, are penned up like hogs. There are forts all around us, and, therefore, we are apprehensive that death is coming upon us." ¹

Pontiac's war was a struggle of life and death.² The English were to be defeated and the way stopped, so that they could not return upon the Indians' land. The encroachment upon his lands was always uppermost in the Red Man's mind when he thought of going on the war path against the English; and no doubt the scalping-knife, the tomahawk and the firebrand would have brought terror and suffering to the frontier of Pennsylvania if the wily Frenchman had not egged the Indian on, and made him his ally during ten long years of border warfare.

Lord Dunmore's war, in 1774, again, points to the probability that the frontiersmen would have had to fight for their lives and homes once more, if the American Colonies had not revolted against England. An Indian war was inevitable; diplomacy was no longer possible. There may have been minor causes, but they were not sufficient in themselves. The main cause was the influx of settlers upon the hunting grounds of the Indians. General Gage, in 1772, had issued a proclamation against settlements beyond the boundaries fixed by treaties made with the Indian Nations, to avoid "causing infinite disturbances." We have the testimony of Logan that even the murders of Yellow Creek, wrongly supposed to have been committed by Captain Michael Cresap, of Redstone (from which error Dunmore's War is also called Cresap's War), did not cause the war of 1774. He said in the following July³: "The Indians are not angry on account of these murders, but only myself." The Indians, regarding the settlements

¹ Parkman's Pontiac's Conspiracy, p. 157.

² Parkman's Conspiracy of Pontiac, p. 179.

³ Wither's Chronicles of Border Warfare, p. 138.

in Southwestern Pennsylvania as the hive from which the adventurers to Kentucky swarmed, directed their operations against this part of the frontier in 1774. In fact, the war, which was then commenced, and carried on with but little intermission up to the treaty of Fort Greenville, by Wayne, in 1795, was a war to prevent the further extension of settlements by the whites. The Red Man had his own cause during all the years of the Revolution. He was not an ally of the English by virtue of the ancient friendship of the Iroquois, nor was he a hireling like the Hessian, fighting for a stipend. On the other hand, the Americans fought two wars at one and the same time—a war for independence and a war for territory. In the latter phase of the Revolution, Virginia and Pennsylvania were especially interested, and they bore the brunt of it. Virginia fought for what the logic of events did not confirm, and Pennsylvania for what her charter guaranteed. Whether the Revolution had come later or not at all, the Indians would have attacked and ravished the frontier before relinquishing the hunting grounds set apart by the King of Great Britain.

During the earlier Colonial period, beginning with the first scattered and independent settlements, from Acadia to Florida, and ending as the wars with France began—each isolated group of Colonists was of necessity left to its own methods and policy in the intercourse and treatment of the natives. There was, of course, the same ultimate reference to British sovereignty as in other Colonial affairs; and instructions were given from time to time as to ways of dealing with the Indians.¹ But each Colony had to meet its own straits and emergencies.² The help and interference from England grew as the strife with

¹ Hart's Contemporaries, vol. 1, p. 186; Preston's Documents, p. 34.

² Charter to William Penn, section 16.

France waxed hotter. Pennsylvania being remote from the seat of the first wars with the French, had sole control of its relations with the Indians until 1754. In that year, Governor Hamilton in common with all the other Governors in America received a letter from the Lords of Trade, recommending "that all the provinces be (if practicable) comprised in one general treaty to be made in his Majesty's Name, it appearing to their Lordships that the Practice of each Province making a separate treaty for itself in its own Name, is very improper, and attended with great inconveniences to his Majesty's service."¹ Such concerted action seemed wise to the Lords of Trade, because it had been tried on former occasions among some of the Colonies. However, the General Assembly of Pennsylvania did not approve very heartily of holding their treaties with the Indians at Albany; but because all the Colonies were invited, they agreed that the Governor might send commissioners if he thought it were of interest and advantage to the Province.² One year later, Sir William Johnson was made superintendent of Indian Affairs, with full power to treat with the Six Nations, and to secure them and their allies to the British interest. Johnson's management of his office gave great satisfaction; and to set at rest the opposition he met from Governor Shirley, of Massachusetts, he received a commission, in 1756, from the Crown, as "Colonel, Agent and Sole Superintendent of all the affairs of the Six Nations and other Northern Indians."³ At the same time instructions came from the ministry forbidding each northern province to transact any business with Indians. Johnson now had the entire management of the Indian relations in his hands,

¹ Votes of the Assembly, p. 279-280.

² Ibid, p. 286.

³ Stone's Life and Times of Sir William Johnson, vol. 1, p. 540.

“and with no subornation but to London.” Indian treaties in Pennsylvania and important conferences were thereafter attended by the King’s superintendent or his deputy.

As long as the founder of Pennsylvania had lived, or during the first forty years of the time while the Province was the principal party, actor and contributor of ways and means in the management of Indian affairs, there is no record of any great dissatisfaction. Naturally, there was distrust at first;¹ but it was soon replaced by confidence founded in honest trade, friendly intercourse and equal rights.² Penn’s concession of the same rights to the heathen in the ownership of land as the Christians enjoyed, was the key to his whole Indian policy. The general theory of those times, originated by the Pope, was that no heathen people could acquire a title to land except to occupy it for hunting and fishing and temporary abode as long as the Christians did not want it. While the Spaniards applied this theory to the letter, resorting to force and bloodshed when resistance was offered, the English, as a rule, paid a nominal price for the land and avoided conquest if possible. However, there were exceptions to this rule in some of the English colonies. A large part of New England was conquered from the Indians.³ One of the causes of Roger Williams’ banishment, was his criticism of the Massachusetts authorities for their failure to pay for Indian lands. He held that the King could not grant land before it had been bought from the Indians. Penn held the same views as Williams, and paid the Indians for every foot of land before he sold it to the settlers. By the feudal powers conferred upon him as the lord of a huge fief, he might

1 Penn’s Letter to the Society of Free Traders, section 23.

2 Penn’s Conditions or Concessions, sections 12-15.

3 Palfrey’s History of New England, vol. 3, pp. 137-138.

have wrested the soil from the savages by force and established his title in blood. Instead, he secured it by treaties in the peaceful shades of the forest, sanctified by the incense from the calumet of peace.

It has been claimed that undue praise is bestowed upon Penn's Indian policy—that the New Englanders had paid for their lands fifty years before,¹ that the Bishop of London advised Penn to do it in his province,² that the pacific policy of the Quakers made this course necessary, that it succeeded because the surrounding Indians, being vassals, were debarred by their conquerors from the use of arms, and that Penn paid twice for his lands in order to secure the good-will of both slave and master—once to the Iroquois, who claimed by right of conquest, and once to the Delawares, who claimed by right of occupation. But no matter how much is due to others and to fortuitous circumstances, William Penn was the Hamlet in it all. For the era of absolute peace lasted only a short time after Penn's death. With the year 1722, Indian complaints concerning land transactions began to appear on the official records of Pennsylvania. Governor Keith, hearing that some Marylanders intended to take up land west of the Susquehanna by virtue of Baltimore's charter, hastily had some land surveyed there for himself. When the Indians learned of this, they desired to know whether the Governor's survey would not occasion the immediate settlement of all that side of the river. They were assured that the Governor had taken up the land solely to prevent others from going there. As to his own right of land west of the Susquehanna, the Indians were referred to the purchase which William Penn had made of Governor Dongan, or New York, 1696. This transaction, made in England,

¹ Bancroft, vol. 2, p. 98.

² Penn's Letter to the Ministry, August 14, 1683.

conveyed to Penn all the land between the northern and southern boundaries of Pennsylvania, lying on both sides of the Susquehanna. However, the Susquehanna Indians, in 1700, complained to Penn that the Five Nations had not consulted them in the sale to Dongan, and they made the same complaint to Governor Keith, in 1722. Here appears, for the first time, the difficulty which Pennsylvania experienced on account of the dominion which the Iroquois claimed over the native tribes of the Province. Keith was also reminded of a promise Penn had made in 1700, that the land should be common among the English and the Indians. Keith's reply¹—" . . . only I have heard further that when he was so good to tell your people, that notwithstanding that purchase, the lands should still be in common, you answered, that a very little land would serve you," etc.—was quite prophetic of the Indian's fate. To strengthen his claim to the survey made across the Susquehanna, Keith went to Albany the same year and had the Five Nations confirm the grant obtained through Governor Dongan. Yet five years afterwards some chiefs of the Five Nations came to Philadelphia and wanted to sell the same lands again.²

The conference at Philadelphia, in 1727, was the first at which serious difficulties appear on the minutes of the Provincial Council.³ They were in the form of petitions from "ye back inhabitants" for protection against "ye Ingeans," and of complaints by the Indians against the frontier settlers. The Indians complained that "many sorts of traders came among them, both Indians and English, who all cheat them, and though they get their skins

¹ Smith's Laws, vol. 2, p. 112.

² Colonial Records, vol. 3, p. 271.

³ Colonial Records, vol. 3, pp. 274-275, and Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 3, pp. 204-213.

they give them very little in pay, not enough to secure powder and shot to hunt with and get more." The traders, they said, had but little of these, but instead brought rum, which they sold very dear, three and four times more than it was worth. They also took notice that the French and English (reference is here to New York) raised forts among them, and that great numbers of people are sent thither, the meaning of which they did not understand, but feared it boded evil. They also desired that no settlements be made up the Susquehanna higher than Paxtang, and that no rum be sold there, that being the road by which their people went out to war, nor at Allegheny. The Governor and Council replied that while there was great talk of war in Europe, the English and French were on the same side. As to trade, they knew it was the method of all that follow it to buy as cheap and sell as dear as possible; every man must make the best bargain he can, and be on his guard. The answer to the complaint about the sale of rum was on a par with the one about trading—evasive and unsatisfactory.

This same complaint had been made in 1722: "The Indians could live contentedly and grow rich if it were not for the quantities of rum that is suffered to come among them, contrary to what William Penn promised them." As to the forts, the Indians were assured that the English were their constant friends, and they need therefore have no fears. Of those built by the French, the Governor and Council had no knowledge. The settlements above Paxtang were made contrary to law, it was admitted; but they were excused with an "of course, as the young people grow up they will spread, yet not very speedily." The Governor further promised to "give orders to them all to be civil to those of the Five Nations as they pass that way, and the sale of rum shall be pro-

hibited there and at Allegheny, but the woods are so thick and dark we cannot see what is done in them.”

The following year, another conference was held at Philadelphia. French intrigues began to show themselves,¹ but the field of operation was yet too far removed from Philadelphia to receive much attention. The greatest difficulty was trespass upon lands not purchased from the Indians. Addressing himself to James Logan, a Delaware chief said, that he was growing old, and was troubled to see the Christians settle on lands for which the Indians had never been paid, that his children might wonder to see all their fathers' land gone without any money for it, that this might occasion a difference between his children and the English. The Delaware chief had reference specially to the Tulpehockin lands now in Berks county, which had been occupied by the connivance of Governor Keith, but without the consent of the Proprietors. A colony of Germans from New York, friends and associates of Conrad Weiser, afterwards the famous Indian Agent of the Province, had invaded the lands and actually aided and abetted the destruction of the Indians' crops.² James Logan promised to make the matter satisfactory, and asked the Indians not to injure the Palatines. The Indians acquiesced, but the lands on the Tulpehockin were not deeded and paid for until 1733. This violation of the well-settled policy of William Penn brought about the first collision between the Indians and the frontiersmen.³ It gave the French their first good chance to intrigue with the savages of Pennsylvania;⁴ and was the entering wedge to the alienation of the natives, “who,” as Governor

1 Colonial Records, vol. 3, pp. 295-298.

2 Colonial Records, vol. 3, p. 324.

3 Gordon's Proclamation, Colonial Records, vol. 3, p. 307.

4 Colonial Records, vol. 3, pp. 438-452.

Gordon said, speaking in his proclamation of May 16th, 1728, about former treaties, "have not been guilty of any failure or breach on their parts of the said treaty."

The deed releasing the Tulpehockin lands embraced none of the lands in the Delaware basin, where the settlements at the Minisinks, nearly forty miles above the Leckey Hills, caused great discontent. Here a warrant for 10,000 acres had been secured by William Allen, a great land dealer, from William Penn, grandson of the founder, about the same time¹ that the Germans came to Tulpehockin. Allen chose a tract in the vicinity of the present town of Stroudsburg, and sold it to such as would settle it. According to the Rolls-office of Bucks county,² a tract sold to one Depue actually included a Shawanese town, and another an island belonging to the same tribe. About this time, too, the Proprietary offered to dispose of lands by lottery, which the lucky ones were allowed to lay out anywhere except on Proprietary and settlers' claims. To assist the adventurers in the choice of good lands, several tracts were laid out in the Forks of the Delaware. Though the lottery did not fill, and therefore was not drawn, the tickets sold became rights, by virtue of which the tracts in the Forks of the Delaware were quickly taken up and settled by the Scotch-Irish.

These transactions provoked the Indians. Seeing themselves deprived of their lands without any consideration, they complained loudly, and even began to threaten. After several ineffectual attempts in 1734-35 to compose the clamors of the Delawares, the Proprietary complained of them to the Five Nations. In 1736, deputies of these arrived in Philadelphia. After a week's deliberation, in the course of which complaint was made against the Del-

¹ Smith's *Laws*, vol. 2, p. 114.

² Thompson's *Alienation of the Indians*, p. 29.

awares, a treaty was ratified by which all the lands between the mouth of the Susquehanna and the Kittatinny Hills were released. By the deed itself,¹ it appears that the extent of land eastward was "as far as the heads of the branches or springs which run in the said Susquehanna;" and therefore it did not give any color of right for settling the lands in the Forks of the Delaware. Wherefore, to correct this defect, some of the Indians who visited Conrad Weiser on their way home were induced at Tulpehockin,² eleven days after the public treaty had been ended,³ to sign a piece of writing declaring that their intention in the deed was to release all the lands between the Susquehanna and the Delaware as far north as the Kittatinny Mountains. The extent of land conveyed by the second instrument was double that described in the deed; yet for the farther grant there was no consideration.

It seems that the Proprietary themselves did not think that the Six Nations could convey lands east of the tributaries of the Susquehanna; for eight months later, August 25, 1737, they procured a release from the Delawares for at least a part of these lands. This release was the famous walking purchase, or the confirmation of a supposed deed of 1686. The Indians having no recollection of any such deed, and there being no record of it on the rolls, it took considerable persuasion to make them believe that the deed was genuine. It is certain that no such original deed was in existence at the treaty of Easton, in 1757.⁴ The tract of land as described in it, and as confirmed in 1737, began "on a line drawn from a certain

1 Smith's Laws, vol. 2, p. 115.

2 Thompson's Alienation of the Indians, p. 115.

3 Ibid., p. 32.

4 Smith's Laws, vol. 2, p. 111.

spruce tree on the river Delaware by a west-north west course to Neshaminy creek, from thence back into the woods as far as a man could go in a day and a half . . . and from thence to the aforesaid river Delaware, and so down the courses of the river to the first-mentioned spruce tree."¹ The Indians knew nothing about the surveyor's chain, and so the deeds call for the measurement of lands by walking or riding. The walk was accordingly made; but it only increased the dissatisfaction of the Indians. It extended about thirty miles beyond the Lechay Hills, over the Kittatinny Mountains, and included the best lands in the Forks of the Delaware. When the line was drawn to the Delaware, from the point reached by the walk, instead of drawing it directly to the river, it was slanted northward, so as to include the valuable Minisink Flats. The Indians complained that the walkers selected by the Proprietary ran instead of walked; at least they could not keep up. Furthermore, their expectation was that the walk would be made parallel to the course of the Delaware. That the walking purchase was a fraud cannot be denied. It sank deep into the Indian heart, and was never forgotten. The Delawares were driven from the English interest into that of the French, who stood ready to increase the dissatisfaction.

The Indians refused to quit the lands or give quiet possession to the people who came to settle in the Forks. Accordingly, in 1742, the Six Nations were brought to Philadelphia again to force the Delawares to leave the Forks. Their coming was necessary, not only for the peace of the Province at that time, but for its future security in case of a rupture with the French.² The situa-

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 1, p. 541

² Governor Thomas' Proclamation, Votes of Assembly, vol. 3, pp. 481-482.

tion was explained, and the Six Nations were asked to remove the Delawares from the Forks, without giving the latter any chances to make a defense. This the Six Nations concluded to do, and, addressing the Delawares, upbraided them in scathing language, calling them "women," with no right to sell lands, and charging them to remove instantly without liberty to think about it. They might go back to New Jersey, where they came from, or settle at Wyoming or Shamokin. Their masters then forbade them ever to meddle in land affairs or pretend to sell any land.¹ The Delawares dared not disobey. They at once left the conference and soon after removed—some to Wyoming and Shamokin, others to Ohio.

Having disposed of the Delawares, the Six Nations proceeded to a little business of their own at the same council. They had helped to defraud the Delawares on the Minisinks, (see page 13), but they were not willing to be defrauded themselves at the Juniata. The Six Nations complained that the Governor's people daily settled on the lands beyond the Blue Mountains. "In particular," said they, "we renew our Complaints against some People who are settled at Juniata, a Branch of Susquehanna, and desire that they may be forthwith made to go off the Land, for they do great damage to our Cousins, the Delawares." The Governor replied that magistrates had been sent to remove the settlers. The Indians interrupted him and said, "These persons who were sent do not do their Duty; so far from removing the People, they made Surveys for themselves, and they are in League with the Trespassers; we desire more effectual methods may be used and honest Men employed."²

The first unwelcome people who came to the lands of

¹ Colonial Records, vol. 4, pp. 479-480.

² Colonial Records, vol. 4, pp. 571-572.

the Juniata were traders, to whom official reference was made at the council of Philadelphia in 1727. In the time of Penn the natives brought their peltry hundreds of miles to the Delaware river. In the course of time, as the demand for skins and furs grew greater, traders penetrated the depths of the forest to hasten and monopolize the trade. In this way the whole Juniata and West Branch regions were explored and advertised to adventurous settlers. These were generally a good class of people, but the Indians estimated them by the traders, who were no better than banditti.¹ The settlers to whom the Indians referred in 1742 were Germans,² who came several years in advance of all other white settlers, and boldly located themselves in the valley of the Juniata. The Governor and the Proprietors caused the settlers to be driven out in 1743. But at the same time the Irish were making settlements on unpurchased lands at Big Cove, Little Cove and other places farther up the valley. Later, some persons had the presumption to go into Tuscarora Gap, into Aughwick lying northward, into Shearman's Creek, into the valley of the Big Juniata, whence the Germans had been driven, and along the west side of the Susquehanna as far as Penn's Creek. So in 1748 the Government sent the sheriff with three magistrates and Conrad Weiser into these places to warn the people; but they paid no heed, and continued their settlement.

The tension was somewhat relieved by the purchase of 1749, which included a strip of land on the east side of the Susquehanna, north of the Blue Mountains, as far as the Delaware. So much the Indians were willing to do, because they had seen on their way down from Onondago that many people, whom it would be difficult to remove,

¹ Votes of Assembly, vol. 3, p. 555.

² Colonial Records, vol. 5, p. 445.

had settled on the east side of the Susquehanna. But they insisted on the removal of those on the west side. Proclamations were accordingly issued, but again disregarded by the "squatters." In May, 1750, Richard Peters, the secretary of the Land Office, with some magistrates, was sent to remove them. On his way he met some Indians, who were delighted to learn of his mission, but feared it would prove like former attempts—the people would be put off now, but come back again next year; and if so, the Six Nations would no longer bear it, but *would do themselves justice*. Mr. Peters, accompanied by the Indians, broke up the settlements at Shearman's Valley, at Aughwick and Big Cove, everywhere dispossessing the people and burning the cabins. But, through a technicality,¹ Peters did not make thorough work, though he had declared before he went out on his mission—"That if he did not at this journey entirely remove these people, it would not be in the power of the Governor to prevent an Indian war."

By the message which Governor Hamilton sent to the Assembly with Mr. Peters' report, it appears that what had been done proved of little avail.² Within two years after the squatters had been led into the Carlisle jail, many of them returned, and others came with them. These continual aggressions greatly incensed the Indians. At a treaty in Carlisle, 1753, they very plainly expressed their views, but were unwilling to say or do anything from which their friendship might be suspected. They advised the authorities that Pennsylvania and Virginia forbear settling on the Indians' lands over the Allegheny Hills, being especially earnest in their renewal of the request to have the traders brought back to the Susquehanna; that

¹ Thompson's *Alienation of the Indians*, p. 72.

² Colonial Records, vol. 5, p. 455.

the Governor recall the people from the Juniata Valley, and that none others locate there until matters were settled between them and the French, "lest," they said, "damage should be done, and we should think ill of them."¹ There was great anxiety now to strengthen the fidelity of all the Indians, as official records fully show. Communications by means of agents were numerous until the unfortunate purchase of 1754 kindled a flame, which could only be extinguished by a deluge of blood.

The treaty, at which the purchase of 1754 was made, was held at Albany, by order of the King (See page 5). The tract acquired by the Proprietary was bounded on the north by a line drawn from Shamokin to Lake Erie, and on the west and south by the utmost extent of the Province. It included nearly all of Pennsylvania west of the Susquehanna. The lands where the Shawanese and Ohio Indians lived, and the hunting grounds of the Delawares, the Nanticokes and the Tuteloes, were all included. They were obtained by methods not described by the writers of the time, but strongly hinted at, and requiring a week to induce the Indians to execute the deed.² The Indians were deceived by compass measurements, which they did not understand;³ the deed was irregular, without proper notice, according to the custom of the Six Nations; and it gave away lands of tribes whose representatives had never signed it.⁴ Pennsylvania and Connecticut had entered a race for the purchase of 1754; each was bent on getting it by fair means or foul; and Pennsylvania won, but it was a costly victory. Many of the Indian tribes seeing their lands gone joined the French,

¹ Colonial Records, vol. 5, pp. 671-684.

² Thompson's Alienation of the Indians, p. 78.

³ Colonel Weiser's Journal of Aughwick Conference, Colonial Records, vol. 6, p. 150.

⁴ Thompson's Alienation of the Indians, p. 79.

and in the following year showed their resentment on Braddock's field.

Governor Morris, after the defeat of Braddock, told the Assembly "that it seemed clear, from the different accounts he had received, that the French had gained to their interest the Delaware and Shawanese Indians, under the ensnaring pretense of restoring them to their country."¹ The Assembly themselves said, "It is rendered beyond contradiction plain that the cause of the present Indian incursions in this Province, and the dreadful calamities many of the inhabitants have suffered, have arisen in great measure from the exorbitant and unreasonable purchases made, or supposed to be made, of the Indians, and the manner of making them. So exorbitant, that the natives complain they have not a country left to subsist in."² John Penn himself, later on, admitted the just cause of the Indians' complaint for past injuries, and would gladly have removed them when it was too late.³

The serious consequences to the British interests occasioned an appeal to the Proprietors through the Lords Commissioners of Trade, with the result that they agreed to limit the bounds of the purchase of 1754. A Commission was sent over, authorizing and directing a treaty to be held for that purpose. Previous to this treaty, great exertions were made by the Quakers to bring about an accommodation with the Delawares and the Shawanese. First a treaty was made at Easton, 1756, with those living in Pennsylvania, but not until war had been declared on them by Governor Morris, and premiums offered for their scalps. Next, in conjunction with Forbes, in 1758, the Moravian missionary, Frederick Post, was sent to the Ohio

¹ Votes of Assembly, vol. 4, p. 492.

² Ibid, pp. 718-738.

³ Ibid, vol. 6, pp. 7-8.

to induce the Delawares and Shawanese there to join their brethren of Pennsylvania in a treaty of peace. His mission was successful; and coupled with Forbes' victory, it made the great convention at Easton in October, 1758, possible. There were present about 300 chiefs, and they had from the 7th to the 26th of the month to state all their complaints about ill-treatment and land-stealing. The result was that the Proprietors reconveyed to the Indians the land of the Albany purchase which had been unjustly taken. The treaty of Easton went far to restore the conditions that had prevailed before the walking purchase and the other aggressions, which had alienated the Red Man, and driven him into an alliance with the French.

Though the Proprietary were more cautious now not to offend the Indians, the settlers on the frontier had no more regard for savage rights than before. Proclamations had to be issued repeatedly, from 1761 to 1763, commanding settlers on unpurchased Indian lands to evacuate and abandon them. However, the fearless Scotch-Irish and the determined New Englander pushed ever farther into the wilderness; nor was the plodding German far behind them. Proclamations had no terror for these. All that the Quakers and the Moravians, and England herself,¹ could do to maintain peace was done; but their efforts could not prevent Pontiac's Conspiracy, with its horrible memories of Wyoming and Paxtang. It might be supposed that the fate of the Yankees on the North Branch, and the atrocities of the murder of the Conestogas, would have had a deterrent effect on the land-grabbing propensities of the frontiersmen; but it had not. Sir William Johnson wrote to General Gage, in 1766, that murders were committed daily, and that Indian war was

1 Trumbull MSS., Mass. Hist. Society.

inevitable. Proclamations against trespass were again issued, but they were of non-effect, and simply laughed at. What made matters worse, the Scotch-Irish and the Quakers had become bitter political enemies through the exigencies of the Indian wars, as the following doggerel plainly shows :

“ Go on, good Christians, never spare
To give your Indians clothes to wear ;
Send 'em good beef and pork and beans,
Guns, powder, flints and store of lead,
To shoot your neighbors through the head ;
Devoutly then make affirmation,
You're friends to George and British nation ;
Encourage every friendly savage
To murder, burn, destroy and ravage ;
Fathers and mothers here maintain,
Whose sons add numbers to the slain ;
Of Scotch and Irish let them kill
As many thousands as they will,
That you may lord it o'er the land,
And have the whole and sole command.”

By an Act passed February 3, 1768, to continue in force one year, all persons were interdicted from settling on the Indian lands under the highest forfeiture known in society, namely, death without benefit of clergy.¹ Exception was made in favor of settlers holding licenses from British officers to settle on the military roads leading to Fort Pitt.

All efforts to keep the settlers out of the unpurchased lands proving non-effective, the last purchase by the Proprietary from the Indians was made at Fort Stanwix, in 1768. The purchase included all of the Province not previously bought, except the part lying north and west of a line which ran from a point just west of Fort Stanwix, south to the Susquehanna, thence up the West Branch

¹ Smith's Laws, vol. 2, p. 570.

and across to Kittanning on the Allegheny, thence down that river and the Ohio. It was understood by the Indians that no white man was to settle to the west of the line agreed upon.¹ In the deed there was an uncertainty as to what was the boundary on the northern side of the West Branch. To prevent controversy with the Indians, no lands were permitted to be surveyed to the west of Lycoming creek ; and a law was again passed punishing, by a fine of 500 pounds and twelve months' imprisonment, any person settling or surveying lands thereon. The reasons for passing such stringent laws were the fears of another war ;² but the law did not deter adventurers from squatting on forbidden lands of the West Branch. They were a little state of their own, administered justice after primitive fashion down to the time of the Revolution, and by a singular coincidence passed a declaration of independence from Great Britain on the same day it was passed by the Congress in Philadelphia. In 1778 these "fair-play" men, so called from their methods of adjusting difficulties, paid dearly for their lands with the lives of their wives and children taken by the Indians in revenge for unfair treatment.

It is clearly seen that the trespass upon unpurchased lands in Pennsylvania, and the unjust and illegal transactions in land—so rare in the lifetime of Penn, but so common under the rule of his heirs—were fresh in the memory of the Indians at the outbreak of the Revolution nor could they have forgotten the unscrupulous dealings and licentious acts of the traders, the squatters of the Juniata and the Lycoming, the murder of the Conestogas, the rewards for scalps offered by Morris³ and John

¹ Smith's Laws, vol. 2, p. 122.

² Votes of Assembly, vol. 6, pp. 7-8.

³ Colonial Records, vol. 7, p. 88.

22 *Border Warfare in Pennsylvania.*

Penn,¹ and other outrageous things unbecoming a Christian people. With a civilized people these memories of past wrongs, formally adjusted by treaties, would not have been *casus belli* at the time of the Revolution. With the Indians they were, especially under the instigations of British emissaries and American traitors.

The first opportunity for British intrigues with the Indians was found in Lord Dunmore's war. There was a belief, prevalent even before it began, that Great Britain, facing an inevitable conflict with the colonies, was anxious for an Indian war, to afford an excuse for the presence of her standing army in America.² For many years afterwards Lord Dunmore himself was suspected of having had a secret understanding with the Indians, "looking to the almost certain results of the commotions which were agitating America."³ Though this view is not now held, he certainly made the acquaintance of men on the frontier in 1774, whom he afterwards regarded as fit instruments to foment war on the frontier. Among these was Simon Girty, one of three white renegade brothers. They had been taken captive by the Indians while the French held Fort Duquesne, and they lived among the savages for some time. Simon Girty now lived at Pittsburgh, where Dunmore met him and employed him as a scout.⁴ In February, 1775, when the Virginia courts were organized in Western Pennsylvania, Simon Girty was appointed magistrate by Governor Dunmore, and took the oath of allegiance to his majesty King George III. Of course, this was a formal proceeding incident to taking the office ; yet, though he was loyal for a time to the colo-

1 Colonial Records, vol. 9. p. 189.

2 American Archives, 4th Series, vol. 1, p. 1018.

3 Wither's Border Warfare, p. 177.

4 History of the Girtys, p. 27.

nies, it is evident that he sided with the Mother Country at that time, from the fact that his name was on the " MS. List " of " Persons well-Disposed to his Majesty's Government, Living on the Frontiers of Virginia," sent by Dunmore to Lord George Germaine.¹ This list finally reached Governor Hamilton, at Detroit, in 1777 ; and the next year we find Simon Girty and his brothers aiding the British in the border war against Pennsylvania,² having been recommended by Lord Dunmore as one of the number having " extensive influence among the inhabitants" in Western Pennsylvania.

Another man met by Dunmore in 1774, and one of far more value to the British cause on the frontier, was Dr. John Connelly, the Benedict Arnold of Western Pennsylvania. He was born at Wright's Ferry, and was half-brother of General James Ewing, of York county, and a nephew of Colonel Croghan, the British Indian Agent. He distinguished himself in Pontiac's Conspiracy, and afterwards settled at Pittsburg. When the contentions for Western Pennsylvania arose between Pennsylvania and Virginia, he sided with the latter because he thought she had the best claims ;³ and he became her willing servant, being made Commandant of the militia, January 1st, 1774, by Lord Dunmore. In this position he became very obnoxious to the authorities of Pennsylvania, and was arrested by Arthur St. Clair, one of the justices of the peace for Westmoreland county. He was released by the sheriff,⁴ but he took possession of Pittsburg, changed the name of Fort Pitt to Fort Dunmore, assailed the Pennsylvania Court at Hannastown with an armed force of Vir-

1 Haldimand Papers.

2 History of the Girtys, p. 59.

3 Narrative of John Connelly, Pa. Hist. Mag., vol. 12, p. 312.

4 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 484.

ginia militia, and fomented disturbance between the Pennsylvanians and the Indians.¹ The war of 1774 brought Dunmore to Pittsburg, where he met Connelly; and the two went forth together to do battle with the Indians. From this association sprang up an acquaintance that ripened into an iniquitous conspiracy.

Before Lord Dunmore had issued his order for General Lewis' retreat after the battle of Point Pleasant, in Lord Dunmore's war, various events had occurred in 1774, beginning with the destruction of the tea at Boston, in March, and ending with the First Continental Congress at Philadelphia, in September; and actual hostilities were only a question of time. Dunmore and Connelly now plotted together in the interests of Great Britain. Connelly got a letter² from George Washington in February, 1775, which made him decide instantly "to exert every faculty in defense of the royal cause." He had all the secrets of Gage, Dunmore, Sir William Johnson, Sir Guy Carleton, and he knew also who on the frontier might join the King's cause. His first work was, by advice of Lord Dunmore,³ to "convene the Indians to a treaty, restore the prisoners, and endeavor to incline them to espouse the royal cause." In this he was successful, though Virginia at the same time had her agents among the savages and watched his actions closely. He secured a large belt of wampum to be transmitted to Lord Dunmore, and from him to his Majesty, as a symbol of their support. The next step Connelly took was to induce as many gentlemen of consequence as possible to join him in defense of the British Government. The leading men approached by him were Simon Girty, Alexander McKee and

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 527.

2 Pennsylvania Hist. Mag., vol. 12, p. 314.

3 Ibid, p. 315.

Matthew Elliott. The first named has already been mentioned as personally well known to Lord Dunmore. Alexander McKee was a native of Eastern Pennsylvania, and early became an Indian Agent at Pittsburg. When Bedford and Westmoreland counties were organized, he each time was made justice of the peace, and became a prominent citizen. Early in 1776, he had to give his parole to the Virginia authorities not to trade with the Indians in behalf of the Crown, nor to leave the vicinity of Fort Pitt. He had been very intimate with Connelly,¹ and in the "list of well disposed," which most likely was prepared by Dr. Connelly for Dunmore, McKee stands first.² On March 28th, 1778, he, with Girty and Elliott, escaped to Detroit, and he was ever afterwards an active agent of the British against the Western frontier. McKee's defection was looked upon as foreboding great disaster.³ Matthew Elliott, too, was an Indian trader, born in Eastern Pennsylvania. He was in the Indian country at the time of the battle of Point Pleasant, and brought the message to the Virginia Governor from the Shawanese, asking for peace. All these were well rewarded by Governor Hamilton for their traitorous act, especially McKee, who was made an Indian officer—Captain and Interpreter in the Indian department.⁴

Having attended to the preliminaries of his plot with Dunmore, Dr. Connelly now proceeded to see him, but he was arrested and taken to Ligonier. There Arthur St. Clair, who was the commander of the militia, "with the help of a cheerful glass," got at some of his designs, which were communicated to Philadelphia.⁵ Connelly

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 695.

2 History of the Girtys, p. 32.

3 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 445.

4 History of the Girtys, p. 63.

5 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 637.

managed to get free, but did not reach Lord Dunmore without another arrest. Between them a plan was formed in July, 1775, which promised fair. A co-operative body of troops from Canada and the Western frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia, with Indian auxiliaries, was to be ready to act when General Howe would draw the attention of the Americans northward. Connelly was dispatched to Gage at Boston, who approved of the plan. But the Doctor could not proceed to Canada on account of the American invasion already begun. So he returned to Virginia, where Lord Dunmore gave him a commission to raise troops on the frontier, and with a body of Canadians and Indians form a junction with his Lordship at Alexandria. He got as far as an inn, five miles beyond Hagerstown, Md. He had an address ¹ with him from Lord Dunmore to Captain White-Eyes, which was designed to influence the Indians against the Americans in case of hostilities, by offering them the King's protection in the possession of their lands. This speech was enclosed in a letter written by Connelly ² to John Gibson, Esq., near Fort Dunmore. In this letter he tried to persuade his friend on the frontier not to cast his lot "with enthusiasts, whose ill-timed folly must draw upon them inevitable destruction." The letter and the enclosed contents fell into the hands of some Maryland Minute Men, and they arrested Connelly. He was sent to Philadelphia and confined in jail, by order of Congress, in January, 1776. He was restored to liberty, by an exchange of prisoners, in October, 1780. He immediately formed another plan on paper to attack the frontiers, possess himself of Pittsburgh, and fortify the passes of the Alleghenies with provincial troops and Indian auxiliaries. It was not acted

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 684.

² Pennsylvania Hist. Mag., vol. 12, p. 408.

upon, however, by the British. So he entered the army of Cornwallis in Virginia, and was again captured by the Americans and held as a prisoner of war until 1783, when he went to England with the defeated army of Great Britain.

The advantage to the British of an offensive and defensive alliance with the Indians, thus early perceived by Connelly and Dunmore through the exigencies of the war of 1774, became apparent to the English Ministry and the American Congress as soon as the Revolution became a fact. Scattered for 1,500 miles along the whole frontier, the savages were desirable friends or formidable enemies to either Great Britain or the Colonies. In the wars between the English and the French, it had been customary on each side to employ them as auxiliaries. In the competition for their friendship at this time, the British had great advantages. The expulsion of the French from Canada was still fresh in the memory of the Indians, and inspired ideas of martial superiority on the part of the British. By the non-importation act, the Colonies had debarred themselves from importing the articles necessary for Indian wants.¹ Since 1754, the transactions with the Indians had been mostly carried on by Superintendents (See page 5), appointed and paid by the King of Great Britain. These being under obligations to the Crown, and expecting further favors, generally used their influence with the Indians in behalf of the mother country. In Pennsylvania the deputy agent was Colonel George Croghan. Born in Ireland, but coming to Pennsylvania, he settled near the site of Harrisburg, and was an Indian trader as early as 1746. Having acquired the confidence of the Indians, he was made deputy agent under Sir Wil-

¹ The Olden Time, p. 98, Speech to Kiashuta, by Richard Butler.

liam Johnson. In 1763 he was sent to England to confer with the Ministry in relation to the Indian boundary line. Later he was sent to Illinois to pacify the Indians there. After his return, he settled at Fort Pitt, and thereafter rendered valuable service in pacifying the Indians, and conciliating them to the British interests up to the war for independence.¹ He had no great love for Connelly in 1774,² though siding with Virginia in her quarrel with Pennsylvania. St. Clair tells Governor Penn not to expect real friendship from him, "for by his interest alone he is regulated."³ In 1775 we find him at the head of the Committee of Observation for West Augusta or Fort Pitt;⁴ and at a session in April, 1776, when Alexander McKee was required to give his parole, he was still on the side of the Colonies.⁵ However, in a letter written by John Butler, Guy Johnson's deputy at Niagara and addressed to McKee, Croghan receives the compliments of the writer. His name then disappears from the records, and he died in Philadelphia, 1782.

That the Indian agents at first played a double part was more fully demonstrated in the case of Guy Johnson, the successor of Sir William, than in that of McKee and Croghan. Being citizens of the Colonies, yet employed by the King, their duplicity was natural as long as the Revolutionary movement had not assumed the form of independence. After July 4th, 1776, a double role was not tolerated—then a Tory was a traitor and a Whig a rebel. In May, 1775, the Provincial Congress addressed a letter to Guy Johnson, respecting a rumor that he intended to set the Indians upon the Americans. In his

1 Letters of Col. Croghan, Pa. Hist. Mag., vol. 15, p. 429.

2 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 507.

3 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 523.

4 Pennsylvania Associates and Militia, vol. 2, p. 731.

5 The Olden Time, p. 99.

reply, written from Fort Stanwix, he said : " I trust I shall always manifest more humanity than to promote the destruction of the innocent inhabitants, or a colony to which I have always been warmly attached—a declaration that must appear perfectly suitable to the character of a man of honor and principle."¹ Like professions were also made to the Committee of Safety of Tryon county.² At the same time, under the secret instructions of General Gage, he arranged with more than 3,000 warriors to take up the hatchet, as appears from a letter to Lord Dartmouth, written in October following.³ One might well have exclaimed with Hamlet, " Look here on this picture and on this." After enumerating his difficulties and embarrassments, he adds :

" And having then received secret instructions from General Gage, respecting the measures I had to take, I left home the last of that month (May), and by the help of a body of white men and Indians, arrived with great difficulty at Ontario, where in a little time I assembled 1,455 Indians, and adjusted matters with them in such a manner that they agreed to defend the communication and assist his Majesty's tribes in their operations. The beginning of July, I set out for this place (Montreal) with a chosen body of them, and rangers to the number of 220, not being able to get any craft or provisions for more, and arrived here the 17th of that month, and soon afterward convened a second body of the Northern confederacy, to the amount of 1,700 and upwards, who entered into the same arrangement, notwithstanding they had declined coming in some time before I gave Carleton's requisition, their minds having been corrupted by New England emissaries."

Colonel Guy Johnson, as well as General Gage and Governor Carleton, got their instructions concerning the employment of Indians from the English Government ;⁴

1 Proceedings of the N. Y. Hist. Society, p. 165.

2 American Archives, Series 4, vol. 2, p. 911.

3 Proceedings of N. Y. Hist. Society, 1845, p. 165.

4 Proceedings of the N. Y. Hist. Society, 1845, pp. 166-167 ; also, American Archives, 4th series, vol. 3, p. 6.

and, most probably, after they had already taken steps to employ them upon their own responsibility. In answer to a letter from Guy Johnson, written March 17th, 1775, concerning the management of the Indians in his Majesty's colonies. Lord Dartmouth wrote, July 5th, giving instructions to "assure them in the strongest terms of his Majesty's firm resolution to protect them, and preserve them in all their rights," and to "exert the utmost vigilance to discover whether any artifices are used to engage them in the support of the rebellious proceedings of his Majesty's subjects, to counteract such treachery, and to keep them in such a state of affection and attachment to the King as that his Majesty may rely upon their assistance in any case in which it may be necessary to require it." Nineteen days later, when news of the battle of Bunker Hill had reached London, Dartmouth writes again to Johnson. He says that "the intelligence his Majesty has received of the rebels having excited the Indians to take a part, and of their actually having engaged a body of them in arms to support their rebellion, justifies the resolution his Majesty has taken of requiring the assistance of his faithful adherents, the Six Nations." Johnson was to "lose no time in taking such steps as may induce them to take up the hatchet against his Majesty's rebellious subjects." The injunction to make haste was unnecessary, for, as we have seen, the Indian Superintendent, had already raised two large bodies of warriors, by order of General Gage. The latter, after the Americans had surprised Ticonderoga, and made incursions upon the frontiers of Quebec, wrote to Dartmouth, June 12th, that General Carleton would be justified "to raise bodies of Canadians and Indians to attack them in return; and we need not be tender of calling on the savages, as the rebels

have shown us the example, by bringing as many Indians down against us here as they could collect."¹ Lord Dunmore, too, May 1st, held out the encouraging hope to Dartmouth that he could "collect from among the Indians, negroes and other persons a force sufficient, if not to subdue the rebellion, at least to defend Government."² These letters from America concerning the employment of Indians received the endorsement of the King and his Ministry. In planning the campaign of 1776, the Indians were to constitute a part of the British army in North America,³ and Colonel Johnson was to follow the example of the rebels, reported by Gage, and engage a body of Indians by means of "a large assortment of goods for presents," to be sent out "by the first ship-of-war."

The instructions of the British Ministry to Guy Johnson, in 1775, led to the disintegration of the Iroquois confederacy. A large number of the Oneidas and Tuscaroras refused to take up the hatchet against the Americans, and thus defeated the British alliance as an act of the league. It was, therefore, resolved to let each nation engage in the war upon its own responsibility. The great council-fire, which had burned so long at Onondaga, went out, never to be rekindled. Johnson held several councils at other places now, and finally went to Montreal, accompanied by 3,000 chiefs and warriors, the most noted among whom was Joseph Brandt, or Thayendanegea. There Sir Guy Carleton and Sir Frederick Haldimand completed the work of winning the Indians of the Six Nations over to the cause of the Crown. In a speech delivered by Brandt in 1803, reviewing the services of the Six Nations in the Revolution, he said, that at Montreal

¹ American Archives, 4th series, vol. 2, p. 968.

² Ibid., vol. 3, p. 6.

³ Ibid.

the English General told them what "had befallen the King's subjects, and said, now is the time for you to help the King. The war has commenced. Assist the King now and you will find it to your advantage. Go now and fight for your possessions, and whatever you lose of your property during the war the King will make to you when peace returns. The Canghnawaga Indians then joined themselves to us. We immediately commenced in good earnest, and did our utmost during the war."¹

Brandt next visited "The Great King," as the British Monarch was styled by the Indians, arriving in London early in 1776. He probably made the visit to satisfy himself as to the wisdom of his agreement so hastily made at Montreal. What were the particular arguments addressed to the Mohawk in the British Capital, to convince him that the arms of the King would be victorious in the end, is not known. It is certain, however, that whatever doubts he may have had were effectually dispelled; since, in May following, we find him with 600 warriors at the massacre of the Cedars, where the savages, under the command of a British officer, but not within his control, murdered several American prisoners, and excited the strongest feelings of indignation in America.² Washington, July 15th, writes to the President of Congress that the inhuman treatment accorded to the American prisoners, and the murder of some of them, deserved measures of retaliation of the severest kind. Although an Indian policy had already been devised in the Colonies, it was radically modified about this time. Previously it had been one of conciliation.

The first reference in the "Journal of Congress" to

¹ Stone's Life of Brandt, vol. 1, p. 90.

² American Archives, 5th series, vol. 1, pp. 350 and 1573.

the Indians was made June 1st, 1775.¹ A petition from Fort Pitt, intimating "fears of a rupture with the Indians on account of Lord Dunmore's conduct," and desiring "commissioners from the Colony of Virginia and the Province of Pennsylvania to attend a conference of the Indians at Pittsburg, on behalf of the Colonies," was referred to the delegates of these two Colonies. A few weeks later,² information had reached Congress that Governor Carleton was "instigating the Indian Nations to take up the hatchet against them." On July 1st, it was resolved³ that in case any British agent should induce any of the Indian tribes to commit actual hostilities, the Colonies should seek to make an alliance with such tribes in opposition to the British. For the purpose therefore of closer observation and more efficient action in respect to the Indian relations, an Indian Department, with three subdivisions—a Northern, Middle and Southern—was created, July 12th,⁴ and commissioners were appointed for each. They had "power to treat with the Indians in their respective departments in the name, and in behalf, of the United Colonies, in order to preserve peace and friendship with the said Indians, and to prevent their taking any part in the present commotions." Money was appropriated to the commissioners for defraying the expense of treaties and presents; and power was given to them to arrest and take into safe custody the King's agents, or any other person whatsoever, that might be found inciting the Indians against the Colonies. The form of an address to the several tribes in all the departments was agreed upon, to be altered as occasion might require, for local adaptation. That its purpose was to

¹ Vol. 1, p. 105.

² Secret Journal, p. 19.

³ Journals of Congress, vol. 1, p. 132

⁴ Ibid, p. 151.

secure neutrality, is evident from these words : " This is a family quarrel between us and old England. You Indians are not concerned in it. We do not wish you to take up the hatchet against the King's troops. We desire you to remain at home, and not join on either side, but keep the hatchet buried deep."

No time was lost by the commissioners in the adoption of measures to carry out this policy. A council-fire was kindled by the commissioners of the Northern Department at the German Flats, for such of the Six Nations who had not followed Brandt. It continued at Albany, in the month of August, for three weeks. The address of Congress was read to them, and pronounced by them as containing " nothing but what was pleasant and good."¹ The reply, however, gave evidence that the " forked tongue " of Guy Johnson had been speaking to them. Requests were made for lands unjustly taken, to be restored by the Colonies. " If you refuse to do this," said Little Abraham, the Mohawk sachem of the Lower Castle, " we shall look upon the prospect as bad ; for, if you conquer, you will take us by the hand and pull us all off." Allusion was also made by an Oneida chief to the pending bloody and bitter controversy between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, in the territory of Wyoming. The result, however, was highly satisfactory to the commissioners, and apparently so to the Indians. Most unfortunately, the Indians on their return from Albany were seized with a malignant fever, which carried off great numbers of them. The survivors regarded it as a Divine visitation for not having joined the side of the King. The events of no distant day proved that the Albany treaty had accomplished no permanent good.

¹ Stone's Life of Brandt, vol. 1, pp. 94-104.

The same fine promises were received in October by the commissioners of the Middle Department at Pittsburg. A strict neutrality was urged upon the Indians, and they agreed to it. Yet in November following they importuned Governor Hamilton, at Detroit, for his assent to make inroads on the frontiers of Pennsylvania.¹ In July, 1776, another conference was held at Pittsburg, and neutrality promised by the Delawares, Shawanese and Mingoes.² The Iroquois, too, announced that their tribes would permit neither the Americans nor the English to march an army through their territory. Yet at the same time a party of Mingoes tried to kill the American Indian agents, and some of the Shawanese warriors journeyed down to the Cherokees and gave them the war-belt.

Whatever Congress did, therefore, in 1775, respecting Indian relations, was in the line of neutrality. It is true, Massachusetts, before the encounter at Lexington and Concord, had enlisted in its service a company of Minute Men among the Stockbridge or River Indians residing in that Colony, and had even written a letter to Rev. Samuel Kirkland, a missionary to the Indians in the western part of New York: "That you will use your influence with them to join with us in the defense of our rights; but, if you cannot prevail with them to take an active part in this glorious cause, that you will at least engage them to stand neuter, and not by any means to aid and assist our enemies."³ The Stockbridge Indians were retained in service for some time after the war began, and came down and joined the camp at Cambridge.

Outside of this act of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, no effort was made to engage the Indians in

¹ History of the Girty's, p. 37.

² American Archives, 5th series, vol. 1, p. 36.

³ Spark's Life and Writings of Washington, vol. 3, p. 495.

active service until May 25th, 1776; Congress then resolved "that it was highly expedient to engage the Indians in the service of the United Colonies;" and they empowered the Commander-in-Chief to employ in Canada and elsewhere a number not exceeding 2,000, offering them "a reward of \$100 for every commissioned officer and \$30 for every private soldier of the King's troops that they should take prisoner in the Indian country or on the frontiers of these Colonies." The Indians of Penobscot, St. John's and Nova Scotia were likewise to be taken into the service.¹ Whether any of these Eastern Indians were ever employed is not known. Washington favored their employment, as appears from his correspondence with General Schuyler, in reference to the execution of the resolutions of 1776;² and later again, when he wrote from Valley Forge, in 1778,³ for a body of 400 warriors authorized by Congress. However, he wanted them divested of the savage customs exercised in their wars against each other, and used as scouts and light troops mixed with Continental parties. Schuyler did not favor the scheme, and wanted to know where 2,000 warriors, not already in the service of the British, were to be found. He felt sure that what little aid the Americans could get from the Indians would cost more than it was worth.

Schuyler's position was proven to be correct. Even the British were greatly disappointed. Though they were successful in getting the Indians to join their armies, yet the results were not commensurate with the cost, especially when it is considered what opprobrium attached to their employment. Burgoyne's experience with them aroused the indignation of his own country. Though he

¹ Secret Journals, May 25th, June 3rd, 8th and 17th.

² Spark's Life and Writings of Washington, vol. 3, p. 406.

³ Ibid, vol. 5, p. 274.

tried to restrain the excesses and barbarities of the Indians under his command, charging them only to kill those opposing them in arms, and to spare old men, women, children and prisoners, yet friends of the Royal cause, as well as its enemies, were victims to the indiscriminate rage of the savages. It was ascertained that even the British officers were deceived by their treacherous allies into the purchase of the scalps of their own comrades.¹ Burgoyne commenced his campaign when the British Government had no more scruples in "letting loose the horrible hell-hounds of savage war," as Chat-ham said, and was fully prepared to do it. In his proclamation to the Americans, June 29th, 1777,² he says: "I have but to give stretch to the Indian forces under my direction, and they amount to thousands, to overtake the hardened enemies of Great Britain and America. I consider them the same wherever they lurk . . . The messengers of justice and of wrath wait them in the field; and devastation, famine and every concomitant horror that a reluctant, but indispensable, prosecution of military duty must occasion, will bar the way to their return." It was about the same time that the border warfare was begun on the frontiers of Pennsylvania, in pursuance of the suggestion to the Earl of Dartmouth by Governor Hamilton, in a letter written at Detroit, September 2, 1776.³ Lord George Germaine, after duly weighing Hamilton's proposition, wrote from White Hall, March 26, 1777, to Sir Guy Carleton that "it is his Majesty's resolution that the most vigorous efforts should be made, and every means employed that Providence has put into his Majesty's hands, for crushing the rebellion."⁴ He

1 Life of Brandt, vol. 1, p. 205.

2 Remembrancer, 1777, p. 211.

3 Germaine to Carleton, Michigan Pioneer Collections, vol. 9, pp. 346-47.

4 Ibid.

instructed Carleton to direct Hamilton, which was done May 21st, to assemble as many of the Indians in his district as possible, and employ them in making a diversion and exciting an alarm upon the frontiers of Pennsylvania, restraining "them from committing violence on the well-affected and inoffensive inhabitants."

Such was the Indian policy of the British Ministry when Burgoyne's savages went forth on their murderous mission, and brought disgrace and indignation upon his head. Their defeat at Oriskany, and their flight at St. Legers, contributed to the surrender of the army,¹ while the bloody tale of Jane McCrea and her companions at Fort Edward made English statesmen blush with shame.² Said Earl Chatham: "We have sullied and tarnished the armies of Britain forever, by employing savages in our service, by drawing them up in a British line, and mixing the scalping knife and tomahawk with the sword and fire-lock." Nor did the caution given to the Indians, not to slaughter the aged men, the women and children, and the unresisting prisoners, and on no account to take scalps from wounded or dying men, excuse the British Ministry. "Suppose," said Burke, "that there was a riot on Tower Hill. What would the keeper of his Majesty's lions do? Would he fling open the dens of the wild beasts and then address them thus: 'My gentle lions, my humane bears, my tender-hearted hyenas, go forth! But I exhort you, as you are Christians and members of civilized societies, to take care not to hurt any man, woman or child?'"

As to whether the Americans or the British began the movement of employing the Indians, is an unsolved question. The blame for their cruelties on the border inhabitants was laid at the door of the British Ministry by the

¹ Cobbett's Parliamentary History, vol. 19, p. 506.

² Ibid, p. 489.

Americans and by the Whigs of England.¹ Burke said, the difference between employing savages against armed and trained soldiers, as the Americans had done, referring to the Stockbridge Indians, and employing them against the unarmed, defenseless men, women and children, left those who attempted so inhuman and unequal a retaliation without excuse. Lord Germaine said he had no alternative, for "they either would have served against us, or we must have employed them." Lord North looked upon the employment of Indians as bad, but unavoidable. If censure were to be meted out by the effects produced, England would have been much more reprehensible than the Americans. But when the intent is considered, and not the success of the measure, historical justice must award to the Americans a due share of the blame.² Neither the Americans nor the English found the Indians of any use as soldiers of the line. As the British occupied the frontiers, they could use them to harass the Americans in the rear, and draw off their forces from the seaboard. As offensive allies, the Indians were therefore of the greatest importance to the British; while to the Americans, they could be of no advantage, except as neutrals. Bearing this in mind, it is readily seen why Congress made treaties of neutrality and the British sought to break them.

To defend the frontiers against the Indians thus allied with the British, and at the same time meet the calls of Congress for the war on the seaboard, was a tremendous task for the Colonies; but none were put to the test more severely than Pennsylvania, with its long line of border settlements, its boundary disputes with Connecticut and Virginia, its heterogeneous population, its voluntary

¹ Almon's Parliamentary Register, vol. 8, pp. 349-353.

² Sparks.

40 *Border Warfare in Pennsylvania.*

militia, and its conscientious scruples against war. The only other Colonies whose frontier exposure could compare with that of Pennsylvania were New York and Virginia. But while New York had its Mohawk Valley and Virginia its Ohio Valley to defend, Pennsylvania had its Delaware, Wyoming, West Branch, Juniata and Ohio Valleys to defend. While New York had its Tryon county and Virginia its West Augusta and Kentucky districts on the frontier, Pennsylvania had its Northampton, Northumberland, Bedford and Westmoreland counties. In three of these five frontier valleys of Pennsylvania there was at the outbreak of the Revolution a fierce civil strife raging.

In the North and West Branch valleys of the Susquehanna the Pennamite and Yankee war was at its height at the outbreak of the Revolution. On the 28th of September, 1775,¹ a plantation on the West Branch, about sixty miles above Sunbury, was attacked by a body of Northumberland militia, who, after killing one man and wounding several others, made prisoners of the other settlers, and conducted them to Sunbury. About the same time a number of boats trading down the North Branch from Wyoming, were attacked and plundered by the Pennamites. "Considering the most perfect union between all the Colonies necessary," Congress, November 4th,² passed resolutions urging Pennsylvania and Connecticut to take speedy measures to prevent such hostilities. The voice of Congress, however, was unheeded. By authority of Governor Penn, Colonel Plunkett, of Sunbury, was authorized to raise a force and expel the Connecticut settlers from Wyoming. When Congress heard of this movement, it again passed resolutions urging

¹ Stone's History of Wyoming, p. 187.

² Journals of Congress, vol. 1, pp. 215-216.

Pennsylvanians to refrain from hostilities until the dispute could be legally decided.¹ Colonel Plunket had already marched ; and in the closing days of December he encountered the Yankees at Nanticoke Falls. One of his men was killed by the first fire and several others wounded. Other circumstances being likewise unfavorable, he abandoned the expedition. The civil feud now ceased. Congress recommended to Connecticut not to introduce any more settlers into Wyoming : ² while the Proprietors of Pennsylvania, having lost their government, were no longer able to continue hostilities. Both Colonies laid their differences aside for the time being, and joined in the common cause of liberty.

Excepting some correspondence between Virginia and Pennsylvania at the opening of the French and Indian War, their boundary question was no cause of difference until 1774. In that year Dunmore took possession of Fort Pitt, changed the name, and made John Connelly Commander of the militia. For calling the militia to meet him early in 1774, Connelly was arrested by St. Clair, magistrate of Westmoreland county. What followed then until "the shot that was heard around the world" was fired at Lexington, can best be told from the circular issued by the delegates of the two Colonies in Congress,³ urging the people to mutual forbearance :

"We recommend it to you that all bodies of armed men, kept up by either party, be dismissed ; and that all those on either side, who are in confinement or on bail for taking part in the contest, be discharged."

There was no Colony among the thirteen that had so great a diversity of nationality and religion—elements that

¹ Journals of Congress, vol. 1, p. 279.

² Ibid, p. 283.

³ The Olden Time, vol. 1, p. 444.

go far to determine a man's attitude on any question—as Pennsylvania. The population of all the others was quite homogenous, and it was therefore comparatively easy to cement it in favor of any line of action. Not so in Pennsylvania. There were three political parties more or less defined, in the Province, in 1775 :¹ the friends of the existing Government, composed chiefly of the adherents of the Proprietaries, royalists from conscientious opinion and from religious scruples, and the greater portion of the Society of Friends ; the Revolutionary or active-movement party ; and a third class of men, earnestly devoted to the cause of the Colonies, but more or less anxious for reconciliation. The first and third were greatly in the majority. The first comprised the Quakers, who, with the Proprietary party, at that time controlled the Assembly. The Germans, from a sense of gratitude to Penn for their homes and liberties, acted with the Quakers. The third party comprised nearly all of those who were recognized as the political leaders of the day—Franklin, Dickinson, Reed, Morris, Mifflin, McKean, Clymer and others. The second class were the Scotch-Irish, but they were far removed from the seat of the Government, and before the declaration of independence had very little political influence.

The Quakers and the German sects were opposed to war on account of religious scruples. This fact had caused a bitter feeling against them on the part of the Scotch-Irish. The latter had been bred to war before they came to America, and had no patience with non-resistance, but looked upon it as cowardice. Upon coming to Pennsylvania, they soon made havoc of the Quaker peace policy. Living on the frontier, they got into endless difficulties

¹ Reed's Joseph Reed, vol. 1, p. 151.

with the Indians, and, when war broke out, they became the special victims of the tomahawk and the scalping-knife. The Quakers sought to make peace through presents, treaties and missionaries. The Scotch-Irish protested against such a weak-kneed policy, and became the enemies of the very people who had suffered them to settle in Pennsylvania. Thus there came about a mutual feeling of hatred and distrust between those who governed and those who needed the support of the Government most. When the Revolutionary movement passed from constitutional opposition against British taxation to actual war, the Quakers and the German non-resistants assumed a neutral and indifferent position, while the frontiersmen were eager for the fray. The very fact that these had not affiliated socially or politically with the ruling classes of Philadelphia, and the counties immediately around the city, left them independent. They were not bound by any personal considerations to act with those who determined the policy of the Province from 1774-1776. Three months before the first Continental Congress met, the Scotch-Irish and German borderers of Hanover, York county, resolved among other things, "that in the event of Great Britain attempting to force unjust laws upon us by the strength of arms, our cause we leave to Heaven and our rifles."¹ This action on the frontier was in strong contrast with that of the Quakers and German sects, who memorialized the Assembly to be excused from military service on the ground that the charter granted them particular immunity.² Compare it, too, with that of the Assembly at Philadelphia, whose uncertain course in 1774-1775³ gave rise to the Provincial Convention of

¹ *Pennsylvania Associators and Militia*, vol. 1, p. 271.

² *Votes of the Assembly*, vol. 6, p. 634; also, *Ibid*, p. 645.

³ *Reed's Joseph Reed*, vol. 1, p. 162.

1776, and caused its own death on the 26th of September. When "the House then rose," the sword was unsheathed; the Hanoverian resolution was put into effect against the British; and the Scotch-Irish Indian policy was practiced on the frontier:

"And when the Lord thy God shall deliver them before thee, thou shalt smite them and utterly destroy them; thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them."—Deuteronomy vii: 2.

Nor did this change of policy in reference to the enemy on the front and the enemy on the rear come any too soon. The doctrine of non-resistance had prevented the establishment of an efficient system of defense in Pennsylvania. Howe and the Indians both threatened invasion in the summer of 1776; yet there was no force to oppose either, except the old voluntary militia established through the efforts of Franklin back in 1744. The war between France and England, begun in that year, threatened to affect the Western frontier. The Delawares had just been peremptorily ordered from the Forks of the Delaware, and the wrongs of the walking purchase rankled deep in their breasts. Franklin then came forward with the famous pamphlet, "Plain Truth."¹ It was a strong plea for military defenses based on the homely saying, that "when the steed is stolen, you shut the stable door."

The first effort to enroll the Quakers in a militia had been made by Governor Evans,² but he was too imprudent to succeed. Then William Penn, Jr., in his instructions to Governor Keith,³ suggested a militia on condition of exempting the Quakers. Owing to the Governor's popularity with the Assembly, he received permission to

¹ Franklin's Works, vol. 3, p. 4.

² Pennsylvania Colony and Commonwealth, p. 43.

³ Colonial Records, vol. 3, p. 64.

establish one. In Governor Thomas' administration, when the Spanish war was on, the question again came up. The Assembly now said : "The Quakers do not (as the world is circumstanced) condemn the use of arms in others, yet are principled against it themselves." ¹ They gave him permission, in the name of the Proprietary, who was by Penn's charter ² captain-general, to organize a voluntary militia, without the aid of any laws, and without consulting the Assembly. He recruited 700 men under this arrangement, but so many indentured servants enlisted that the Assembly refused to vote supplies until these should be returned. This offer he rejected, and raised funds on the credit of the British Government. When, five years later, 1744, Franklin's "Plain Truth" created a strong sentiment in favor of locking the stable in due time, Governor Thomas proceeded to enlist men from the combatant portion of the people, and asked for no assistance from the Assembly. Franklin assisted him, and in a few days they had enrolled 10,000 volunteers. They were called Associators, from the fact that they associated for defense at public meetings; and the name was retained by the militia of Pennsylvania down through the Revolution. After the defeat of Braddock, Franklin succeeded, November 25th, 1755, in getting the Assembly to pass an act forming and disciplining a voluntary militia. ³ It was passed without much difficulty, because care had been taken to leave the Quakers and others conscientiously opposed to war at liberty. The Associators were paid out of the Provincial treasury, and were subject to the orders of the Governor. There was another class of soldiery in different parts of the Province, who,

¹ Votes of the Assembly, vol. 3, p. 362.

² Section 16.

³ Franklin's Works, vol. 3, p. 78.

"without call or authority from the Government, and without due order and direction among themselves," assembled "on any occasional alarm, whether true or false," for the defense of their homes and families against the savages.¹ They were the Rangers, and were usually mounted. They were paid, if at all, from local funds or by appropriations made after their service had been rendered. Their original duty was to range the woods for stray horses.² Such in general was the nature of the organization of the militia, not as existing in 1775, but as known in the history of the Province.

Active service among the Associators was revived by the following brief resolution of the Committee of Correspondence, passed in Philadelphia April 25th, the day following the arrival of the news from Lexington,³ namely, to "associate together, to defend with arms their property, liberty and lives against all attempts to deprive them of it." This committee, through its branches in the various counties, had already, in 1774, passed resolutions all over the Province, pledging the inhabitants to support the acts of the Continental Congress for a redress of American grievances.⁴ When peaceful measures were no longer possible, as evidenced April 19th, the tone of the resolutions changed.⁵ They "recommended to the inhabitants," of Lancaster county, for instance, "immediately to associate and provide themselves with arms and ammunition, and learn the art of military discipline to defend their just rights and privileges."⁶

On May 26th, Congress resolved that the Colonies be

1 Preamble Militia Act of 1755.

2 Votes of the Assembly, May 9th, 1724.

3 Westcott's Philadelphia, vol. 1, p. 295.

4 Pennsylvania Associators and Militia, 1775-1783.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 292.

put in a state of defense.¹ A more compact and energetic body was now required in Pennsylvania, and one that had more authority than the Committee of Correspondence. Accordingly, the Assembly, on June 30th, created the Council of Safety, which was delegated with power to call into actual service "any number of the officers and private men of the association within this Colony." On the 3rd of August it appointed a committee to prepare rules and regulations in conformity to those adopted by Congress July 18th.² All able-bodied men between 16 and 50 were to form themselves into regular companies of militia, 83 rank and file. The companies were to be formed into regiments or battalions, and all officers above the rank of captain were to be appointed by the Assemblies, or their authorized committees. People with religious scruples were "to contribute liberally in this time of unusual calamity, to the relief of their distressed brethren." One-fourth of the militia of each Colony were to serve as minute men, always ready for special call to service. Rules and regulations were published and sent to the county committees for the signatures of the Associators. But many of them refused to sign because Congress had excused persons with scruples against war.³ After some hesitancy and delay, the Assembly, November 7th,⁴ resolved that "all male white persons between the age of 16 and 50, capable of bearing arms, who do not associate for the defense of the Province, ought to pay an equivalent for the time spent by the Associators in acquiring discipline; ministers of the Gospel of all denominations and servants purchased *bona fide* for valuable consideration

¹ Journal of Congress, vol. 1, p. 99.

² Journal of Congress, vol. 1.

³ Colonial Records, vol. 10, p. 349.

⁴ Votes of the Assembly, vol. 6, p. 646.

only excepted." The county commissioners were empowered to fine the non-Associators two pounds and ten shillings annually, in addition to the ordinary tax. This provision gave infinite trouble. The fines were not paid without force in many instances.¹ The arms of non-Associators were to be surrendered for the use of the Associators, and this, too, resulted in serious conditions.²

The military association of 1775-1776 having been hastily formed, and not enacted into law, but merely called into existence by the Committee of Correspondence, and afterwards approved by resolves of the Assembly, a movement was made after the State had been formed to pass a militia law. Accordingly, on March 17, 1777, the Assembly, realizing that "the Freedom handed down by our virtuous Ancestors may be in danger of being wrested from us unless the strongest and most immediate Efforts are made for its support," passed an act to regulate the militia.³ It provided for a Lieutenant of the militia and a number of Sub-Lieutenants not exceeding five for each county, to be appointed by the President or Vice-President of the Executive Council. They were to order the constables within their counties to make a return of every male white person between the age of 18 and 53, and capable of bearing arms, excepting "delegates in Congress, members of the Executive Council, judges of the Supreme Court, masters and faculty of colleges, ministers of the Gospel and servants purchased *bona fide* and for a valuable consideration." Later, members of the Assembly were excepted, too.⁴ They were then to divide each county into districts, each to contain not less than 440 nor

1 Pennsylvania Associators, vol. 1, p. 546.

2 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 601.

3 Law Book, vol. 1, p. 97.

4 Law Book, vol. 1, p. 164.

more than 680 privates (1,000 in 1780),¹ and to sub-divide the districts into eight parts, as nearly equal as possible. This division being made, the men enrolled for militia duty in each district were to be called together by the Lieutenants to elect by ballot three field or battalion officers—Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel and Major. These were to be freeholders, but in June following² an act was passed by which they were to be selected “on the Scale of their Merits rather than of their Estates.” The inhabitants of the sub-districts were likewise to meet and elect by ballot company officers—one captain, two lieutenants, one ensign and two courtmartial men. All these were to be commissioned by the Executive Council of the State. The Lieutenants were required to cause the several companies of militia in their respective precincts to be divided by lot into eight parts, to be called classes, as nearly equal as possible, and numbered from one to eight. The whole militia was subject to be exercised in companies ten times in a year; and in battalions, twice a year. In case of absence from drill, except on account of sickness or other accident, fines were collected after the manner of any other debt.

In case of rebellion or invasion in the State, or in case Congress required assistance in the State or outside, the Executive Council could call into actual service such part of the militia as seemed necessary. The first draft was to be composed of the class number one of each company; and if that number was not sufficient, class number two was to be drawn; and so on by classes from time to time as occasion might require. Each class was liable to serve two months at a time, then to be relieved by the

¹ Law Book, vol. 1, p. 375.

² Ibid, p. 133.

class next in numerical order, the relief to arrive two days before the expiration of the two months. In case of grave necessity, the Executive Council could call out one-half of any battalion or one-half of any company without respect to the rule, unless an Indian invasion in any county made their presence at home a necessity.¹ In 1779, the Executive Council was empowered to call out any part of the militia without regard to rotation or location.² The pay and rations for actual service was the same as that of the Continental troops, to be rated at twenty miles a day until the return home. In case a man could not serve or get a substitute, he was to pay a fine—equal to the average cost of substitutes, as determined after their return. This was modified³ so as to require the payment of a definite amount at once—forty pounds—unless a substitute was produced of and belonging to the family of the man who would or could not march. Serving as a substitute did not excuse the substitute from serving in his own turn. Almoners—one in each sub-district—were appointed to look after and provide for the needs of poor families while the fathers were on their own turn of service.⁴ Subjoined to the act of organization were twenty-eight wholesome rules and regulations, by which the militia were to be governed.

On the 20th of December of the same year,⁵ 1779, after the first serious inroads of the savages on the Western frontier, an act was passed to empower certain commissioners, appointed by Congress, to take vigorous measures for the defense of the terror-stricken inhabitants in that quarter. The Lieutenants and the sub-Lieutenants of

1 Law Book, vol. 1, p. 163.

2 Ibid, p. 280.

3 Ibid, p. 163.

4 Ibid, p. 134.

5 Ibid, p. 149.

Bedford and Westmoreland counties were empowered and enjoined, if applied to by the commissioners, "to take the most speedy and effectual measures for raising and embodying, whether of classes or otherwise, such parts of the militia of their counties as shall from time to time be deemed necessary." They were to serve for two months or longer, and not again do duty for two succeeding tours, or the space of time required for any expedition upon which they might go.

In March, 1780, the Lieutenants of the several counties were authorized to raise a corps of light-horse, six privates for each battalion of infantry.¹ On the 26th of May following, still another class of military was organized, the *Pennsylvania Volunteers*.² Frequent calls of the militia had proved very inconvenient, especially in seed time and harvest. As a remedy, each and every company of militia in the State was to provide or hire two able-bodied men, not less than 18 or more than 45, to be formed into a company for the defense of the State. It was organized in June, and was to serve till January 15th, 1781, the season of the year when Indian incursions were most frequent.

As the first movement for "obstructing a communication between the Southern and Northern Governments" contemplated the raising of Tories and Indians, the demolishing of Fort Pitt and an attack of the frontier settlements in Western Pennsylvania,³ so the first alarm of an Indian war came from that quarter.⁴ It was sounded at Pittsburg May 16th, 1775, at a meeting of the inhabitants on the frontier held to approve of New England's

¹ Law Book, vol. 1, p. 376.

² Ibid, p. 390.

³ Connelly to Gage, *American Archives*, 4th series, vol. 3, p. 1661.

⁴ Augusta County (Virginia) Committee Minutes, *The Olden Time*, vol. 1, p. 273.

opposition to the "invaders of American rights and privileges." Dunmore and Connelly could not conceal their plot from those vigilant patriots, who realized even then that border warfare was to be inaugurated to engage their attention, and divert it from that interesting object of liberty and freedom. They accordingly resolved to cultivate friendship with the Indians, threatened condign punishment in case any person should take the life of a friendly Indian, and sent a petition to Congress intimating "fears of a rupture with the Indians on account of Lord Dunmore's conduct."¹ At the same time they organized independent companies, gathered up such arms and ammunition as were not employed in actual service, and wrote to the Council of Safety for powder and lead.² The frontiersmen assembled at Fort Pitt in 1775, also saw through the deep designs of the Quebec act, passed by the British Parliament the year before. This act extended the boundaries of Canada southward to the Ohio river, in defiance of the territorial claims of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York and Virginia. The territory was to be governed by a vice-roy with despotic powers; and such people as should come to live there were to have neither popular meetings, nor *habeas corpus*, nor freedom of the press.³ "This," said Lord Thurlow, "is the only sort of constitution fit for a colony." To be exposed to such a country was fraught with great danger to Western Pennsylvania. The frontiersmen realized this, and asked for support to stand "against the inroads of the savages and the militia" from the adjoining "Indian country and the Province of Quebec."

For very natural reasons, the settlements at Wyoming

¹ Journal of Congress, vol. 1, p. 105.

² Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 647.

³ Cobbett's Parliamentary History, vol. 17, p. 1361.

were also harrassed with fears of Indian outbreaks in 1775. The quarrels between the Yankees and the Pennamites made the frontier on the Susquehanna a vulnerable point. On the Western frontier we found the inhabitants of Westmoreland county arrayed against those of the district of West Augusta, and the Indians ready to pounce down upon them both. On the Northern frontier, the savages were ready to take advantage of the quarrels between the counties of Northampton and Northumberland and the township of Westmoreland. The New Englanders were situated on the very borders of the Indian towns, which spotted the upper branches of the Susquehanna, several of them being within the town of Westmoreland. The conduct of the Indians gave strong indications of hostility at the time of Colonel Plunkett's expedition.¹ The Connecticut men blamed the Pennsylvanians for intercepting Indian supplies transported up the Susquehanna, and thereby inviting an attack upon the settlement. Furthermore, Wyoming was an outpost whose isolation was complete. The distance to the nearest settlement on the Delaware or the Susquehanna was seventy miles. When, therefore, Connecticut prohibited any further emigration to Wyoming without special license from the General Assembly,² it proved to be a great hardship; for it meant that those already there would alone have to carry out the patriotic resolves of August 8th, 1775,³ and meet the attacks of the savages in the course of the war.

The year 1775 had brought nothing more serious to the frontier than rumors and suspicions of Indian attacks. The plans of Dunmore and Connelly had come to grief,

1 American Archives, Series 4, vol. 3, p. 1964.

2 Miner's History of Wyoming, p. 177.

3 Ibid, p. 165.

and the Colonies still presented an unbroken front to the British, from Georgia to New Hampshire. In 1776, the plan of the English armies was to conquer the Hudson river, and thus cut the Colonies in two. General Howe was to capture the city of New York, while General Carleton was to descend from Canada, recapture Ticonderoga, and take possession of the upper Hudson and the Mohawk. To aid in this campaign, the Indians were employed as regular troops in the British army. Guy Johnson and Brandt both had been in England in the winter of 1775-1776, and made the final arrangements for their employment. Though the Americans had succeeded, in 1775, in getting promises of neutrality, all hopes of continuing it were now dispelled; for most of the Indians that had not gone with Guy Johnson and Brandt to Canada to join the British army, gave numerous evidences of hostility to the frontier settlements.

The minutes of the Council of Safety show that as early as January 8th, 1776,¹ Colonel St. Clair and Richard Butler petitioned for the public powder then in Westmoreland county to remain there as the property of the Province, but not to be used except in the defense of the county. It is evident that the plottings of Dr. Connelly, which had just fully come to light, gave great uneasiness to the Western frontier. Of all the men in Western Pennsylvania at that time, St. Clair and Butler were best informed as to the state of that country. Arthur St. Clair came to America from Scotland in 1758, as an ensign in the British army. He served under Wolfe at Quebec. He married in Boston, and after resigning the lieutenancy, to which he had been promoted, came to Western Pennsylvania to take up some land granted to him by

¹ Colonial Records, vol. 10, p. 449.

General Gage.¹ Here he became a trusted military officer under the British, and a civil magistrate under the Penns. In the latter capacity he had entire control of local affairs in Westmoreland county, and through his zeal for Pennsylvania in the dispute with Virginia, incurred the ill-will of Lord Dunmore and Dr. Connelly. When the Revolution commenced, he sided at once with the Colonies. He was the leader of the patriots at home, and kept those in Philadelphia informed of the state of the frontier about Fort Pitt. Soon after the writing of the petition just alluded to, he was commissioned colonel in the Continental service. He rose rapidly, and became a major general. After the Revolution, he served his State in the Council of Censors and in the Congress, being President of the latter body at the time of the passage of the Ordinance of 1787. Having taken an active interest in establishing the Northwest Territory, he was made its first Governor, thus rounding out most fitly his career as a frontiersman.

Richard Butler was a native of Ireland, and came with his father to Lancaster county in 1748, and shortly afterwards to the sunset side of the Alleghenies. About 1770, he and his brother settled at Fort Pitt, and entered into partnership as Indian traders. In the troubles with Virginia, Butler espoused the cause of Pennsylvania. When the Middle Department of Indian Affairs was created by Congress, he was one of the agents of the commissioners—a position for which he was well fitted. He served with great usefulness for more than a year in this position. On July 20th, 1776, he was elected by Congress major of the battalion ordered to be raised for the defense of the Western frontiers. Major Butler soon afterwards became lieutenant colonel in Daniel Morgan's famous rifle corps,

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 10, p. 483.

which in no small degree he helped to make the finest marksmen in the world, as General Burgoyne pronounced them to be after the battle of Stillwater. After the Revolution, Butler again entered the Indian service as superintendent of the Northern District. His career ended while he was with St. Clair in his expedition against the Indians in 1791. Wounded several times in that disastrous battle on the banks of the Wabash, he was finally tomahawked by an Indian, but, before he died, put a bullet through the breast of his savage assailant.

The scarcity of powder, hinted at by St. Clair and Butler, as well as of lead, was a serious matter on the frontier. Nine days after their petition, the Council of Safety inserted the following advertisement in the newspapers of Philadelphia :¹

“Such persons as are willing to erect powder mills in this Province, within fifty miles’ distance of this city, are desired to apply to the Committee of Safety, who will lend them money on security if required for that purpose, and give them other encouragement.”

A liberal response was made to this advertisement from Philadelphia, Bucks, Chester and other counties around, and a committee was appointed for the purpose of erecting powder mills.² There was a constant demand from the frontier for powder, and jealousies arose when one county was ordered to deliver some of its stores to another. When the Committee of York county was ordered to ship some to Northampton and Northumberland for the attack on Wyoming, they said it was “a disgrace to the sons of America ! Tell it not in Gath !” that powder and lead originally destined for the defense of the whole United Colonies, should be employed in an unhappy affair be-

¹ Colonial Records, vol. 10, p. 455.

² Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 709

tween two of them. Congress needed powder at the front, the Province needed it for practice in the militia, and the frontier needed it in the preparation for defense. It was so scarce later on, that the morning and evening guns on the warships of the Delaware had to be forbidden. Cautions against waste were frequently thrown out by the Council of Safety. The mills were in constant danger, too, of being blown up by Tories, and had to be guarded by the militia. One of them did explode, and evidence of disloyal threats was brought out in the investigation.

Much of the difficulty in the supply of powder was due to a lack of knowledge in the making of saltpetre.¹ Its manufacture in Philadelphia, in 1775, was so unsuccessful that one Baltzer Monday, evidently a German, was sent down from York Town to "instruct any who may chuse to learn." York Town had also sent a saltpetre maker to Maryland; and Virginia had then not made twenty tons all told. "'Tis a shame for America," writes the York County Committee to the Council of Safety, "when we have so many people who have wrought many years at making saltpetre in Germany, and understand it as well as any of our old women making soap, that so much has been said and so little done in an article so essential to the safety of America; it is true, they are but mechanics, and don't understand theory, but let them make a sufficiency for our present wants, and let the theorists improve and amend their defects at leisure."

The scarcity of lead was even greater than that of gunpowder; for it was recommended in May, 1776, by the Council of Safety,² that all the inhabitants of Philadelphia send in all such lead as they might have in use in their families and about their houses, such as draught weights

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 668.

² Colonial Records, vol. 10, p. 558.

and window weights, also clock weights, for which iron weights could be procured to supply their private convenience. The liberal price of six pence per pound was allowed. Two years later the attention of the Supreme Executive Council was called to the existence of lead in Sinking Valley,¹ then in Bedford county, now in Blair. Some few persons had found their way to the mines, raised small quantities of ore and smelted it. The Council, acting on what are now termed "populistic" principles, seized the mines and operated them for the State. General Daniel Roberdeau, then a member of Congress from Philadelphia, but before that a brigadier general in the militia, was made superintendent of the mining operations. He received leave of absence from Congress in order to attend to this work. Fears of Indian attacks made it necessary to erect a stockade fort, and garrison it with the militia. Roberdeau stayed at the mines only a short time, leaving the direction of affairs in the hands of experienced miners. Lead was taken out for about a year; but how much is not known. The undertaking was not profitable. It proved a moth to the General's circulating cash, and obliged him to make free with a friend in borrowing. He had to ask an enormous price for the lead on account of the depreciation of Continental money, and was handicapped in the working of the mine by want of protection against the Indians.

After the application of St. Clair and Butler for powder and lead, as summer drew nearer, the people on the Western frontier became more anxious. Indian attacks were most frequent when the settlers were busy in the fields, especially in harvest time. In March, Bedford and Cumberland counties were requested by the Council of

¹ History of Juniata Valley, pp. 231-240.

Safety, "in case the inhabitants of Westmoreland were attacked by an enemy, to spare them the necessary powder belonging to the public for their defense."¹ In April Kiashuta appeared before Richard Butler (See page 27), with an invitation to come to Niagara; and McKee, the suspect, had received a request to invite all the Indians he might see to attend the meeting of the British agent. Although the old Seneca chief was warned "to hearken to no speeches that tend to disturb the peace of the country," his return from Niagara was awaited with anxiety. Kiashuta was a distinguished character among the Six Nations from the time of Washington's first visit to the Ohio, whom he accompanied from Logstown to La Boeuf. He survived all the troubles of the French war, of Pontiac's war—in which his part was so prominent that it was sometimes called Kiashuta's war—and of the Revolution. He died near Pittsburg, and left his name to the beautiful plain on the Allegheny river, where his remains now rest.² Two days after the Declaration of Independence, Kiashuta was back, and attended a meeting of the Congressional Committee for the Middle Department of Indian Affairs. He produced a belt of wampum from the Six Nations to the Delawares, Shawanese, Wyandots and other western Indians, informing them that the Six Nations would take no part in the war, and desiring them to do the same. He had authority to say that "the Six Nations would make it their business to prevent either an American or an English army passing through their country."³ As the neighboring tribes were not represented, another meeting was held near Fort Pitt in October, when these, too, offered assurances of friendship. But

¹ Colonial Records, vol. 10, p. 525.

² Craig's History of Pittsburg, p. 157.

³ The Olden Time, vol. 2, p. 112.

British influence from Detroit had to be combatted, and matters were discouraging at times. Shortly after the conference with Kiashuta, 100 men, raised in Westmoreland, were engaged for service until September 15th. The danger became so threatening, that in September Congress¹ issued an order assembling all the militia that could be spared for the defense of Fort Pitt. Powder and lead, together with 10,000 flints, were forwarded to George Morgan, the Indian agent, who succeeded Colonel Butler. The militia in Cumberland county, ready to march to the assistance of Washington in New Jersey, were held for the defense of the frontiers until further orders. However, Mr. Morgan wrote to John Hancock, November 8th, "I have the happiness to inform you that the cloud which threatened to break over us is likely to disperse." In this he was not mistaken; for, in connection with 100 militia under Major John Neville, Morgan was enabled to maintain comparative peace during the winter of 1776-1777 at and around Fort Pitt.

Morgan and Neville were two valuable men to Western Pennsylvania. The former was a resident of Fort Pitt at the close of the French and Indian war, having erected the first house with a shingle roof in the place.² Morganza marks the site of an estate which he and his brother bought later. At the time of his appointment to the Indian agency, he lived on a farm near Princeton, New Jersey. At Pittsburg he was kept in hot water all the time. That he discharged his duties to the satisfaction of the Indians was shown in 1779, when the chiefs of the Delawares sought to confer upon him the rich and fertile Sewickley "bottom,"³ in appreciation of his services in

¹ Journal of Congress, vol. 2, p. 350.

² History of Allegheny County, p. 444.

³ Ibid, Part 2nd, p. 97.

their behalf while agent at Fort Pitt. Though he could not accept the offer, it must have been gratifying to him ; for he had just been acquitted of a charge of mismanagement and disloyalty. Later, in 1780, he again was made the target of criticism, and was removed from his position.¹ Colonel Brodhead, who was then in command at Pittsburg, expressed the desire to the Executive Council that a man with not so many farms and other interests might succeed him. Farming was Colonel Morgan's delight ; for after the war he was again in New Jersey, the foremost farmer in America,² his broad fields being the admiration of travelers, and his products winning the prizes of agricultural societies.³ When Aaron Burr was on his expedition to Louisiana, he stopped with the Colonel at Morganza, and tried to persuade him to join. Both he and two of his sons attended Burr's trial at Richmond as witnesses.

John Neville was a descendant of one of the boys kidnapped in England, and brought to Virginia, in the early history of that Colony. He was in Braddock's army, and thus learned to know Western Pennsylvania. Before 1774, he had made large purchases of land on Chartier's Creek, and when the Revolution began he became a trusted patriot. The Virginia Provincial Convention ordered him, in August, 1775, to march with a company of 100 men and take possession of Fort Pitt. The Virginia and Pennsylvania delegates in Congress had recommended that "all bodies of armed men in pay of either party should be discharged." As Pennsylvania had no armed men at Fort Pitt, the arrival of Captain Neville was not

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 12, p. 249.

2 Pennsylvania Hist. Mag., vol. 12, p. 102.

3 Ibid, vol. 16, p. 171.

welcome to St. Clair,¹ especially since it was contrary to what had been recommended. But without regard to the motives of Virginia, Neville's militia was needed at Fort Pitt to counteract the scheme of Connelly, and insure the safety of the frontier inhabitants, whether Virginians or Pennsylvanians. That he acted with prudence is proved by the fact that none of the evils predicted by St. Clair, in his letter to Governor Penn, occurred. Neville retained the command of Fort Pitt until the appointment of General McIntosh by Congress, in 1778. He then served with much ability at the front, especially distinguishing himself in the Southern campaigns. At the close of the war, he returned to his estates in Allegheny county, and in 1791 was made inspector of internal revenue. In this position he bore a prominent part in the famous "Whiskey Rebellion," performing his duties loyally to the Federal Government, at the expense of his property and the peril of his life.²

On the Northumberland, or West Branch, frontier there was much less cause for fear and anxiety in 1776 than on that of Westmoreland. Fort Augusta, now Sunbury, was the headquarters of the military department of the upper Susquehanna. The first battalion of Associators was organized February 8th, 1776,³ with Samuel Hunter as Colonel. Under the militia law of 1777, he was appointed county lieutenant, and exercised authority to the close of the war. He was a native of Ireland, and is first mentioned in the history of Pennsylvania as in command of the militia at Fort Augusta, in 1763.⁴ In November following, he was commissioned captain, and served in

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 659.

2 Craig's History of Pittsburg, chapters 11-12.

3 Pennsylvania Associators, vol. 2, p. 337.

4 McGinness' History of West Branch, vol. 1, p. 284.

Bouquet's campaign the next year. He performed valuable services on the frontier, and served as a member of the Council of Censors in 1783. He died at Fort Augusta in 1784, and was buried there.

The first intimation of fear in Northumberland concerning Indian attacks was given March 13th, 1776.¹ The Committee of the county wrote to Colonel Hunter, who was then in Philadelphia for service to his country, to present their condition as a frontier county to the Council of Safety, and ask them, if more men were wanted, whether it would not be better to have two or three companies raised, officered and disciplined, and put into immediate pay; and if not wanted nearer home, to be ready wherever needed. They also complained of recruiting officers from other counties coming to that infant frontier county and draining it of its single men, who "choose rather, under pay, to have to do with a humane enemy, than, at their own expense, encounter merciless savages." Two weeks later, the Committee wrote directly to the Council of Safety. They held that the safety of the "interior parts of the Province would be better secured by adding strength to the frontiers." They also gave the Council a glimpse into their condition as frontiersmen. The people were poor, many of them had come there "bare and naked," while those who had a little property were no better off on account of the delay in cultivating a wilderness before they could have any produce to live upon. A well-disciplined militia was not possible under such conditions. Some men had to lose two days in going to muster; and not being paid for it, they could not attend regularly. In spite of these untoward circumstances, the Committee had the pleasure of informing the

¹ *Pennsylvania Associators*, vol. 2, p. 342.

Council, in June, that there were very few (if any) disabled persons amongst them, and the non-Associators very inconsiderable. The greatest difficulty in the way of defense was that they were very ill-armed, having already sent all the best arms with their men into the Continental and Provincial service.

Another matter of great anxiety to the patriots on the North Branch was the scarcity of salt. But from this the people of the whole Province suffered. The non-importation act of the first Continental Congress had caused this dilemma. So, early in June, 1776, steps were taken by the Province to establish salt works at Tom's River, New Jersey, to relieve public necessities and reduce the exorbitant price of this article.¹ In this way the Province, in November, was able to make a distribution among the counties according to their necessities. It was to be sold at fifteen shillings a bushel, and in quantities of not more than half a bushel to any one family. However, the price and quantity could not long be regulated.² The works of Tom's River proved of little account, and salt had to be procured from any source and at any price. On the frontier, it was especially hard to get. The militia that came from the back counties to the support of Washington's army at Trenton and Princeton could not be supplied with the smallest quantity.

Nothing further was said in Northumberland about fears of an Indian invasion until the close of July, when the delegates of the county to the Provincial Convention petitioned the Council of Safety for aid. A month later, John Harris wrote³ from Paxtang that the Indians were for war, as had been learned from some twenty of them,

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 771.

² Colonial Records, vol. 11, p. 41.

³ Annals of Buffalo Valley, p. 97.

who had been at Sunbury. Captain John Brady had induced a few Senecas and Monseys to come to Fort Augusta to make a treaty; but nothing was accomplished, save the partial consumption of a barrel of whiskey by the savages, and the total destruction of the rest by Brady to avoid evil consequences. One of the Indians told him he would some day rue the spilling of that barrel. Whether Brady's death in 1779 was in payment of this threatened penalty cannot be known; but, if it was, the barrel of whiskey was dearly paid for. Captain John Brady was born in Delaware, 1733, his father having emigrated from Ireland. The family removed to the Cumberland Valley, near Shippensburg, and John became a surveyor and pioneer. After marrying, he lived at Standing Stone, now Huntingdon, till 1769, when he settled on the West Branch. In 1776, he was appointed a captain in the 12th Pennsylvania, and was wounded severely at Brandywine. The Indians becoming troublesome on the Susquehanna, Washington ordered Captain Brady home to assist in the defense of the frontier. Before losing his own life, he was called upon to mourn the death of his son, James, who was killed by the Indians while he was reaping the harvest. Captain John Brady was the head of an illustrious family. Sam, the oldest of six sons, and Hugh, the youngest, both served their country well—Sam as the famous scout and Indian fighter, and Hugh as a General in the United States Army.

The first reference to Indian incursions on the records of Northampton county is found on the minutes of the Standing Committee, of August 8th, 1776, when the committeemen of each township were summoned to meet at Easton, "the 16th inst.," "to consult upon the safety of the county against incursions of the Indians."¹ On the

1 Pennsylvania Associators, vol. 2, p. 613.

day appointed it was resolved that "the militia of this county do not march to New Jersey according to the resolves of the Convention;" and further, that "a magazine of powder, lead and arms be immediately collected . . . for the defense of this county against incursions and depredations of the Indian enemy, and that the Standing Committee write to the Convention or Council of Safety for such ammunition and arms." When it had become apparent that Howe, after leaving Boston, was making New York the objective point, Congress resolved to reinforce Washington with 13,800 militia, 10,000 of whom were to form the "Flying Camp." Pennsylvania's quota was 6,000, and that of Northampton county, 346. At the time it was resolved at Easton that the militia should not march to New Jersey, the first installment was already on the way;¹ and the Provincial Convention in Philadelphia had asked Congress not to march the rest with the Flying Camp. Dangers were reported from the entire frontier of the Province. It was then that the situation at Fort Pitt began to look critical. Accordingly, on August 10th, the Provincial Convention² excused the Associators of Northumberland, Northampton, Bedford and Westmoreland counties from marching to the Jerseys until the danger from the Indians had subsided. The request of the Committee from Northampton seems to have become a popular one to make just then. On the 15th of August, the township of Albany, in Berks county, also asked that its quota for the Flying Camp be excused from marching on the pretext that the Indians were coming. The Convention tabled this request.

Northampton and Northumberland caused Wyoming no uneasiness in 1776, common interests having put a

¹ History of Lehigh and Carbon Counties, p. 13.

² Journal of Representatives and Proceedings of Committees, p. 68.

quietus on the civil feud ; but the Six Nations now began to threaten the Valley. As at Fort Pitt, the Indians committed offenses against individuals only. A person, named Wilson, was attacked and roughly handled.¹ Colonel Zebulon Butler, without any official authority, thereupon sent a messenger to the neighboring tribes to ascertain their intentions. A chief returned with the messenger. He said the Indians at the head of the Susquehanna were all one mind, and were all for peace.² He denied having had any hand in the attack upon Wilson. The messenger of Butler brought word back that the Indians were very anxious for a council-fire to be held at Wyoming. Their importunity was so pressing that Butler wrote Roger Sherman, member of Congress from Connecticut, for advice. Butler wanted Connecticut to act, because when the Indians came to Westmoreland they expected presents and hospitality from him. He had frequently given them, but found the burden too great for one man to bear. They also wanted a United States flag. They probably had sinister motives in these requests.³ The council-fire was a scheme to get into Wyoming without creating alarm, and then treacherously to destroy the settlement ; while the flag would serve as a decoy on a fitting occasion.

In September, a deputation of three chiefs arrived at Wyoming, and brought a "Talk" agreed upon by certain authorized chiefs.⁴ While it professed peaceable intentions, its tone was one of complaint. The request for a fire at Wyoming was repeated, "so that the flame and smoke may arise to the clouds." Figuratively taken,

1 American Archives, vol. 2, series 5, p. 824.

2 Ibid, p. 825.

3 Miner's History of Wyoming, p. 185.

4 Ibid, p. 186.

this was quite prophetic of the massacre of 1778. The uneasiness in Wyoming and Northampton was the result of the retreat of the American army from Canada to Crown Point. Every artifice was used by Guy Johnson and John Butler to set the Indians on the frontiers of New York and Pennsylvania. A report had reached the Wyoming Valley in August that Colonel Butler was at Oswego "with Indians and Canadians."¹

As has been seen, the burden of Indian affairs rested on Zebulon Butler. He was born in Connecticut and died at Wilkesbarre. He served in the French and Indian War, and in the expedition to Havana, and rose to be a captain in 1761. He settled in Wyoming in 1769, and led the Yankees in the war with the Pennamites. He was moderator at the town meeting of Westmoreland, August 24th, 1776, when steps were taken for the defense of Wyoming by the erection of forts—an act that aroused the insolence of the Indians who still dwelt in the valley. He was made Lieutenant Colonel of the regiment in the Connecticut Line, which contained the companies raised in Westmoreland. Butler became Colonel in March, 1778, and while on a furlough he commanded the weak garrison at Wyoming in the massacre of July. He served with distinction throughout the war; but on his arrival home was seized and without law was cast into prison for a brief time, because he threatened to set fire to a set of riotous soldiers just discharged.

With the close of the year 1776, all hope of averting war with the Indians had disappeared. The accession of the savage interest to the cause of Great Britain was now complete. It was certain that the frontier settlements would be one line of murder and conflagration. Governor Hamilton, at Detroit, to whom the entire management of

¹ Miner's History of Wyoming, p. 187.

frontier affairs had been entrusted, was ordered by Guy Carleton, October 6th, 1776, to enlist the Indians and have them ready in the spring.¹ The purpose of this attack on the frontier was to weaken the main army of the "Rebels" and facilitate the operations of Howe and Burgoyne. Hamilton was fully aware of the importance of his part and played it well. He soon acquired the hatred of the "buckskins," who held him in abhorrence and nicknamed him the "hair-buyer" general. That he deserved this name is disputed; but scalps were bought and paid for at Detroit. There is an account of an Indian, who, by dividing a large scalp into two, got \$50 for each half at Detroit.² Franklin in his list of twenty-six British atrocities,³ gives the 10th and 14th as—

"The King of England, giving audience to his Secretary of War, who presents him a schedule entitled *Account of Scalps*; which he receives very graciously."

"The commanding officer at Niagara, sitting in state, a table before him, his soldiers and savages bring him scalps of the Wyoming families and presenting them. Money on the table with which he pays for them."

It would seem that the British Government took the initiative in the matter of premiums for scalps, for it was not until 1779 that the subject was mentioned officially, in Pennsylvania at least. President Reed then inquired in a letter to Colonel Lochry, stationed at Hannastown, whether the inhabitants on the frontiers desired a reward on Indian scalps.⁴ The reply was that they favored it, as it would give spirit and alacrity to the young men and make it their interest to be constantly on the scout. But Reed got no encouragement at that time from the people

1 Haldimand MSS., Book 121 p. 3.

2 The Winning of the West, vol. 2, p. 3.

3 Franklin's Works, vol. 10, p. 73.

4 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 7, p. 362.

in Philadelphia, nor from Congress.¹ Early the next year, however, remembering with what advantage young men in former Indian wars went out in small parties to harass the enemy and strike them in their own homes, the Executive Council offered \$1,000 for every Indian scalp.² This step was undoubtedly taken, also, in view of the fact that the British had done so before. American prisoners who had been taken by the Indians and returned from Detroit and Niagara reported that rewards were paid for scalps at those places.³ It should be said that the offer of a premium for scalps was made in deference to the wishes of the distracted frontiersman at a time when there was no safety outside of the forts, when seeding and harvesting had to be done under the protection of the militia, and when Detroit and Niagara were crowded with unfortunate captives. Furthermore, the offer was practically a dead letter, for President Reed repeatedly said that it was barren of results. Nor must the fact be overlooked that Congress had not sanctioned it, and that Continental officers refused to let it go into effect where they had jurisdiction.⁴

General Carleton's injunction to Governor Hamilton to have the savages ready in the spring, was faithfully observed. Before the snow was off the ground, the war parties crossed the Ohio and fell on the Western frontier. Tories were at work, too. They sought to bring on a war with the savages by massacring friendly Indians who came to see the Indian agent.⁵ Colonel Morgan felt obliged to let these messengers sleep in his own chamber for security. The Tories on the frontier were in a posi-

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 7, p. 569.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 8, p. 167.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 12, p. 240.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 5, p. 287.

tion to do vastly more for the British cause than those in the interior. Law of any kind—civil or military—was not so readily enforced, especially around Fort Pitt, where the civil feud had not yet died out; escape from justice was more easy; intrigues could be planned with greater security; the fear from forfeiture of property in case of detection did not operate so strongly, for there was less attachment for hearth and home; while a disaffected rifleman from the frontier, fighting with the Indians, did more effective service than a Loyalist in the ranks of the British army. In fact, the Tories on the frontier were the leaders of the border warfare. They knew the Indians, their mode of warfare and their secret paths. Little wonder, therefore, that Lord Germaine was so anxious that "all such loyal subjects" should "engage in the King's service";¹ and that the arrival of McKee, Elliott and Girty at Detroit, was especially commented upon in a letter by Hamilton to General Carleton.²

By the first of April, the whole Western frontier was in consternation. Death and captivity had struck such terror in the minds of the people that most of them fled to the heart of the settlement and a greater number over the mountains.³ Archibald Lochry, the Lieutenant of Westmoreland county, quickly raised a company of rangers, else the country would have been deserted. Lochry was a pillar in Westmoreland until he was killed in the wilderness of Ohio, while on an expedition against the Indians, in 1781. He was of Scotch-Irish birth, probably born in the Octarora settlement; for in 1763 he was an ensign in the Second Battalion⁴ of the Provincial troops. While in the service on the frontier, he formed

1 Haldimand, MSS., Book 121, p. 8.

2 Ibid, Book 122, p. 35.

3 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 5, p. 344.

4 Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd Series, vol. 2, p. 614.

a desire for a home remote from the settlements, and so he took up a large tract of land between Greensburg and Ligonier. His official correspondence was dated at the "Twelve-Mile Run."

The conditions as described by Morgan and Lochry moved Congress, April 9th, to appoint an experienced officer to take command on the Western frontiers.¹ Accordingly, Brigadier-General Edward Hand was appointed and he assumed his duties June 1st. Reports of Indian atrocities were forwarded by him to the Executive Council, with the request that the militia of Westmoreland and Bedford be placed under his orders.² The matter was laid before Congress, and on August 16th, that body passed a resolution desiring the Council to give the General "such assistance from the militia of the counties of Westmoreland, Northumberland and Bedford" as he might "think necessary" to carry war into the Indian country. This was the beginning of the Indian expeditions of Pennsylvania.

Edward Hand, M. D., was a native of Ireland and came to this country as a surgeon's mate in the Royal Irish regiment, 1767. Dr. Hand was stationed at Fort Pitt until 1774, when he resigned his commission and went to Lancaster to practice medicine. He gave his allegiance to the Colonies, engaged in the manufacture of rifles³ and entered the army as Lieutenant Colonel in Thompson's famous Battalion of Riflemen. The rifle, in 1775, was used only along the frontiers of Pennsylvania and the Southern Colonies.⁴ It had been introduced into Pennsylvania about 1700 by Swiss and Palatine immigrants. The frontiersmen improved it and made out of

1 Journal of Congress, vol. 3, p. 100.

2 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 5, p. 143.

3 Pennsylvania Magazines, vol. 14, p. 333.

4 Harper's Magazine, May, 1899, The Birth of the American Army.

it a superior type of fire-arms. Over every cabin door hung a well-made and correctly-sighted rifle. As soon as a boy was big enough to level it, he was given powder and ball to shoot squirrels. The wars with the Indians taught the boys to keep cool and shoot straight under fire. These were the "expert riflemen" organized by Act of Congress, June 14th, 1775, into a corps of nine companies, from the counties of Cumberland, York, Lancaster, Northumberland, Bedford, Berks and Northampton, under the command of Colonel William Thompson of Carlisle, and Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hand of Lancaster. In one short month, the first company, Nagel's Berks County "Dutchmen," was at Cambridge, and in less than 60 days, nine companies of back-woodsmen from Pennsylvania, two from Maryland and two from Virginia—1,430 all told—were at Boston. When they made a charge or awaited one, the command—"Wait till you see the whites of their eyes"—was not necessary. For unlike the muskets and shot-guns of the New Englanders, the rifle could be relied upon to hit a man at a much greater distance. At a review, a company of these riflemen, while on a quick advance, fired their balls into objects of seven-inch diameter at a distance of 250 yards. Their shots frequently proved fatal to British officers and soldiers.¹ So frequent became the returns of British officers, pickets and artillerymen shot at long range, that Edmund Burke exclaimed in Parliament, "Your officers are swept off by the rifles if they show their noses."

These men were the flower of the frontier, "remarkably stout and hardy, many of them exceeding six feet in height." They were the first troops levied on this continent by authority of a central representative government. They were the nucleus of the American army, absolutely

¹ Thatcher's Military Journal, August 17th, 1775.

loyal to the American cause, and knowing no fatherland but the wilderness. Even their garb, patterned after that of the Indians, was distinctively American. And when Congress drew its first levies from the frontiers, it stirred into the American army the leaven that leavened the whole. But what was the gain of the Continental army was the loss of the frontier. And when England, in 1777, began to attack the rear-guard all along the line, the absence of so many of the best men belonging to it was a serious matter. It is therefore clear why Edward Hand, who had already become a brigadier general of the Riflemen, was selected to assume command at Fort Pitt. General Hand served his country to the end of the Revolution, and then resumed the practice of medicine at Lancaster. He also held a number of important civil trusts, one of which was to act as an elector for choosing the first President and Vice-President of the United States; and another to help frame the State Constitution of 1790. He died at his farm at Rockford, Lancaster county, 1802.¹

The expedition planned by Hand could not be made. He made a call for 2,000 militia, but they were not in a humor to turn out, "for this, that and a thousand reasons, which probably could not be obviated without violating the militia law and discarding many officers, the General perhaps not excepted."² There was a lack of unity between the Virginians and the Pennsylvanians, and the danger in withdrawing so many of the militia also had much to do with the failure.³ The most, therefore, that Hand could do was to protect the settlements through defensive measures. "If I can assist the inhabitants to stand their ground," he wrote, "I shall deem myself do-

1 Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, vol. 7, p. 98.

2 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 18.

3 Ibid, p. 68.

ing a great deal.”¹ The defensive measures, aside from calling out the militia and directing their movements, consisted in the erection of forts, stockades and block-houses. The Western frontier line needing protection on the north reached from the Allegheny Mountains to Kittanning, thence down the Allegheny river for forty-five miles to Pittsburg, and along the Ohio as far as the Great Kanawha.

The building of frontier forts in the Revolution was one of the valuable lessons learned in the French war. There were erected during the campaigns of 1755-58, and that of 1763, no less than 207 forts, large and small.² The chain formed two distinct barriers on the west. The outer one guarded what was the frontier against the French, along the east bank of the Ohio (Allegheny) river, from Kittanning to the southwestern corner of the Province. The inner line extending along the Blue Mountains, from the Delaware river to the Maryland line, guarded against Indian raids. Between these two chains were isolated forts at Lewistown, Shirley, Fort Littleton, Bedford, Loudon and other points. In addition to these forts, it became necessary at various points, where depredations were most frequent, to erect stockades around strongly-built farm houses and mills, or to build block-houses specially as places of safety and defense. Most of this work was done by the Province; but some of it, principally the erection of stockades and block-houses, was the result of local effort.³

At the outbreak of the Revolution, but a few of the forts erected in the French war were in a state of defense. They were Fort Pitt, Fort Ligonier, Fort Augusta, and

¹ History of Allegheny County, p. 82.

² Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania, *passim*.

³ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 2, p. 552; also, Frontier Forts, vol. 1. pp. 250, 258, 265.

others possibly that were not needed then, as the frontier had moved considerably northward and westward since 1763. The first forts of the Revolutionary period in Western Pennsylvania were erected during the time of Dunmore's war, to put a stop to the unreasonable panic that had seized the inhabitants.¹ Then there was no further occasion for such defenses, until General Hand's plan of carrying the war into the Indian country failed, and he had to be content with protective measures. Including the rehabilitation of a number of old forts—notably Fort Ligonier and Hannastown—he succeeded in putting up a large number of new forts, stockades and block-houses. Colonel Lochry, who kept a diligent watch over affairs, reported in November that the whole population north of the old Forbes Road, from the Allegheny mountains to the river, were kept close in forts and could get no subsistence from their plantations.

It was frequently the case that the settlers had to live in the forts for weeks at a time, taking their scanty household goods, farm implements and live-stock with them into the enclosure. When there was no immediate danger outside, the men, leaving the women and children inside, went to their fields in the day and returned at night, but never without their rifles close at hand. Sentinels were placed at proper places, and on the least alarm the whole company of workers repaired to their arms. The fort consisted of cabins, stockades and block-houses. A range of cabins formed at least one side of the fort, with log partitions between them. The walls on the outside were ten to twelve feet high, the slope of the roof being turned inward. The block-houses were built at the angles of the fort, and projected about two feet beyond the outer walls of the

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 4, p. 519.

like Westmoreland, had to defend itself unaided. Stockade forts were constructed hastily, and the settlers abandoned their cabins and their fields of grain, to seek refuge within these enclosures. Those who refused or neglected to avail themselves of the forts generally paid dearly for their folly.

On a Sunday morning in June, the Indians killed two men who had gone out from Ante's fort to milk the cows. The Indians had lured them into the bushes by seizing the bell-cow and holding her. This was the beginning of a series of murders that were committed incessantly to the end of the year. After the battle of Brandywine, Captain John Brady,¹ and a number of other officers from the West Branch, were ordered home by Washington to assist the inhabitants in the defense of their homes and families. It was one thing for a man in the older communities to become a soldier of the Revolution ; but quite another for the frontiersman. The latter never knew when he enlisted what evil might befall his wife and children during his absence. So it must have been a welcome order for the men from Northumberland to return and defend their homes. Colonel John Kelly, who had been ordered home before, had command on the frontier. Colonel Kelly was born in Lancaster county. In 1768, he settled in Buffalo Valley, then a part of Berks county. He was young, of great physical vigor, and bold as a lion. In 1776, he marched to the Jerseys, and won imperishable glory by cutting the girders of a bridge on Stony Creek in sight of the advancing British. After the war, he was for many years a magistrate in Union county. He died in 1832, and a monument stands on his grave in Lewisburg. Major Moses Van Campen, another frontiersman, re-

¹ See *Supra*, p. 65.

nowned for his daring, served a three months' tour with Kelly in the summer of 1777. Van Campen was of Dutch and French extract, born in New Jersey, and after living for awhile with his parents at the Delaware Water Gap, in Northampton county, came with them to the Fishing Creek, in what is now Columbia county. Getting some taste of military life in the Pennamite war of 1775, he was prepared for service in the Revolution, and marched to Boston with a regiment from Northumberland to join the Continental army. In 1778, he was taken captive, but freed himself by killing five Indians. He accompanied Sullivan's expedition the next year, and performed valiant deeds on the frontier till 1782, when he was again captured and carried to Niagara. There he was given the option between torture and death at the hands of the Indians (for he was recognized as the man who had killed so many Indians), or allegiance to the British cause. "No, sir, no—my life belongs to my country; give me the stake, the tomahawk or the scalping-knife before I will dishonor the character of an American officer." His loyalty saved him, and he became a prisoner of war. He was exchanged, and after the war removed to New York, where he died in 1849, at the age of 92.¹

Towards the close of the year, Northumberland was in dire straits. The first and second classes of the militia were on the frontier under Kelley; the Indian atrocities did not abate till after the snow had fallen;² the people could with difficulty be persuaded to return to their homes; they had no crops; they had no salt to cure their winter meats; and added to all this, the third and fourth classes of the militia were ordered to join General Wash-

¹ McGinness' History of the West Branch Valley, p. 642-656.

² Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 175.

ington at Valley Forge, but had neither arms nor blankets.¹

The first measure of defense taken by Wyoming in 1777, was to send scouts up the river to watch the Indian paths and bring intelligence. They learned that certain Tories were busy communicating with the Indians at Tioga and the British at Niagara. A party of nine men was then sent out to arrest the Tories, which they did; but Lieutenant John Jenkins and three others were captured by a band of Tories and Indians. He and two of his men were carried to Canada. There it was decided to exchange him for an Indian chief, who was a prisoner at Albany. When Jenkins came there under an Indian escort, the chief had died. The Indians would have tomahawked Jenkins if they could; but they had to release him and return without their prisoner. These were the first prisoners taken from Wyoming. But fortunately there were no murders or outrages committed on the North Branch that year. The Indians of the Six Nations may have awaited the doubtful issue of Burgoyne's campaign, or they may have tried to lull the valley into security and "reserve it as a cherished victim for another campaign."² Had they been more aggressive, the two companies in the Continental army might have been recalled, and the tale of 1778 been less horrifying. The people, however, were not idle; for they built forts upon an enlarged scale and with greater strength. They worked at them by turns; even the boys and the old men were not exempted from duty.

On the Northampton frontier, there was no border warfare in 1777. Fort Penn may have been erected then, but there is no positive evidence to that effect.³

¹ History of Juniata and Susquehanna Valleys, vol. 1, p. 106.

² Miner's History of Wyoming, p. 200.

³ Frontier Forts, vol. 1, p. 328.

Of all the dark, impenetrable clouds that passed over the American army, none so completely veiled the issues of the Revolution as the one that rested over Valley Forge in the winter of 1777-78. And it was then that the darkest, most horrible plots against the frontier were formed at Niagara and Detroit by the British and their Indian allies.¹ It was assumed, and rightly so, by Governor Hamilton that "the Rebels" would not give much attention to the frontiers since the taking of Philadelphia had called for all their available forces, "and they would scarcely send from that quarter a good officer, staunch men, or serviceable artillery." The Indians had lost enough men in 1777 "to sharpen their resentment." They brought 73 prisoners alive to Governor Hamilton and 129 scalps. He had no reason "to doubt the readiness of the chiefs for going to war in the spring, either in small parties or *en gross*." The savages met in council at Detroit, June 14th, to receive their orders.² Every tribe north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi seems to have been represented. Governor Hamilton thanked them for attending his call and assured them that he remembered the good will with which they took up their father's axe (King George's) striking as one man his enemies and theirs, forcing "them from the frontiers to the Coast, where they have fallen into the hands of the King's troops." He then told them that the British had "taken New York, Boston and Philadelphia, and driven the Rebels back wherever they dared show their faces, both by land and sea." To mix resentment with the feeling of joy which these victories would inspire in the savage breast, he told them that the King, always attentive to his dutiful children, ordered the axe to be put into

¹ Haldimand MSS., Book 122, p. 26.

² *Ibid*, pp. 54 and 75.

their hands "in order to drive the Rebels from their land, while his ships of war and his armies drove them from the sea." The Indian nations accepted the axe with great cheerfulness and unanimity; but the Delawares were not altogether to be depended on, since the chiefs present at the council could speak for only sixty of them.

Hamilton's intrigues at Detroit had become known to Congress before 1778. On November 20th, of the previous year,¹ that body, having in its possession some of his proclamations lost by the Indians where they committed their murders, concluded that he was responsible for the "barbarous and murderous warfare." They also traced the disaffection, so prevalent then in and around Fort Pitt, to his agents and emissaries. A commission was therefore appointed to repair to Fort Pitt without delay to investigate and suppress the disaffection in that quarter, and to concert with General Hand a plan to capture Detroit. This commission reported to Congress, April 27th,² and confirmed all the reports and suspicions that led to its appointment. Defensive warfare was acknowledged to be inadequate and an expedition to reduce Detroit was ordered on the 11th of June, and the Indians along the route were to be compelled to sue for peace. To facilitate the success of the expedition, and the sooner to compel the hostile tribes to cease their war on the frontier, another expedition was to be organized at Albany to chastise "that insolent and revengeful nation," the Senecas. About the same time, General Hand, to undo the mischief done by McKee, Elliott and Girty among the Delawares and Shawanese around Fort Pitt, held a conference with these nations. That he was partially successful was proven by the fact that so few Delawares had

¹ Journals of Congress, vol. 3, p. 409.

² Journals of Congress, vol. 4, p. 244.

come to Hamilton's council at Detroit. With the Shawanese, he could do but little. The three renegades, "of that horrid brood called refugees, whom the devil has long since marked as his own,"¹ had been quite successful with these, as they had serious grievances.²

It was well that Congress made this change of policy, from defensive to offensive warfare, for the Indians had come into Westmoreland county as early as April,³ attacked a company of rangers, killed nine of them, wounded the captain and took nine guns. It was a larger body of Indians than had ever before appeared at once and their attack was much more vigorous. Lieutenant Lochry predicted a general evacuation of all the posts except Fort Pitt, with the next appearance of such a body of the enemy. General Hand, having been recalled by his own request, was succeeded, at the suggestion of General Washington, by General Lochlin McIntosh, of the Georgia Line,⁴ a soldier with whom Washington parted at Valley Forge with much reluctance, as his services were sorely needed there. McIntosh did not arrive at Fort Pitt until early in August; so Congress resolved that the expedition to Detroit should be deferred for the present, but that he should proceed to destroy some of the Indian towns west of the Ohio. But this order did not change his purpose.⁵ It seems that Congress did not consider the army he could raise strong enough to undertake the reduction of Detroit. Before the expedition was planned, Washington had ordered the Eighth Pennsylvania to the assistance of General Hand. This regiment consisted of seven companies from Westmoreland and one from Bedford, and

1 History of Allegheny county, p. 84.

2 Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 14.

3 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 495.

4 Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 20.

5 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 12, p. 118.

numbered in 1778 about 340 men.¹ It was raised for the defense of the Western frontier by a resolution of Congress, passed July 15th, 1776.² But it was needed "below" soon afterwards, and in November, received orders to join Washington in New Jersey, or wherever he might be.³ One of the men wrote at the time :

"Last Evening, We Received Marching orders, Which I must say is not disagreeable to me under ye Sircumstances of ye times, for when I entered into ye Service I judged that if a necessity appeared to call us Below, it would be Don, therefore it Dont come on me By Surprise; But as Both ye officers and Men understood they Ware Raised for ye Defence of ye Western Frontiers, and their famelys and substance to be Left in so Defenceless a situation in their abstinence, seems to give Sensable trouble, altho I Hope We Will Get over it. . . . We are ill Provided for a March at this season, But there is nothing Hard under some Sircumstance. We Hope Provisions will be made for us Below. Blankets, Campe Kittles, tents, arms, Regementals, etc., that we may not Cut a Dispisable Figure, But may be Enabled to answer ye expectation of ower Countre."

The commander of the regiment at the time of its return to the frontier was Colonel David Brodhead. He was a native of New York, but his father removed to a place in Northampton county, now East Stroudsburg, Monroe county. David was twenty when the French war commenced, and probably received his first lesson in border warfare when the Indians attacked his house, in 1755. In 1771, he removed to Reading, and became a surveyor. His first duty performed in the Revolution was that of delegate to the Provincial Convention, in 1775. The next year he joined the Continental army as lieutenant colonel. After the war he held the office of

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 635.

2 Journals of Congress, vol. 1, pp. 411-419.

3 Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series, vol. 10, p. 641.

Surveyor General of the State for eleven years, and died at Milford, Pike county, 1809.¹

The advance of Colonel Brodhead's regiment towards Pittsburg began in June, but the march was interrupted by a detour up the Susquehanna to check the savages who were ravaging the West Branch and the Wyoming Valley. The command did not arrive at Fort Pitt before September. Previously to Brodhead's "late arrival," General McIntosh had been reinforced by the 13th Virginia, likewise recruited on the frontier and sent back from Valley Forge. But his entire force available for the expedition, including the militia, was only about 1,300 men. He had tried hard to have more. He resolved to break up the numerous small forts, which General Hand had been obliged to garrison, because his chief dependence was on the militia. These forts "were frequently altered, kept or evacuated, according to the humors, fears or interests of the people of most influence,"² and required a large body of militia to defend them. McIntosh also abandoned the numerous store-houses throughout the border counties, and built one general store-house in the fork of the Monongahela river, where all loads from across the mountains could be discharged without crossing any large streams. By this measure, the men that had guarded the stores became available for active duty. To guard the frontiers in his absence, he authorized the Lieutenants of Westmoreland and of several counties of Virginia, to organize a few companies of rangers; and to garrison the few remaining forts—Pitt, Hand and Randolph—he raised independent companies. Through the efforts, also, of a Congressional commission, consisting of two gentlemen from Virginia and one from Pennsylva-

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd series, vol. 10, p. 645.

² Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 24.

nia,¹ the greater part of the Delaware nation was made a close ally of the United States, and "the hatchet placed into their hands." They promised to furnish their best and most expert warriors, and a levy for two captains and sixty braves was afterwards made upon the nation. Probably the most important concession from them was the consent to march an army across their territory.²

All these preparations being made, General McIntosh opened a road to the Beaver, and erected a post with barracks and stores, upon the present site of Beaver. It was called Fort McIntosh, and was built of strong stockades, furnished with bastions, mounting one six-pounder each, and large enough for a whole regiment.³ Early in October, the headquarters of the army were removed from Fort Pitt to the new fort; but a forward movement into the Indian country was retarded by a want of supplies. A month later, cattle from over the mountains arrived, but they were poor and could not be killed for want of salt, which then cost \$20 a bushel at Fort Pitt.⁴ Being now reproached by the Delawares for his tardiness, McIntosh ordered 1,200 men to get ready to march; and on the 16th of November the movement westward began. It required the rest of the month to reach the Tuscarawas—seventy miles distant from Fort McIntosh—the "horses and cattle tiring every four or five miles." Not meeting the enemy here as he had expected, and the supplies for the winter not having reached Fort McIntosh, the General's expedition against Detroit had to be abandoned for the year 1778. He erected Fort Laurens on the Tuscarawas, and garrisoned it with 150 men, under command of Colo-

¹ Journals of Congress, vol. 4, p. 235.

² Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 25.

³ Frontier Forts, vol. 2, p. 488.

⁴ Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 27.

nel John Gibson, the same whom Doctor Connelly sought to corrupt in 1775. He was a native of Lancaster county. At the age of eighteen he accompanied Forbes' expedition, and then settled at Fort Pitt as an Indian trader. He was captured by the Indians, and saved from burning at the stake by an aged squaw. After remaining with the Indians for a number of years, he returned to Fort Pitt. He was active in securing peace with the Indians in 1774, and soon after was appointed colonel in a Continental regiment. He served with the army in New York, and in its retreat across the Jerseys. After the war he was prominent in civil life as a member of the Constitutional Convention of 1790, and judge of Allegheny county. He commanded a regiment in St. Clair's expedition, and was major general of the militia during the Whiskey Insurrection. In 1800, Jefferson appointed him Secretary of Indiana Territory, and later became its acting Governor.¹

With the remainder of his army, General McIntosh returned to Fort McIntosh, where he disbanded the militia "precipitately," for they had shown signs of mutiny. And no wonder, for, on the return, the troops had to eat roasted beef-hides that had been left to dry, so scarce were the provisions. Thirty-six hides were cut up and roasted in one night.² The Eighth Pennsylvania was assigned to Fort Pitt. The residue were divided among the principal forts, including Fort McIntosh.

An expedition of more consequence, both immediate and future, was that of George Rogers Clark. He arrived at Fort Pitt from Virginia early in 1778, authorized by Governor Patrick Henry to enlist men for a secret expedition against the Illinois country. He had sent spies

¹ History of Westmoreland County, p. 96.

² Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 28.

thither, and learned that a number of the British posts were weakly garrisoned, the troops having been withdrawn to defend Detroit and Niagara against the expeditions planned at Fort Pitt and Albany in 1777. Clark had a hard winter's work in enlisting troops for his heroic undertaking, because the backwoodsmen, ignorant of his true design, were opposed to it. So when, on May 12th, he "set sail for the falls" of the Ohio, on boats built at Fort Redstone, now Brownsville, Fayette county, he had only 180 men, but they were picked riflemen. Though Clark and all his men were in the Virginia service, some of them were Pennsylvanians at the time, and many others became such after the settlement of the boundary. General Hand furnished Clark with every necessity he wanted.¹ The result of the campaign was the reduction of the British posts between the Ohio and Mississippi rivers—Kaskaskia, St. Phillips, Vincennes and others. When the treaty of peace was made, in 1783, these posts were held by American garrisons, and the conquest of Clark helped to make the Mississippi river the western boundary of the United States. The expedition also had a salutary effect on Indian depredations, as it resulted in the capture of Hamilton the following year.

On the Northumberland frontier there was scarcely any lull in Indian ravages in the winter of 1777-1778. On the first day of the year, one of the settlers was killed and scalped two miles above Great Island, and eleven Indians were easily tracked in the snow and two of them killed.² Colonel Antes, who had built Fort Antes at the mouth of Nippenose Creek, and owned a grist mill there of great value to the people, was in command in that section. He came down to consult Colonel Hunter at Fort

¹ Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 15.

² Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 176.

Augusta, and in consequence of the fright, the fifth class of militia, which was to join the army at Valley Forge, was ordered to remain at home. These and other available forces were held in readiness for a call to arms. After the snow had disappeared in March, great uneasiness seized Northumberland. There were only two rifles and sixty muskets in the public stores of the county ; and if the sixth and seventh classes of militia would have been called out then, they could not have been armed.¹ Fortunately, there was no necessity for additional troops. When, about the first of May, the fifth class had served their two months, the sixth simply exchanged places. But now there was a scarcity of meat and flour, and provisions had to be forwarded from Lancaster and Cumberland counties.² To provide for this want in some measure, the people were asked to preserve shad and barrel them up for the use of the militia.

News was now received from Bedford and Westmoreland that the Indians had been seen there. It needed no confirmation ; for scarcely had a week passed when they commenced to kill, scalp and carry off captives on the West Branch, and classes of militia from all the battalions had to be ordered out on their respective tour of duty. The Council, still in session at Lancaster, now acted with energy and promptness. Rifles, muskets, powder, lead, flints and provisions were ordered for Northumberland from Northampton Town (Allentown), York Town, Carlisle and Lebanon ; and an appeal for help was made to Congress.³ This body had frequently drawn on the State's supplies, and it was therefore right " to depend on their issues at this time." The Council now felt certain that

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 392.

² Ibid, p. 478.

³ Ibid, p. 536.

the attack of the savages was concerted by the British, for the employment of such horrid allies was avowed in the face of the world. The Council, knowing that the border warfare was made in concert with the invaders of the eastern side of the State, felt that Pennsylvania had a claim to be supported by the force and money of the United States, as had been done lately for the Southern States.

By the close of May,¹ Colonel Hunter wrote to John Hambright, a leading citizen of Northumberland, then a member of the Executive Council at Lancaster :

“ We are really in a Melancholy situation in this county, the back inhabitants have all Evacuated their habitations and Assembled in different places. . . . It is really Distressing to see the inhabitants flying away and leaving their all, Especially the Jersey people, that came up here this last Winter and Spring, not one stays, but sets off to the Jerseys again.”

On the second of June,² he wrote to Vice-President Bryan that the people had drawn up a petition to Congress for relief, and would lay it before the Council before presenting it, for approval. The next day³ John Harris, the founder of Harrisburg, wrote to the Vice-President, from Paxton, “ I pity my bleeding Country, and am willing to assist the county of Northumberland by any means in my power.” He feared that unless something were done quickly, the people would all move off and the crops would be lost. In a short time afterwards communication between Antes' Mill and Big Island was cut off, and a bloody slaughter occurred at the present site of Williamsport,⁴ in which four men, two women, one boy and one girl were killed and scalped, and five others taken captive. All these events were but forerunners of a disaster greater

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 570.

2 Ibid, p. 573.

3 Ibid, p. 574.

4 Ibid, p. 599.

than any of them. It would seem that Colonel Hunter had a presentiment of what was soon to happen at Wyoming; for, on the 4th of July, the day after the massacre, and before he knew of it, he wrote to Vice-President Bryan, of the Council, now again in Philadelphia:¹ "Wyoming will not long be able to oppose the rapid progress of the enemy; in that case we cannot say where they will stop, and Lancaster county must soon feel their ravages."

The massacre of Wyoming was not without its premonitory signals. The wave of joy which swept over the country after Burgoyne's surrender, and lifted it out of the despair of Brandywine and Germantown, struck this beautiful valley in Pennsylvania with the sound of a roaring breaker. It was feared that the Indians released from British service in northern New York, and now under no restraint whatever, would turn their dreaded arms upon the frontiers. And where was there another settlement so exposed to, and so much hated by, the savages as Wyoming? Early in the spring of 1778, Congress was asked by the settlers for troops to defend them against the expedition that was reported to be organized against them at Niagara.² General Schuyler wrote to the Board of War on the condition of Wyoming. Ransom's and Durkee's independent companies in the Continental army plead and remonstrated that their families, left defenseless, were menaced with invasion, and that they should be returned according to the conditions of their enlistment. But all that Congress did, though it had information of its own to confirm these fears,³ was to order a

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 624.

² Journals of Congress, vol. 4, p. 113; Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 371; Stone's Life of Brandt, vol. 1, p. 304.

³ Journals of Congress, vol. 4, p. 63.

company to be enlisted from among the inhabitants, the men to find "their own arms, accoutrements and blankets." As in all other sections of the frontier, men and arms were exceedingly scarce, for the best of both had been drawn into the Continental service.

Unlike their behavior on the West Branch, the Indians committed no open acts of hostility on the North Branch until a few days before the massacre. In the month of May, scouting parties were discovered some twenty miles up the river, but they were after information rather than scalps. Soon after two Indians, once residents of Wyoming, came down with their squaws, pretending to be on a friendly visit. By freely administering rum to the visitors, it was learned that the settlement was to be cut off at an early day. This was the signal for defense. Steps were taken to form the company authorized by Congress; the people in the outer settlements fled to the forts, and letters were dispatched in great haste to the men in the Continental army, calling upon them to come home. On hearing this news, every commissioned officer, but two, resigned, and more than twenty-five men, with or without leave, left the ranks and hastened to the Valley.¹ Congress was now obliged to act. On the 23rd of June—only one week before the arrival of the Indians²—the Westmoreland companies, numbering then only 86 men, were "detached from the main army for the defense of the frontiers."

The enemy's preparation at Tioga Point to descend the river at the time of the "June fresh," was now well known. The Indians were no longer anxious to conceal their plot from the people of Wyoming; for they felt sure of their victims. The wise men of Congress had been

¹ Miner's History of Wyoming, p. 215.

² Journals of Congress, vol. 4, p. 263.

outwitted by the simple savage of the forest. While the Wyoming massacre was planning at Tioga Point, Seneca chiefs were in Philadelphia, ostensibly to negotiate a treaty, but in reality to deceive and prevent aid to Wyoming. Nor did they leave until the fatal blow had been struck.¹ On the evening of the 29th of June, or the morning of the 30th,² the enemy, consisting of 400 British provincials, including many Tories from Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York, and 600 or 700 Indians, some of whom had come from Detroit, entered the Valley of Wyoming, near its northern extremity, through a gap of the mountain. They were under the command of Colonel John Butler, of Niagara.³ Whether Brandt commanded the Indians is a disputed question.⁴ The invaders took two small forts without opposition. In this they were aided by Tories residing in that neighborhood. One of the forts was burned, and several people were killed and taken captive.

When the inhabitants below learned of the approach of the British and Indians, they assembled in Forty Fort, so called from the circumstance that, at one time in the previous troubles of the settlement, it was occupied by forty men. Colonel Zebulon Butler, then at home from the army, assumed command. The women and children were ordered into the various forts of the Valley. The militia—some three hundred—were hastily mobilized, and with these Colonel Butler marched up the Valley to meet the enemy, and soon met a party of Indian scouts, who had just murdered some settlers engaged at work in a field. After killing two of these advanced guards, his

1 Journals of Congress, vol. 4, p. 285.

2 Miner's History of Wyoming, p. 217.

3 Stone's Life of Brandt, vol. 1, p. 339.

4 Winsor's Hand-Book of the American Revolution, p. 192.

command had to fall back on Forty Fort for want of supplies.

On the 3rd of July, a council of war was convened at Forty Fort, for a request to surrender had been made twice already by the British commander. There was some hesitancy about taking the offensive just then, as reinforcements were expected. But as there was so little hope of succor now, the column of about three hundred men, old men and boys, marched from the fort. They had gone but a short distance when the three officers who had resigned from the regular army rode breathless and exhausted into Forty Fort. The privates who had started with them were still about forty miles off. Having snatched a morsel of food, they followed their gallant commander.¹ It was evident now that he had to depend on his militia alone. When he met the enemy, their line was formed "a small distance in from their camp, on a plain thinly covered with pine, shrub-oaks and undergrowth, and extending from the river to a marsh at the foot of the mountains." He formed a line of equal length, and the battle commenced. The militia bore up well at first; but, unfortunately, the Indian commander—Brandt possibly—marching through the marsh, turned their left flank, commanded by Colonel Dennison. The latter ordered his men to "fall back" to avoid capture and to reform. They mistook his order for a "retreat," and the whole line took flight. Colonel Butler rode up and down the line, calling to the boys not to leave him. But it was too late.

The battle being ended, the massacre began. The Indians threw away their rifles, rushed forward with their tomahawks, making dreadful havoc, answering cries for

¹ Miner's History of Wyoming, p. 221.

mercy with the hatchet. Less than sixty of the Spartan band escaped either the rifle or the tomahawk. Twenty-three officers fell, most of whom while trying to rally the men when the retreat began. Durkee and Ransom, the veteran captains of the Line, were among the dead. Some of the fugitives escaped by swimming the river and fleeing to the mountains; and when the news reached the lower part of the Valley, most of the women and children likewise fled to the mountains. Those who could not make their escape, sought refuge in Fort Wyoming. The Indians, whose desire for blood had been satiated, proceeded after the battle to satisfy the cravings of hunger by plundering kitchens and pantries. On the morning of the 4th, Colonel John Butler demanded the surrender of Fort Wyoming. There was not much disposition to refuse the demand, for everybody in the Valley that could get away was on the flight to the Wind Gap and Stroudsburg, some of them making their way to old Connecticut. The fugitives endured untold hardships, especially those who passed through the "Dismal Swamp," which from that time on has been known as the "Shades of Death." Some died of wounds; others perished from hunger; several children were born in the wilderness; families were broken up, and in some cases they never saw one another again. But it does not appear that anything like a massacre followed the capitulation.

This step was now promptly taken. But as Colonel John Butler insisted on an unconditional surrender of Colonel Zebulon Butler, with the fourteen Continental soldiers remaining, the heroic leader of the men of Wyoming escaped in the night and left Colonel Dennison of the militia to make terms. These stipulated that the settlers should be disarmed, their garrison demolished, but

their lives and property preserved. The losses of the Tories were to be made good. To prevent further atrocities by the Indians, all the whiskey near Forty Fort was emptied into the river. But they were so jubilant after the Yankees had marched out of the fort that they began to plunder the settlers' homes far and wide. Colonel Butler confessed that he could do nothing with the savages after such a victory. The only remedy he had was to withdraw from the valley, which he did on the 8th of July.¹ His part in this horrible affair was far less open to reproach than that of the Government of Great Britain, which employed the demons under his command. Even the Tories of Wyoming were more reprehensible than he.

Such was Colonel Hunter's presentiment, if presentiment it was. As the report of the massacre passed down the North Branch and spread up the valley of the West Branch, it caused a wild, precipitate flight, known as the "Great Runaway." On the 9th of July,² Colonel Hunter's pen was not equal to describe the situation in Northumberland. From all appearances, he felt sure that the towns of Northumberland and Sunbury would be the frontier in less than a day. That their inhabitants would make a stand, he felt sure, but how long they could hold out, was a question. Should they fail for want of assistance, the neighboring counties could find no excuse for their "breach of brotherly love, charity, and every virtue which adorns and advances the human species above the brute creation." This stirring appeal he made to the militia of Berks county. Soon other letters were written—from Paxtang, Hummelstown, Carlisle and Lancaster—all reporting the calamities of the twin branches of the Susquehanna. Wm. McClay, afterwards one of the first

¹ Miner's History of Wyoming, p. 235.

² Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 631.

United States senators from Pennsylvania, who was then a resident at Sunbury, wrote to the Executive Council in a most pitiful tone ¹

"I left Sunbury, and almost my whole property on Wednesday last. I never in my life saw such scenes of distress. The river and the roads leading down were covered with men, women and children, fleeing for their lives, many without any property at all, and none who had not left the greater part behind. In short, Northumberland county is broken up. Colonel Hunter alone remained using his utmost endeavors to rally some of the inhabitants, and to make a stand, however short, against the enemy. I left him with very few, probably not more than a hundred men on whom he can depend. Wyoming is totally abandoned. Scarce a family remained between that place and Sunbury, when I came away. The panic and flight has reached to this place (Paxtang). Many have moved even out of this township. . . . For God's sake, for the sake of the county, let Colonel Hunter be re-inforced at Sunbury. Send him but a single company, if you cannot do more. . . . The miserable example of the Wyoming people, who have come down absolutely naked among us, has operated strongly, and the cry has been, 'Let us move while we may, and let us carry some of our effects along with us.' . . . Something ought to be done for the many miserable objects that crowd the banks of this river, especially those who fled from Wyoming. They are a people you know, I did not use to love, but now I most sincerely pity their distress. . . ."

Here is a picture describing the scene near Lewisburg: ²

"I took my family safely to Sunbury, and came back in a keel-boat to secure my furniture. Just as I rounded a point above Derrstown (Lewisburg), I met the whole convoy from the forts above. Such a sight I never saw in my life. Boats, canoes, hog troughs, rafts hastily made of dry sticks, every sort of floating article had been put in requisition and were crowded with women, children and plunder. Whenever any obstruction occurred at a shoal or ripple, the women would

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 634.

² History of the Juniata and Susquehanna Valleys, vol. 1, p. 108.

leap out into the water and put their shoulders to the boat or raft and launch it again into deep water. The men came down in single file on each side of the river, to guard the women and children. The whole convoy arrived safely at Sunbury, leaving the entire range of farms on the West Branch to the ravages of the Indians."

In answer to these appeals, Colonel Brodhead, who was approaching the Standing Stone (Huntingdon) on his way to Pittsburg, was ordered to the West Branch with his regiment.¹ He was at Fort Muncy by the 24th of July. He sent a company to Penn's Valley to protect the reapers while they cut the grain. His arrival had induced great numbers of the settlers to come back and garner their grain.² This was perilous work, for the Indians fell upon the soldiers in several instances. In spite of these heroic efforts to save the harvests, the loss from the "Great Runaway" was estimated at \$200,000.

But the Eighth Regiment was under orders to go to Fort Pitt, and its good work of restoring confidence had to be handed over to others. As the murdering, pillaging and burning did not stop in the West Branch valley, Colonel Thomas Hartley's regulars from New Jersey, and a body of militia from the neighboring counties, came none too soon. He was at Sunbury by the first of August, and at Muncy by the eighth. His men continued to do duty as guards in the harvest fields, and soon encountered the savages with the same deadly results that were experienced by Brodhead's troops.³ Thomas Hartley was born on a farm in Berks county.⁴ He studied law and practiced at York when the Revolution began. He now took a prominent part in the councils of York county and joined the army in December, 1775, as Lieutenant

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 635.

² *Ibid.*, p. 660.

³ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 689.

⁴ Penna. and the Federal Constitution, pp. 733-734.

Colonel. In the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, he commanded the Pennsylvania brigade. Having been chosen to the Assembly, he resigned his command in 1779, and Congress bore testimony of the "high sense of Colonel Hartley's merit and services." He served on the Council of Censors in 1783, gave his vote in the Pennsylvania Convention for the Federal Constitution, and was a member of Congress under it until he died in York, 1800.

In September, Colonel Hartley planned an expedition up the West Branch and to Tioga (Athens), to destroy some of the villages of the Indians, and break up their places of rendezvous. Though the people had come back, the savages were still very troublesome. Among those murdered in the harvest fields since Hartley's arrival was the young hero, James Brady, son of Captain John Brady, and brother of Sam, the scout. The force under Hartley now numbered 600 militia and 100 régulars; but as he had to give ample protection to the settlers during his absence, there were only about 200 men at his disposal for the expedition. His route, beginning at Muncy, was up Lycoming creek, and thence down Towanda creek to the North Branch. The march began at 4 A. M., September 21st. Rains, swamps, mountains, defiles and rocks impeded the march. The men swam or waded the Lycoming upwards of twenty times—about as often as the railroad now crosses it. Colonel Hartley, in his report to Congress,¹ said that "the Difficulties in Crossing the Alps or passing up Kennebec could not have been greater." He found the haunts and lurking places of the savage murderers who had desolated the frontiers, and saw the huts where they had dressed and dried the scalps of women and children. On the morning of the 26th, the expedi-

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 7, p. 5.

tion met a party of Indians and killed the chief. A few miles farther on, they came upon a camp where seventy Indians had slept the night before. These all had fled, and the way to Tioga was opened. This town—Queen Esther's Town—was burned and all the villages about. If she was at Wyoming, as some historians claim, like a chafed tigress, the retribution which tradition says overtook her in Sullivan's expedition the next year,¹ must have begun now. On the 28th, Hartley crossed the river and marched towards Wyalusing, in the North Branch Valley. Here seventy of the men, "from real or pretended lameness," went into the boats; others rode on the empty pack-horses; and only about 120 men fell in the line of march. They were attacked once or twice by the Indians, but succeeded in killing ten of them, with a loss to themselves of "four killed and ten wounded." There was no further trouble encountered on the march, and the expedition arrived at Wyoming in good spirits. Here Hartley left half his force, and did all he could for the good of the settlement; but he asked Congress for a regiment of the Continental Line to march there; but his advice was not heeded. The expedition returned to Sunbury October 5th, having performed a circuit of nearly 300 miles in two weeks. The Executive Council passed a vote of thanks for the "brave and prudent conduct" of Colonel Hartley and his men, in repelling the savages and other enemies from the frontiers.²

Colonel Hartley remained on the North Branch till the close of the year; but he had to contend with a scarcity of troops. The volunteers refused to do duty longer, unless the bounty offered them when they enlisted were paid. Some of the men had paid as high as thirty pounds

¹ Stone's Life of Brandt, vol. 1, p. 340.

² Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 7, p. 81.

for their trusty rifles and they now insisted on being reimbursed. The Indians, too, continued to harass the settlers ; especially in November, when a number of murders were committed at Fort Freeland. It was, therefore, with deep regret that the people of Northumberland saw Colonel Hartley depart for another field of duty ; though he left his one hundred regulars with them. He had done more for them than had ever been done before. Their outlook for the winter was dark indeed. Grain was so dear that the poor, and they were now in the majority, could not buy it. For the high price of grain, the monopolizers and the forestallers were to blame. They were looked upon as worse enemies than the Indians or the British.¹

The border war of 1778 reached even the frontiers of Northampton county. Shortly after Colonel Butler fell upon Wyoming, news reached Fort Penn that a company of Tories and Indians had arrived in the county above the Minisinks and were massacreing "all men, women and children, even those who had been captured by them before and dismissed by them with certain badges of distinction."² Jacob Stroud begged for aid from the Lieutenant of the county, as the settlement at Fort Penn was only about sixty men strong then. Happily the danger passed by. But the Indians were a constant menace to the Delaware Valley above the Blue Mountains. Many of the people fled to New Jersey ; the militia that had been called out in July, had served their time ; and so in October,³ Colonel Stroud wrote again for help. He told the Council that the Tories were most to blame for the unhappy situation. These had their families, relatives

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 7, p. 117.

² Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 651.

³ Ibid, vol. 7, p. 63.

and correspondents in the settlements, and knew just where and when to strike at them through their savage tools. The people of Northampton were not as safe now as they were while Wyoming formed a barrier to the north. This increased danger of Indian ravages was likewise duly emphasized in the appeal for aid. But in Northampton, as elsewhere on the frontiers, help seldom came until after the interior counties themselves were in danger of attack. This was, no doubt, partly due to indifference, but mostly to the constant drainage of men and means for the Continental army. Then, too, the jealousy between Northampton and Northumberland on the one hand, and Wyoming on the other, as well as between the Westmorelanders and the Virginians, had much to do with a lack of prompt and united action against the savages. In a letter written by a gentlemen from Easton to Vice-President Bryan,¹ a month after the Wyoming massacre, he says :

“But as the late great settlement at Wyoming is now destroyed, . . . an important question will arise, wherein the interest and peace of the several states may be involved. How far encouragement or even permission for the settlement of that country again, should be allowed by any states, collectively or disjunctively, under color of making settlements, or regaining possession of lands upon any particular claim or right.”

It will be remembered, too, what Wm. McClay wrote about the people of Wyoming at the time of the “Big Runaway.” (See p. 98).

When the year 1779 opened, not much had been accomplished in the way of carrying the border war into the Indian country. Colonel Gibson, at Fort Laurens, occupied the most advanced point reached. However, his

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 6, p. 720.

presence in the Indian country did not prevent the treacherous Delawares and Mingoes under Simon Girty, from killing some of the soldiers who had brought him supplies from Fort Pitt. A party from the fort had gone out for wood, and they were all killed in sight of the fort except two who were made captives. These things happened in January. Becoming emboldened, the savages next besieged the fort, and only withdrew because their own supplies gave out. Before they had left, a messenger managed to steal through their lines and informed General McIntosh at Fort Pitt of the critical situation at Fort Laurens. He quickly raised a force of 200 militia west of the mountains, and with these and the Continental troops at Fort Pitt, he set out for Fort Laurens and arrived there on the 23rd of March to find the enemy gone; but a salute fired by the garrison frightened the pack horses, causing them to break loose and scatter the provisions in the forest. This was a severe loss. The men in the fort had subsisted on raw hides and roots for nearly a week. McIntosh had planned to march to Sandusky and destroy the towns of the Wyandots; but the ground being wet and provisions scarce, he had to abandon the project and return to Fort McIntosh, leaving a small garrison at Fort Laurens.¹

The Georgia General had previously asked to be relieved of the command of the Western department,² and General Washington designated Colonel Brodhead to succeed him. Colonel Lochry, May 1,³ wrote to President Reed, that not less than forty people had been killed, wounded and captured that spring, and that the enemy had killed people within three hundred yards off Hannas-

1 Washington-Irvine Correspondence, pp. 31-33.

2 Journals of Congress, February 20th, 1779.

3 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 7, p. 362.

stances will permit.”¹ He estimated the whole number of warriors in the Six Nations, including the Tories, who had joined them, at 3,000. To these he added what aid they might be able to get from Canada, and the British forts on the frontiers. To meet them, a force of about 4,000 would be needed, he thought. The plan of campaign involved a combined movement of two divisions—one from Pennsylvania up the Susquehanna to the Tioga river, under General Sullivan as chief in command, and one from New York, under General Clinton, to form a junction with Sullivan. The expedition was to be the principal campaign of 1779,² and the one most promising of success. General Gates was Washington’s choice for the command; but he declined, saying that the man to take it “should enjoy youth and health.”

Washington had at first also included in his plan an expedition under General Brodhead from Fort Pitt. It was to move from Kittanning up the Allegheny, and co-operate with Sullivan as circumstances might permit. In closing his instructions to Brodhead, Washington gives us another view into the unhappy divisions that still existed at Fort Pitt between the Pennsylvanians and the Virginians.³ It had jeopardized the success of former operations in that quarter, and Washington was therefore anxious that his General should not interest himself in it. The same caution was given by President Reed, about a month later, to Colonel Hunter, who in this time of common danger was to cultivate harmony with the people of Wyoming, leaving the unhappy disputes to be settled some other time.⁴ But the idea of attempting a co-operation between the troops at Fort Pitt and the armies mov-

¹ Writings of Geo. Washington, vol. 7, p. 354.

² Ibid, p. 402.

³ Ibid, p. 372.

⁴ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 7, p. 317.

ing from other quarters against the Six Nations was abandoned in April.¹ Brodhead was to await the result of Sullivan's expedition, and in the meantime get ready for a similar enterprise against Detroit. The commander at Fort Pitt first gave necessary relief to Fort Laurens, for the post had been subsisting on herbs, salt and cow-hides. He sent out some good, wholesome food, and plenty of strong whiskey. But in spite of all these efforts to maintain a fort in the Indian country, it had to be abandoned in August; for it was once more threatened by a large force of Indians. It was never again garrisoned, nor was it destroyed during the war.²

To give some relief to the people of Westmoreland and Bedford, Brodhead got permission from Washington to conduct an expedition up the Allegheny into the country of the Senecas. Kittanning had previously been strengthened by means of Fort Armstrong; and Captain Sam Brady, of the Eighth Pennsylvania, had made a successful raid into the country above. Captain Brady was the son of Colonel John Brady. He was cradled among the dangers of frontier life, passed through many conflicts with the Indians, and had several hairbreadth escapes from death. He was but nineteen when he entered the army at Boston, and won for himself a first lieutenancy. In 1779, he was brevetted captain and ordered to join General Brodhead. He remained in the service to the close of the war. The Indian party whom Captain Brady followed from Kittanning had killed a soldier, a woman and four children, and taken two children captive. He killed their captain, retook their plunder, and rescued the two children. It was this daring deed that lent hope to Colonel Brodhead's enterprise. After collecting all the

1 Washington's Writings, vol. 7, p. 410.

2 Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 38.

available forces at Fort Pitt—friendly Delawares, militia and regulars, about 600 men rank and file—Brodhead, with Colonel Gibson second in command, advanced on the 11th of August up the Allegheny. Above the mouth of the Mahoning, the advance guard fell in with thirty or forty warriors, coming down the river in seven canoes. A sharp contest ensued, which resulted in the defeat of the Indians and the capture of their canoes. The expedition then moved to within four miles of the State line, but found most of the Indian towns evacuated. Brodhead's troops burned every one of them, laid waste many acres of corn, and secured much valuable booty. Returning, they took the Venango road, and arrived at Fort Pitt September 14th, without the loss of a man.¹ Brodhead received a vote of thanks from Congress for his successful enterprise.²

Naturally, the success of the expedition into the Seneca country made the commander at Fort Pitt anxious to proceed against Detroit. But he had no orders to that effect, and could get none; ³ for Washington was not able to send him the men and supplies for such an expedition. The fact was, that the men already in Brodhead's command were naked and shoeless. Nor was there any immediate necessity for the expedition, since the Western frontier enjoyed comparative quiet the rest of the year. It seems, however, that the lull was productive of a dispute between Colonel Brodhead and the Lieutenant of Westmoreland county. Congress, in the spring, had ordered five companies of rangers to be raised in the frontier counties—"good woodsmen, and eager to revenge the

¹ *The Olden Time*, vol. 2, p. 305.

² *Journal of Congress*, vol. 5, p. 296.

³ *Washington's Writings*, vol. 8, p. 150.

barbarities they had sustained from the savages." ¹ The two companies from Westmoreland went with Brodhead's expedition, and when he returned to Fort Pitt he kept them there in the barracks. Lochry wanted them at Han-nastown, and, as the captain of one of them was his son-in-law, ² the latter left his post without Brodhead's permission. Some of these rangers enlisted in the Eighth Pennsylvania, and this, too, gave rise to a dispute between these gentlemen. Though the matter did not amount to much, yet it was the beginning of more serious dissensions in the future. ³

It seems that the inferior officers and private soldiers at Fort Pitt also had difficulties to contend with at the close of the year. The depreciation of paper money had become a serious burden to them, as well as to the whole country. Even the Indians would not accept it. Pennsylvania had tried every remedy but the right one to lessen its evil effects. The only expedient that seemed natural to adopt was to prohibit excessive prices. Every township and county had its committee of prices, a scale of prices having been authorized and published, and a person offering or giving an extravagant price was to be summoned for a hearing. ⁴ But the traders on the frontiers paid no attention to these regulations; and so the officers of the line and staff at Fort Pitt held a meeting, and appointed a committee to investigate the regulations adopted "down the country," and thus force the traders to sell at the same prices, on penalty of being expelled from the country west of the Allegheny mountains. ⁵

The impossibility of an expedition against Detroit,

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 7, p. 664.

2 Ibid, vol. 8, p. 40.

3 Ibid, p. 109.

4 Ibid, vol. 8, p. 250.

5 Pennsylvania Packet, June 1st, 1779.

though a great disappointment to Brodhead, is evident from the difficulties that attended the organization of Sullivan's. In July,¹ General Washington wrote to the Executive Council that he feared the troops requested of Pennsylvania would not be furnished, and entreats in the most pressing terms that the Council forward their quota. It was not in his power to send a greater Continental force. He had "stretched this string as hard as it will possibly bear." General Sullivan had made Easton his headquarters, and had expected to march the army for Wyoming the first week in June,² but he did not start until the 18th. He had to get warrants from the Council to procure wagons and horses; for Pennsylvania had a law by which wagon-masters were appointed in each county, subordinate to a wagon-master general, who received his orders from the Executive Council.³ As this was a more roundabout method than impressment, there was much delay in getting the transportation train under way. Sullivan procured a hundred wagons and teams in Bucks and Northampton counties. These were used to haul the stores to Middletown on the Susquehanna, whence they were to be transported up the North Branch in boats. The demand for these wagons and boats had much to do with the failure to raise the ranging companies intended for Sullivan; for the expedition was under the authority of Congress, and the latter paid more for the service of transportation than Pennsylvania offered for military duty.⁴

Having provided transportation for the stores, Sullivan marched out of Easton, June 18th, with a force of 2,500 men, but the rangers of Pennsylvania had not joined

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 7, p. 539.

² *Ibid.*, p. 450.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 427.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 458.

him,¹ nor were "any about to do it." On the 23rd, the army arrived at Wyoming by way of the Wind Gap and the Pocono Mountain, passing over the most barren country ever seen by a man from the Granite State even.² Wyoming's massacre was then a year old, and the story of its horrors, the charred remains of its houses, and the two hundred and fifty widows of its slain defenders, nerved and strengthened the men for the campaign before them. A stay of more than a month was made here to await the arrival of the provisions and the military stores. The fleet that brought these came up the North Branch, July 24th, 134 boats strong, and was saluted by thirteen guns from the garrison at Wyoming.

The British had not failed to note the movements of this large army. Before it left Wyoming, attacks were made by strong bodies of Indians and British to the right and to the left of it. To the right of it, Captain Brandt, the Mohawk Chief, with some 60 Indians, and 30 Tories disguised as Indians—which was a very common practice with the Loyalists when acting with the savages—made an incursion into the Delaware Valley.³ Though the battle that ensued occurred at Minisink, in New York, yet it was just across the border from the Minisinks in Pennsylvania, and many of the fugitives made their escape to the latter place. The Lieutenant of Northampton county at once notified the Executive Council, and hurriedly ordered out the militia. The Council promptly forwarded powder and lead; but the militia was slow to respond. Colonel Stroud, of Fort Penn, was expected to defend the settlements above the Delaware Water Gap. But the Lieutenant of Northampton county failed to supply him

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 7, p. 568.

2 General Sullivan's Indian Expedition, p. 181.

3 Stone's Life of Brandt, vol. 1, p. 415.

with troops. So he took steps of his own to collect soldiers, and then came a clash, which had to be investigated by the Executive Council.¹ The trouble was the same as elsewhere—the people not immediately exposed to the attacks of the Indians thought themselves safe, and did not answer the call as they should have done. President Reed, however, lost none of his faith in the militia. He said, “It was to this force, and not to standing troops or volunteer companies raised for a few months and stationed in forts, that New England delivered herself from the most horrible Indian wars.” But he forgot that the people of his State had never had a compulsory militia law before the Revolution, and that their training in answering to calls was therefore not calculated to make them prompt now. Fortunately, Northampton county was not visited by Brandt. He had to retrace his footsteps to protect his own home, for General Sullivan would not allow himself to be turned aside.

To the right, in Northumberland county, the same tactics were employed to divide or turn back the expedition. The first attack was made upon Fort Freeland, 15 miles from Northumberland. It was surrounded on the morning of July 28th, by about 300 British and Indians under Captain McDonald. There were twenty-one men in the fort, and some women and children. The women at once began to run their spoons and plates into bullets; but the men had to surrender. However, to the presence of Sullivan at Wyoming, no doubt was due the favorable condition that the old men, women and children should be set free. In this way, one lad of sixteen was able to avoid captivity by quickly putting on his mother's clothes. A party sent from Northumberland² to succor

¹ *Frontier Forts*, vol. 1, pp. 341-345.

² *Pennsylvania Archives*, vol. 7, p. 589.

the garrison at Freeland's was met by a superior force and lost the captain and twelve men, killed and scalped. Again the situation in Northumberland beggared description, not a single inhabitant being north of Northumberland Town.¹ But Sullivan, though appealed to by Colonel Hunter for help, would not "answer the intention of the enemy and destroy the grand object of this expedition." "Tomorrow morning," he wrote on the 30th of July, "the army moves from Wyoming and by carrying the war into the Indian country, it will certainly draw them out of yours." General Sullivan might have had more sympathy if Pennsylvania had furnished the troops Congress had asked for. Since she did not furnish them, he concluded she certainly would be able to defend her frontiers without much inconvenience.²

Sullivan was correct ; for as soon as his drums and fifes had played in sprightly unison and reveille—

"Don't you hear your General say,
Strike your tents and march away?"

Captain McDonald fled as precipitately from the frontiers of Northumberland as Brandt from the Valley of the Delaware. The expedition, with its pack horses and cattle, moved out of Wyoming the last day of July, passing many houses and farms ruined and laid waste by the enemy soon to be encountered. The artillery followed in boats, 120 in number and forming a line nearly two miles long. The army reached Tioga Flats on the 11th of August, and General Clinton formed a junction with it on the 22nd. Clinton likewise had met with disappointment in not getting as many troops as he had expected. The Oneidas and some Onondagas had volunteered to

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 7, p. 593.

² Ibid, p. 594.

join him, but at the last moment they received a warning from General Haldimand, that he would let loose upon them such a number of his Indian allies as would convince them of their folly when too late.¹ After erecting a strong stockade at Tioga Plains, and stationing a garrison in it, General Sullivan slowly moved up the Chemung to give battle to the enemy at Newtown, the site of Elmira now. Brandt commanded the Indians, and Colonel John Butler the British and Tories. They were entrenched behind breastworks half a mile long and difficult of approach. Their works were masked by shrubs stuck in the ground, as if still growing. They contested their position bravely, but were compelled to break and flee. It was the 28th of August. The fields were ripe with corn, squashes, beans, potatoes and other vegetables. These were destroyed wherever found. Immense orchards of peach trees were laid waste, and the whole Indian country of the Lake region, including some forty towns, was laid in ashes. One whole month was devoted to the work of devastation, which had been enjoined upon Sullivan in Washington's instruction. On the 5th of October the whole army, except the pack horses and their attendants, embarked in boats and floated merrily down the Susquehanna to Wyoming, where they arrived on the 8th of October, and were feasted for two days on venison and turkey. In spite of the fact that Congress had found fault with Sullivan for having requested an unreasonable amount of provisions,² the troops had been on half rations for some time.³ The sumptuous feast at Wyoming was therefore badly needed for the march to Easton, where they completed their victorious expedition, October 15th.

1 Stone's *Life of Brandt*, vol. 2, p. 8.

2 *Journal of Congress*, vol. 5, p. 252.

3 General Sullivan's *Indian Expedition*, p. 167.

The day before Congress had passed a resolution thanking General Sullivan and his army for their important services, and setting apart a day of general thanksgiving in the United States.¹

The expedition of Sullivan and that of Brodhead, together with the surrender of Hamilton to Clark in the same year, marked the high tide of border warfare in Pennsylvania. When Governor Hamilton had learned of Clark's success in 1778, he at once started out with a little army of 500 British, Tories and Indians and marched through the forest to Vincennes. Taking possession of it, he spent the winter making alliances with the Indians. But late in February the crafty Virginian appeared before Vincennes, and after getting willing possession of the town, forced Governor Hamilton to surrender. Instead of having the carnival of burning and scalping which he had planned for the summer, the cruel Britisher went to Virginia, a prisoner of war, to be exchanged in New York and allowed to return to England, March 10, 1781.² His successor at Detroit was DePeyster, who was more humane than Hamilton, for he told the Delawares, when later they joined the British cause, that he preferred *live meat* (meaning prisoners) to *scalps*.

Though the expeditions of 1779 put an end to organized Indian invasions, they did not stop the depredations of isolated bands. So exasperating did these again become that the year 1780 marks the time when premiums for scalps were offered by the authorities of Pennsylvania. On the Western frontier the attacks began as early as the middle of March, on the Ohio south of Pittsburg; and by May they had reached Westmoreland.³ Most of the in-

1 Journals of Congress, p. 289.

2 Haldimand MSS., Book 123, p. 53.

3 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 8, p. 246.

habitants were again in the forts, and the work in the fields had to be done with guns close at hand. Ranging companies were organized at the expense of the people, who subscribed liberally. But a great scarcity of powder existed. Some that had been sent was damaged in the carriage over the mountains, and what was received in good order was accompanied with a request to use sparingly, as the lower counties were heavily taxed and it was necessary to convince them that care and prudence would be exercised. Moreover, help of any kind was not to be expected from Philadelphia in the summer of 1780. The British were in New Jersey, scarce two days' journey away, and Washington required the support of Eastern Pennsylvania, lest the consequences of an accident might be fatal to the city.¹ It is therefore not surprising that the calls from the frontier were loud and impatient. They came from Huntingdon² and Bedford,³ where the presence of the Indians was a greater menace even than in Westmoreland; for the preparations to meet them were not so extensive. Huntingdon had only four or five pack horses and wanted two or three beef cattle "drove down" from Bedford; while Bedford had four horses and wanted six more, one driver, and a supply of forage.⁴ No wonder President Reed wrote to Colonel Piper, Lieutenant of Bedford county, that the public business was sometimes delayed a whole day while members of the Council were employed in looking for horses and wagons.

On the 10th of July, to give relief to the Western country, Colonel Brodhead informed the Lieutenants of his department that he would make an attack upon the Wyandots upon the Sandusky. But before he was ready

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 8, p. 318.

² Ibid, p. 278.

³ Ibid, p. 297.

⁴ Ibid, p. 350.

news arrived that a body of thirty of their warriors had attacked the settlements southwest of Fort Pitt. He sent a detachment down the river to intercept the savages. The movement was successful, for the whole party were killed, but not before some unsuspecting harvesters had been surprised and shot.¹ This affair made Brodhead all the more anxious to proceed to Sandusky. But he had only one day's allowance of bread and three or four of beef, and the conflicting authority of Pennsylvania and Virginia made it difficult to get supplies.² The time for starting to the Sandusky was now postponed until October; but when that time had arrived, all hope of the expedition was abandoned.³ Brodhead deeply lamented the failure to "retaliate on the hell-hounds of the forest." However, he felt that the blame did not lie at his door. "The want of provisions," wrote Washington, "is a clog to our operations in every quarter."⁴ Added to his chagrin, the Colonel was much annoyed by the disaffection of the inhabitants west of the mountains. They often drank the health of George III, and seemed to desire the removal of the Continental troops to give them a chance to submit to the British Government.⁵

On the Northumberland frontier there were fewer depredations committed in 1780 than in the years before; but they were sufficient in number to keep the people in daily fear. The German regiment was stationed in the valley, but it did not seem to be of much account,⁶ for they would not stir a foot off their posts without some other support. The Indians made their appearance in

1 Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 48.

2 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 8, p. 536.

3 The Olden Time, vol. 2, p. 375.

4 Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 49.

5 The Olden Time, vol. 2, p. 378.

6 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 8, pp. 156, 157 and 172.

April,¹ coming as far down even as Colonel Hunter's plantation, fifteen miles from Sunbury. Here they killed a man and child and carried off a woman. Northumberland Town was almost abandoned, and there was danger of another "Runaway." During the summer the usual appeals for help were sent to Philadelphia, and several companies of militia from the nearby counties were ordered into Northumberland. In September² a large body of Indians appeared at Fort Rice, which had been put up the fall before by the Pennsylvania Germans and occupied by them. These having now been withdrawn, the Indians thought it a favorable chance to attack the fort. Colonel Kelley was first ordered to relieve the small garrison; but when he got there the enemy had gone off to set fire to the barns and grain-stacks in the valley. Learning that there were some two or three hundred Indians, General Potter, who was then home from Camp, marched to Muncy Hill. But the wily savages, having accomplished their work of ruin, escaped with but one scalp and one prisoner, but with a large number of horses and cattle.

General Potter,³ born in Ireland, was the son of the first Sheriff of Cumberland county, served in the French war as lieutenant, and pursued the Indians who had killed school-master Brown and his ten pupils near the present site of Greencastle. When the Revolution made it necessary for the Associators to organize, he became Colonel of the Upper Battalion of Northumberland county. He commanded the men of his county at Trenton and Princeton, and was a brigadier-general at Brandywine and Germantown. In 1778 he was at his home in

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 8, p. 156.

² Ibid, p. 567.

³ Pennsylvania Mag., vol. 8, p. 563.

Penn's Valley on account of his wife's sickness and assisted in repelling the savages. He held important State offices after the war and died on his large estate in Penn's Valley, 1784, being a member of the Council of Censors at the time of his death.

The Indian invasions made so early on the frontiers of Northumberland were a part of a general movement that proceeded from Niagara. It fell heaviest upon New York,¹ however, where one of the first things done by Brandt was to fulfill the threat of Sir Frederick Haldimand against the Oneidas. It had been a very severe winter, so cold that in New York harbor cannon were wheeled on the ice from Staten Island to the city. The Indians who had been driven from their comfortable homes in the lake region of New York suffered greatly in their narrow and crowded quarters at Niagara.² Spring therefore was welcomed by them that they might satisfy their thirst for revenge. They probably, and correctly so, counted on a feeling of security on the frontiers after Sullivan's Expedition. The first news from the North Branch concerning Indian attacks reached Philadelphia through the military commanders of Northumberland county.³ Then Colonel Stroud of Northampton informed the Council of the distress which "the unexpected and cruel invasion of the savages had occasioned."⁴ About the middle of April he reported that two men had been captured a few miles from his house, up the Delaware, and that the inhabitants were fleeing below the mountains towards Easton, Bethlehem and Nazareth. The reports from Wyoming, or the North Branch, had not been exaggerated. One of the first captives made by the

1 Stone's Life of Brandt, vol. 2, chapter 2, *passim*.

2 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 8, p. 591.

3 Ibid, pp. 157-171.

4 Ibid, p. 176.

Indians was a man who had escaped from Queen Esther's ring of murderous torture, 1778.¹ He was a prize of more than ordinary value. After committing various outrages in the very heart of the settlement, they pushed down to Fishing Creek, where they took the famous Moses Van Campen prisoner, after scalping his father, brother and uncle. There were at this time only about 120 men at Wyoming, the consolidated independent companies and a detachment of the German regiment. These were distributed among the forts and in scouting parties. While they gave comparative security, they were not able to keep the savages from going around the settlements and penetrating even beyond the Blue Mountains. A party of Indians murdered a man and his three children on the Schuylkill, 33 miles north of Reading; ² at Tunkhannock, some booty was received that was supposed to have been taken at Fort Allen, below the Lehigh Water Gap; while a man and his daughter were captured near Mauch Chunk and carried to Niagara.³ Under these common dangers and sufferings, it would not seem possible for the territorial bitterness to come to the surface; yet such was the case.⁴ Colonel Hunter, by order of President Reed,⁵ had stopped some supplies on their way up the Susquehanna to Wyoming, while "jealousy and discontent" broke out between the soldiers from the lower counties of Pennsylvania and those of Wyoming. Congress therefore ordered that Washington should station a garrison at Wyoming, to consist of troops "not belonging to the Line of Pennsylvania or Connecticut, or citizens of either of said States."

1 Miner's History of Wyoming, p. 278.

2 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 8, p. 529.

3 Miner's History of Wyoming, p. 286.

4 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 8, p. 649.

5 Ibid, p. 717.

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New Year's sun in 1781 was veiled heavily, though before the close of the year Cornwallis had surrendered at York Town. The mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line at Morristown was evidence of the complete exhaustion of material resources for the Revolution. But none of the States had been so thoroughly drained as Pennsylvania. This State had not only been the residence of Congress, with all their train of attendants and officers, but also of all the military mechanism of the United States. From hence the quartermaster principally drew his wagons, his horses, his camp equipage of all kinds—besides a great number of wagoners and artificers. Prisoners of war and state had been largely the inheritance of Pennsylvania. All this was done at great expense to the State, and burdened it with a heavy load of debt. The substance of the people had been used, but in its place they had nothing but money made of rags. Such was the condition of Pennsylvania when Congress made its requisition for supplies, in 1781, an amount equal to eleven years' taxes and all the other income of the State.¹ It is not surprising, therefore, that the demands from the frontiers were harder to meet now than ever. In the very first letter of the year, received by President Reed from Colonel Brodhead, the latter had to apologize for his "tale of misfortune."² He had to send to Virginia for cattle, and Governor Jefferson had bought up all the flour in Pennsylvania west of the mountains. Scarcely a pound of either was left for the regulars at Fort Pitt, who, besides having scant rations, were almost naked, and would soon not have a rag to cover their nakedness. At the same time a grand council of British and Indians was in session at Detroit, planning a descent upon Western Pennsylvania. Money,

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 9, pp. 141-149.

² Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 8, p. 706.

fine uniforms and every other art of persuasion were used with the savages ; while Colonel Brodhead had never been furnished with goods of any kind, nor a penny of money to transact business with the Indians. They drove their cattle and swine to Detroit, and did business there on a gold basis, whereas at Fort Pitt they received money which even the Americans would not take from them. It was impossible, therefore, to hold the wavering Delawares any longer ; and not a single tribe beyond the Ohio remained friendly.¹ Colonel Brodhead was informed of the defection of the Delawares by the Moravian missionary on the Muskingum—Heckewelder—and in April he organized an expedition. He made a rapid march to the wilds of Ohio, and had an interview on the Muskingum with Heckewelder, as to the whereabouts of the Moravian Indians—converts of Heckewelder and his associate, Zeisberger. It was agreed that these Christian Indians were not to be disturbed, but it required the greatest exertions of Brodhead to carry out his agreement ; for the militia hated the Christian Indians as much as the others. Nevertheless, it must be said that the peaceful attitude of the Delawares up to that time was largely due to these missionaries. Heckewelder was constantly with this tribe from 1771-1786, and Zeisberger spent sixty-two years of his life among them and other tribes.² The information of these men respecting Indian affairs during the Revolution was always eagerly sought,³ and they often gave timely warning of an intended raid on the Western frontiers. It is true, the Indian war parties that plundered and destroyed white settlers were sometimes sheltered and

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 8, p. 770.

² Heckewelder's Narrative, p. 7.

³ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 8, pp. 152-158 ; vol. 9, p. 57.

harbored by the Moravian converts,¹ and even these themselves occasionally joined in taking up the hatchet.² But we must not forget that there were numbers of such Americans as McKee, Elliott and Girty, who told them that the American armies had been all cut to pieces by the English, that General Washington was killed, that there was no more Congress, that the English had hung some of its members and taken the others to England, to hang them there, that the whole country beyond the Alleghenies was in the possession of the English, and that the Americans on the west side of the mountains were preparing to kill all the Indians, even the women and children.³ Under such influences, it is not strange that the work of Heckewelder and Zeisberger and their co-laborers was sometimes without avail in holding their converted Indians for the American cause.

Having arranged for the safety of the Moravian Indians, Colonel Brodhead proceeded to Coshocton and attacked the hostile band, and made them sue for peace. He committed the care of the prisoners—about twenty—to the militia. Exasperated by the frequent outrages that had been committed against them, these frontiersmen on their way back to Pittsburg murdered and scalped the whole number in their charge, except a few women and children. Notwithstanding the chastisement of the Delawares, in April, the usual fright and flight of the settlers was reported from Westmoreland⁴ and Bedford⁵ in June and July; and the designs upon Detroit were naturally revived. Want of men and supplies still made it impossible for Brodhead to execute it. So, much to his chagrin,

¹ Heckewelder's Narrative, p. 166.

² Pennsylvania Packet, April 16, 1782.

³ Heckewelder's Narrative, p. 180.

⁴ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 9, p. 246.

⁵ Ibid, p. 152.

Virginia undertook an expedition against that point, and the person to command it was George Rogers Clark. Though Brodhead obeyed orders, and supported Clark in his preparations, yet he suspicioned that Virginia's enterprise was not intended so much for the relief of the frontiers as for the extension of her territorial claims.¹ It looked suspicious even to others.² However, the fact that the people of Westmoreland joined in it most heartily³ seems to indicate that they, at least, regarded Virginia's motive to be an honest one. Colonel Lochry, with a force of volunteers and a company of rangers, was to form a part of Clark's command; Lochry went down the river to join Clark, who had started some time before the Westmorelanders. But, alas! Lochry's force was suddenly attacked, August 24th, by a body of Indians under Brandt and George Girty (brother of Simon) some distance below the mouth of the Miami. Every man of them—numbering more than a hundred—was killed or captured.⁴ Colonel Lochry was among the slain. This unfortunate affair, and the non-arrival of other reinforcements, made it necessary for Clark, who was at the falls of the Ohio, to abandon his enterprise. A detachment of artillery, which he had taken along from Fort Pitt, arrived there after many hardships, November 26th.

Colonel Brodhead, before Clark's departure, had gone to Philadelphia on public business and turned his command over to Colonel Gibson. At the suggestion of Clark, Gibson agreed to make an excursion against the Wyandots at Sandusky,⁵ to start in the beginning of September. When Brodhead returned, August 11th, the

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 9, pp. 152 and 307.

² *Ibid.*, p. 405.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 247 and 306.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

⁵ Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 57.

matter was at once laid before him. He agreed to it, and, claiming the right of command, called upon the county lieutenants for their assistance. But a clash now occurred between him and Colonel Gibson as to which was the commanding officer at Fort Pitt. Charges had been brought against Brodhead in April, that he with others was "concerned in buying manors and millseats and speculating on public money."¹ So when the Sandusky expedition was to be undertaken, Colonel Gibson and his friends claimed that Washington's instructions to Brodhead, on his return from Philadelphia, were such that he could not with propriety be in command until after the depositions relating to the charges had been taken.² But Brodhead stood his ground, and wrote to Washington that the expedition against the Sanduskies would proceed from Fort McIntosh, September 4th and 5th, and that he would command.³ Everybody that wanted to could go; and the volunteers thus raised were allowed to select their own officers. Each man was to provide himself with a horse and thirty days' provisions.

But now most alarming news came from Zeisberger, the Moravian Missionary, that a large number of Wyandots, Delawares, Munseys and Shawanese were approaching the settlements.⁴ He cautioned Brodhead not to disclose the source of the information, lest the savages would take revenge on the Moravian Indians and missionaries. The county lieutenants were at once notified and Forts Henry (Wheeling) and McIntosh put in readiness for defense.⁵ The country took the alarm, and several hundred men were in arms. Nor was it long before the news

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 9, p. 97.

2 The Olden Time, vol. 2, p. 393.

3 Ibid, p. 395.

4 Heckewelder's Narrative, p. 239.

5 The Olden Time, vol. 2, pp. 395-396.

from Zeisberger was confirmed by the appearance of the Indians at Fort Henry; but on seeing the garrison prepared for them they disappeared. After killing and capturing several people and slaughtering all the cattle they could find, they withdrew across the Ohio.

Disappointed in not surprising Fort Henry, the savages now swore vengeance on the Moravian Indians. They had learned in some way, just as Zeisberger feared might be the case, that he had notified the commander at Fort Pitt of their approach. However, this betrayal was not alone responsible for what followed. DePeyster, at Detroit, had been made to believe by McKee, Elliott and Girty that the Moravian missionaries were sent by Congress as spies among the Indians. To give their reports greater weight, these Tories persuaded some Indian chiefs to join them in lodging complaints with the commandant against the missionaries.¹ In this way they hoped to secure DePeyster's consent to murder the missionaries and their Indian converts. Not wishing to assume responsibility for such a crime, he sent McKee to the war council of the Six Nations, at Niagara, and got an order from them to the Chippewas and Ottawas to this purport: "We herewith make you a present of the Christian Indians on the Muskingum to make broth of them."² The occasion had now arrived for this order to be put into execution. On returning to the Muskingum after their poor success at Fort Henry, the exasperated savages took the missionaries prisoners, tied them and destroyed everything they had. The Moravian Indians were told they must move or they would all be cut off. There was nothing to do but to obey. There were three mission stations in what is now Tuscarawas county, Ohio, and their Indian

¹ Heckewelder's Narrative, pp. 229-230.

² Loskiel's Indian Missions, part 3rd, chapter 9, p. 150.

inhabitants now all marched through the wilderness under the command of the "infamous rascal, Matthew Elliott." They carried their simple stock of household goods on their backs and drove the cattle and swine before them. Arriving at the Sandusky, October 11th, the Christian Indians were left there for the winter, while the missionaries were obliged to go with Elliott to Detroit and answer the charges that had been lodged against them; but as the evidence was insufficient, they were allowed to return to Sandusky, when the cold of winter already made their journey one of great hardships. Their horses having been stolen before the start, DePeyster kindly furnished them others,¹ a kindness of which his predecessor would scarcely have been capable.

While the main body of the savages under Elliott were convoying the Moravians to Sandusky, a band of seven returned to Washington county and captured an old man of sixty. The settlers quickly gave them chase and killed all but one. There was a better organization for defense now in southwestern Pennsylvania. The dispute about the boundary line between Pennsylvania and Virginia had run on to the great disadvantage of this section until 1779. In that year it was agreed to extend Mason and Dixon's Line due west to the five-degree limit, as called for by the charter of Pennsylvania, and that a meridian line from the western extremity of Mason and Dixon's Line should be the western boundary of Pennsylvania. This agreement was not carried out until 1783, and consequently there was anarchy and confusion in that section, lasting until Washington county was erected by an Act of the Assembly, March 28th, 1781.² It included

¹ Heckewelder's Narrative, p. 297.

² Journal of the House of Representatives, vol. 1, p. 598.

all the territory in Pennsylvania south of the Ohio and west of the Monongahela.

The Indian invasion into Wheeling and Monongahela valleys, together with the conflict of authority at Fort Pitt, caused a postponement of the expedition against Sandusky, and finally its abandonment.¹ Washington now put an end to the dispute between Brodhead and Gibson by appointing the latter to the command "during the dependence of the trial."² Brodhead was mildly rebuked for misconstruing the Commander-in-Chief's letter to him. He was told that there should have been no doubt as to the impropriety of holding the command while his trial was preparing and hearing.³ The change took place September 17th; but Gibson was in command only until Brodhead's successor, General William Irvine, arrived early in November. The new commander spent the rest of the year in a reformation of military affairs at Fort Pitt, working at times with his own hands as an example for his officers. Nothing else of consequence is to be recorded about the Western frontiers for the year 1781, except that there was a report sent to Fort Pitt, by Zeisberger, to the effect that Guy Johnson with a large army was coming down from Presque Isle. This had some foundation. Sir Henry Clinton had proposed to General Haldimand, as a threat to Clark's expedition against Detroit, that a force of 2,000 men should come down from Niagara to Fort Pitt by way of Presque Isle and co-operate with an expedition from the Southern army up the rivers Potomac and Susquehanna. But Haldimand did not think well of Clinton's proposition. "Fort Pitt," said he, "is not to be taken by a *coup de main*, nor will

1 Washington to Gibson, Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 62.

2 Spark's Letters to Washington, vol. 3, p. 452.

3 Washington to Brodhead, Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 62.

the enemy suffer it to be surprised." ¹ General Irvine was therefore not disturbed in his preparations for an active campaign in 1782.

William Irvine was born in Ireland, 1741, and was like so many other officers from Pennsylvania, of Scotch-Irish descent. He studied medicine and was appointed surgeon of a British ship of war. In the French war his line of duty brought him to America, whither he returned after peace had been declared, settling at Carlisle. Irvine took an active part on the side of the Colonies at the opening of the Revolution. He raised the Sixth Pennsylvania and was appointed to its command early in 1776. He marched at its head to Canada and was among the 200 prisoners at Three Rivers. He was carried to Quebec and not exchanged until April, 1778, although paroled shortly after his capture. Having won distinction in the battle of Monmouth, he was made a brigadier General in 1779. He was actively engaged in the army until 1781, when after doing duty in the recruiting service for awhile he was appointed to the command of the western department. He held this post to the close of the war. Pennsylvania showed her gratitude for his services by giving him a tract of land on Lake Erie, known as "Irvine's Reserve." It was through his advice that Pennsylvania bought the "triangle" on Lake Erie from the United States. After the war he held a number of important trusts—on the Council of Censors, in the Congress of the Confederation, in the State Constitutional Convention of 1790, in the Congress under the Constitution, in the Whiskey Insurrection and in the Electoral College, etc. He died, 1804, in Philadelphia, having removed there from Carlisle. ²

¹ Vermont Historical Society, vol. 2, p. 342.

² Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 65.

There was quite a decrease of Indian outrages in the Susquehanna and Delaware Valleys in the year 1781. The savages appeared early in the spring, but after harvest there were but few of them seen; ¹ for they had received a signal blow in New York.² A later incursion had been ordered, as appears from the following letter to Joseph Brandt, dated October 3rd, 1781:

"DEAR JOSEPH:—If you have no other object of importance in view, I request that you will make a move upon Minisink and the East Branch of the Susquehanna as soon as possible."³

The ravages began in March and April.⁴ In Northumberland the enemy had made five different strokes from the 22nd of March till the 12th of April. A force of militia from the counties below was called out on a two months' tour, and sent up the North Branch. Their presence seems to have frightened the Indians, for Colonel Hunter discharged some of them in August, though he claimed that it was because of a lack of rations.⁵ There was the greatest distress in Northumberland at that time. Many of the rangers were so naked for want of clothing that they could not do duty. There was no surgeon in the county, within forty miles,⁶ to attend either the soldiers, if wounded, or the people, if taken sick. One offered himself from Lancaster county, but he was found lacking in character and ability.⁷ General Potter expressed the wish that the Assembly could make a visit with him, that they might be moved to extend relief. But relief was impossible from that quarter, especially when

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 9, p. 392.

2 Stone's Life of Brandt, vol. 2, pp. 155-159.

3 Haldimand, MSS., Vermont Hist. Society, vol. 2, p. 345.

4 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 9, pp. 70, 106, 107; Miner's Hist. of Wyoming, p. 292.

5 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 9, p. 364.

6 Ibid, p. 208.

7 Ibid, p. 238.

it was expected that the British in New York would invade Pennsylvania after Washington had stolen that matchless march on Clinton—across New Jersey, through Pennsylvania and Maryland, and down into Virginia—there to fight the last battle of the Revolution.

In Wyoming, the conditions were very like those of the North Branch. Occasional incursions of small bands occurred all summer, and several people were killed; but the company of Continental troops now stationed there gave confidence. Scouting parties were sent out, going from fifty to eighty miles up the river. In September, a party of Indians attacked the Hanover settlement, and succeeded in carrying off two boys in revenge for the death of an Indian, who had been shot by the father the year before. To kill an Indian on the frontier was always liable to be fraught with serious consequences. In this respect, again, the lot of a soldier on the frontier was far less desirable than that of a man in the regular army.

Northampton was more scared than hurt in 1781. The Indians crossed the Delaware into New Jersey, and did some bloody work there. On their return they burned a house in Northampton county, and drove away a herd of cattle. This might not have alarmed the people much; but, as the Indians hurried away, they lost a knapsack containing an order from Colonel Butler to Captain Brandt, by which it appeared that a heavy attack was intended to be made.¹ The militia flew to arms as never before. Their methods of checking the Indians were specially recommended by President Reed to other counties; and the Council gave twenty-five pounds of hard money to one party for their activity and bravery.²

Though the war along the seaboard had practically

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 9, p. 107.

² Ibid, p. 238.

closed in 1781, the border war in Pennsylvania continued in all its fury on some parts of the frontiers. Early in January, 1782, General Irvine had gone to his home in Carlisle and to Philadelphia. Until his return, March 25th, Colonel Gibson was in command at Fort Pitt. During Irvine's absence, a most atrocious massacre was committed by a body of two hundred Monongahela settlers, under David Williamson, colonel of a militia battalion of Washington county. The Moravian missionaries had obtained permission from Detroit for the Christian Indians, confined at Sandusky, to return to the Muskingum to get some corn that had been left there. Now, it happened that in February some Indian atrocities were committed in Washington county.¹ Coming so early, while the snow was still on the ground, these raids caused much surprise and consternation. The belief was prevalent that some "enemy Indians" had occupied the vacant villages of the Moravian Indians.² Upon reaching the Muskingum, however, Colonel Williamson's militia found there the Moravian Indians who had come from Sandusky to get corn. There were about 150 men, women and children, and they offered no resistance. The question arose what to do with them. Sundry articles were found among them that had been taken from people in Washington county. They confessed that ten warriors had come with them from Sandusky, and had gone into the settlements, and that four of these were then present in the villages.³ The majority were no doubt friendly, for they offered to go to Pittsburg that their sufferings might end.⁴ Colonel Williamson put it to a vote whether the

1 *Pennsylvania Archives*, vol. 9, p. 496.

2 *Washington-Irvine Correspondence*, p. 100; also, *Wither's Border Warfare*, p. 320.

3 *Pennsylvania Archives*, vol. 9, p. 540.

4 *Wither's Border Warfare*, p. 322.

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Indians should be spared or slain. Just how the vote resulted is in doubt; ¹ but there is no doubt as to the fate of the Indians. They were all killed except those in the upper village, the slain numbering upwards of ninety, most of whom were women and children. After pillaging the villages, the white demons burned every house within them. While preparations for death were going on, the Indians assembled for the last time in the worship of God, and many of them were tied while in the act of prayer. ² There was a divided sentiment on the frontiers about this massacre at the time of its occurrence; but an investigation was impossible; for, like school-boys, the militia would not testify against one another. Such was the end of the Christian Indians on the Muskingum. They fell a victim at the hands of the frontiersman, after he had experienced unspeakable horrors for eight long years. In 1782, the "back inhabitants" could scarcely look upon an Indian any more as a human being. Nevertheless, the murder on the Muskingum was not justifiable.

To make the punishment of the Indians more complete still, another voluntary expedition was now organized to proceed against the Indians at Sandusky. This place was the rendezvous for the Indians of the Northwest—Shawanese, Mingoes, Monseys, Ottawas, Delawares and others—preparatory to their raids on the Western frontier. General Irvine gave his permission for the expedition, on condition that any conquests the volunteers might make should be in behalf and for the United States. ³ It was to be no expedition such as Virginia had sent out under Clark—with a double purpose, ostensibly to harass the enemy, but in reality to acquire territory. Each vol-

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 9, p. 540.

2 Heckewelder's Narrative, pp. 318-319.

3 Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 113.

unteer furnished his own horse and gun and provisions for a month, on condition that he was afterwards exempt from two tours of military duty. In this way, an army of 500 was collected at Mingo Bottom, on the Ohio, below the present site of Steubenville. By a vote, Colonel William Crawford was elected commander, the other candidate having been Colonel Williamson, under whom the Moravian massacre occurred. William Crawford was born in Virginia. He learned the art of surveying under Washington, but when the French war broke out he forsook the compass and became a soldier. At the close of Pontiac's war, he was a captain. Having been across the mountains as a soldier, he settled there afterwards, and located in what is now Fayette county as a farmer, surveyor and Indian trader. He served as justice of the peace in old Bedford county, and in Westmoreland upon its organization; but he was prominent in Lord Dunmore's war, and thus became committed to serve the interests of Virginia in the long territorial dispute. He entered the Revolutionary service as lieutenant colonel of a Virginia regiment, and served at first on the frontier, then with Washington at Brandywine and Germantown. When General Hand was assigned to the Western Department, Colonel Crawford was ordered to Fort Pitt, where he did valiant and useful service under the various commanders.

Crawford's expedition started May 25th, and pursued "Williamson's trail" to the Muskingum, where the horses were fed with the corn of the Moravian Indians. Here two stray Indians were recklessly fired upon by the volunteers, and Colonel Crawford realized that the troops under him were hard to command. They were ten days on the march to Sandusky, while it might have been per-

formed in seven. General Irvine had advised them to attack the town in the night, but, instead, they halted within ten miles of the enemy, and resumed the march at the late hour of seven in the morning.¹ The enemy, numbering about 200 Indians and 100 British rangers, were encountered at 4 P. M. Both parties fought hard for a piece of woods, but the enemy gave way at sunset. The next day, the British and Indians being heavily reinforced and the Americans greatly burdened with their sick and wounded, Colonel Crawford ordered a retreat, but great confusion attended it. Quite a number, therefore, were missing after the detached bodies of the troops had been collected again. Among the missing ones was Colonel Crawford.² They had been captured about thirty miles from the scene of the battle; and five days afterwards they were all but one cruelly put to death by the Delaware Indians. The one that escaped was a Doctor Knight, who arrived at Fort Pitt in the course of twenty-one days. He reported³ that Colonel Crawford was first tied to a long post, with room to walk around it; his ears were cut off, and squibs of powder blown into different parts of his body. Then the squaws took hickory brands and touched such parts of his body as would be most tender. They took the scalp and slapped it in the face of Doctor Knight. Thus the victim was tortured one whole hour, when Doctor Knight was removed from the horrible scene. Just as the Doctor was leaving, Colonel Crawford sank down on his knees exhausted; but a squaw threw a shovelful of hot coals on him to put him again in motion. The colonel made no outcry, except to beg

¹ Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 122.

² Pennsylvania Packet, July 4th, 1782; Pennsylvania Gazette, July 11th, 1782.

³ Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, July 23, 1782; also, Incidents of Border Life, pp. 131-139.

Simon Girty, whom he had formerly known at Pittsburg, to shoot him. But his appeal was met with a satanic smile. The next day Doctor Knight passed the place under his Indian guard and saw the bones of his colonel in the ashes. Doctor Knight was to be burned, too, but he managed to escape before he was tied to the stake. The British accounts, though not going into the details, all agreed in pronouncing the death of Colonel Crawford as "cruel," as a "torture," "abhorrent," etc., and they united in saying that it was in revenge for the murder of the Moravian Indians.¹

This account of Dr. Knight struck the people of Western Pennsylvania with a strange mixture of fear and resentment and they at once began to prepare for another expedition.² Washington, however, cautioned General Irvine against rashness, for he thought such treatment as Crawford had received had to be expected when it was remembered how the Moravian Indians fared.³ But before the settlers could retaliate, the Indians were on the frontier in Westmoreland county. The people of that section had kept together at various points of safety during the spring and summer and exercised the strictest watch. The militia deserted from the posts because they had not been paid and were in rags. The whole country north of the Forbes' Road was well-nigh deserted. Such was the condition of affairs when Hannastown was attacked on Saturday, July 13th. This town had been the county seat of Westmoreland since its organization in 1773. It consisted of about thirty houses built of logs. Its courthouse and jail, of like construction, had both witnessed many an exciting scene in the days of Connelly

¹ Washington-Irvine Correspondence, pp. 372-374; also Haldimand MSS., Vermont Historical Society, vol. 2, pp. 290-363.

² Spark's Letters to Washington, vol. 3, p. 524.

³ Washington-Irvine Correspondence, p. 132.

and through the subsequent years of territorial disputes. On the 13th of July a number of the town folk had gone to O'Conner's fields, a mile and a half north of the village, to cut the harvest of Michael Huffnagle. Suddenly a number of Indians were seen approaching the fields. The reapers all ran for the town. Fathers called for their wives and children and the children for their parents, all rushing towards the fort. Even the criminals of the jail were allowed to seek the shelter of the stockade. Five men had volunteered to go to the fields and reconnoitre. One was on horseback and got there first. When he saw the savages mustered in force, he returned and told those on foot to flee to the forts for their lives. The Indians were exasperated when they came to Hannastown and saw that the people had all gone into the fort. So they applied the torch and every house but two was laid in ashes. While the flames were still adding fury to the vengeance of the savages, a band of the latter set out for Miller's Fort where a wedding on the day before had brought a number of guests together from a distance, to be added to the number of those who dwelt in the cabins of the fort. Some were in the fields, others in the fort and still others in the house where the wedding had been held. The savages came upon the place so suddenly that most of its dwellers and sojourners were taken prisoners, and a few of them killed ; while the fort and the buildings around it shared the fate of Hannastown.

In the evening the marauders all assembled near Hannastown, regaling themselves with their booty. About thirty farmers of the surrounding country managed to get into the fort and by a trick that was common deceived the savages as to the numerical strength of the garrison. They marched and countermarched on the bridge across the ditch around the fort to the music of

the fife and drum. The sounds carried terror to the savage breast in the silence of the night, and towards morning about 300 Indians and 60 Tories marched off toward the Kittanning. The prisoners were surrendered to the English in Canada, whence most of them returned after the cruel war on the frontier had ceased—a day which happily then was not far distant. Hannastown was never rebuilt and the plow has been going over the place for a century.¹

In September the Council and Assembly proposed to Washington to send out two expeditions from Pennsylvania—one from Fort Pitt and one from Northumberland county;² but Washington soon after received information that the British had called in all their Indian parties and so the two-fold project was abandoned.³ Irvine, however, would have marched from Fort Pitt in September had he not been disappointed in raising a sufficient force. The Indians were still murdering in the neighborhood of Fort Pitt and he was also anxious to draw off the Delawares and Wyandots to prevent them from joining the Shawanese whom General Clark intended to attack at the same time.⁴ But General Clark destroyed the towns of the Shawanese on the Miami, without any assistance, early in November.⁵ In doing this after the British had called in their light troops and Indians he greatly added to the hatred in which he was held by the British and Indians.⁶

The Northumberland frontiersmen had the opportunity early in February, 1782, to attend court in Sunbury, and thus in a representative way, to discuss affairs in their

1 *Frontier Forts*, vol. 2, pp. 300-307.

2 *Pennsylvania Archives*, vol. 9, p. 630.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 640-648.

4 *Washington-Irvine Correspondence*, p. 135.

5 *Roosevelt's Winning of the West*, vol. 2, p. 209.

6 *Haldimand MSS.*, *Vermont Historical Society*, vol. 2, p. 362.

county. They seem to have been of one mind as to what to do, which was to move off the frontiers, or at least to put their families out of danger. They had for three years been visited in the early spring by the Indians, and they expected the hostile visits as usual.¹ A company of militia was accordingly stationed at Fort Muncy by the Executive Council. Nor did they arrive too soon, for the enemy appeared on the Lycoming about the middle of April.² Fort Muncy was rebuilt and tradition says some Hessian prisoners were employed on the work.³ Ranging parties were constantly out looking for Indians; and it was while on this kind of duty that Moses Van Campen was captured a second time. (See page 80). On the 6th of May a party of rangers met a number of Indians not far from the present site of Mifflinburg, and the engagement resulted in the loss of two men killed. In August a large body, numbering some sixty or seventy, appeared a few miles above Sunbury and murdered a whole family. It was these repeated attacks that led the Council and Assembly to propose to Washington an expedition from Northumberland,⁴ but which was abandoned when the Commander-in-Chief learned that the British light troops and Indians had been called in. It seems to have been a mistake not to send a force up the Susquehanna into the Indian country, for in October the outrages became more serious again. The people now lost all confidence in the British assurances that no more incursions should be made on the frontiers, and they would not return to their homes until winter had set in.⁵

The Indians were pacifically disposed towards Wyom-

1 *Pennsylvania Archives*, vol. 9, p. 503.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 528.

3 McGinnis' *History of the West Branch*, p. 637.

4 *Pennsylvania Archives*, vol. 9, p. 630.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 657.

ing and Northampton in the year 1782. In October, therefore, the question of withdrawing the Continental garrison from Wyoming came up in Congress. As it was left to the discretion of the Commander-in-chief,¹ the Executive Council urged Washington not to withdraw it, for two reasons ; first, the pacific disposition of the Indians ought not to be relied on to the extent of withdrawing the garrison ; secondly, should the assurances of the present amicable temper be fully confirmed, there was much reason to fear that the old contest between Pennsylvania and Connecticut would immediately be renewed. The Council was not willing that any risk of disturbing the peace and tranquillity of Wyoming should be taken. Pennsylvania's interests were safest as long as a Continental garrison was stationed in the disputed territory.² The settlement of this dispute had already been under way for a year. Soon after Cornwallis' surrender, the Executive Council had presented a petition to Congress, praying for an adjustment of the matter.³ Connecticut promptly met the overtures ; and on August 12th, 1782, the delegates of the two States in Congress announced that they had agreed on a number of gentlemen to constitute a court.⁴ This court met at Trenton in November, and, after sitting forty-one days, announced a decision in favor of Pennsylvania, December 30th. When the Continental troops were withdrawn in February following,⁵ two companies of rangers from Northampton county were stationed at Wyoming to insure the continued safety of the settlements against Indian incursions.⁶

1 Journals of Congress, vol. 7, p. 499.

2 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 9, p. 653.

3 Journals of Congress, vol. 7, p. 219.

4 Ibid, p. 435.

5 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 9, p. 755.

6 Ibid, p. 761.

Nor was this precaution unnecessary, for, before the arrival of the rangers, two men had been either killed or captured. Along the whole frontier, from Northampton to Washington county, the savages renewed hostilities in the spring of 1783. It was a grievous disappointment to the settlers. They were more discouraged than they had ever been before. Their sanguine hopes of peace gave way to despair.¹ Their brethren in the country "below" had already enjoyed peace since the surrender of Cornwallis, and the soldiers of the Continental army were resting in camp, soon to return to their homes. These early incursions were made in retaliation of Clark's destruction of the Shawanese towns on the Miami. (See p. 139). The "Six Nations" had received word from their brothers of that act "by the perfidious, cruel rebels," "at a time when they and we were forbade to go to war, and directed to cease hostilities." They therefore notified the British that they would remain idle no longer and see their brethren and people destroyed. They even asked General Haldimand's assistance in sharpening their axes. He employed every argument to dissuade the Six Nations from their purpose; but he could not do it. He saw some justice, too, in their request, and so he resolved to assist them by every means in his power. He wrote this resolve, and the reasons for it, in an open letter, with the request that, in case the messenger fell into the enemy's hands, it be delivered to General Washington, as it concerned the American's happiness more than the King's service.² It seems that Virginia, to some extent at least, established her claims to the country north of the Ohio at the cost of the blood of Pennsylvania frontiersmen.

The depredations committed in accordance with the

¹ Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 10, p. 22.

² Haldimand MSS., Vt. Hist. Society, vol. 2, pp. 362-363.

resolves of the Six Nations and the British, led Congress, on the first of May, to pass a resolution that the Indians be informed of the cessation of hostilities and the preliminary articles of peace, and that the United States would enter into a treaty with them, too. This communication was to be coupled with a warning, that if they did not cease hostilities Congress would take decided measures to compel them thereto.¹ Ephraim Douglas, an officer of the Eighth Pennsylvania, and the first clerk of the courts of Fayette county, was delegated to carry this message to the Indians.² Before leaving Fort Pitt, he suggested to General Irvine to dispatch a messenger to General Clark, in order to restrain him from any further attacks on the Indians until the proposals of Congress had been made to them. On arriving at Detroit, Douglas was well received by DePeyster and the Indians; and he at once wrote back to Fort Pitt, announcing the fact of his friendly reception, in order that no unfriendly act should be committed at home against any Indians who might chance to visit the frontiers now that they knew the Americans wanted peace. The message of Congress he withheld from the Indians at Detroit by request of DePeyster. The British commandant thought it incompatible with his duty to suffer the message of the United States to be delivered before he was possessed of such authenticated accounts of the treaty with England as would justify his concurrence with Douglas. The Indians, however, agreed to cease further hostilities, provided the inhabitants of the United States showed the same disposition to avoid every cause of just complaint, especially to confine themselves to their own side of the Ohio.³ Douglas then proceeded to Niagara,

¹ Journals of Congress, vol. 8, p. 255.

² Washington-Irvine Correspondence, Appendix M, p. 413.

³ Ibid, p. 415.

hoping that the commandant of that post might have more authority to act with him. But he was again disappointed. He was not allowed to assemble the Indians and make known his mission. The British took this stand in order to protect the Indians in the possession of their lands.¹

Upon this point there was much anxiety among the Indians at this time. Captain Brandt came to see Douglas at Niagara and insisted that they must have their lands secured before they would enter into any further or other treaty, and the British commandant suggested that Congress send some person among them to give assurance upon this point.² Nor was this anxiety without good reason. Companies were being formed for purchasing large tracts of lands, which had been appropriated by Pennsylvania and Virginia for the redemption of officers' and soldiers' certificates. In Pennsylvania, these lands lay north and west of the Ohio and Allegheny, but the Indian titles to them were not yet extinguished.³ It was an open secret that the land companies conspired with the surveyors to make surveys in the Indian country. General Irvine therefore issued an order forbidding either men or women from crossing the Allegheny or Ohio anywhere between Kittanning and Fort McIntosh without a permit.⁴

To avoid giving offence to the Indians by possible encroachments of these land companies, the Legislature of Pennsylvania in September asked Congress for permission to buy the lands north and west of the Ohio and Allegheny, but the request was refused.⁵ However, measures were then taken under deliberation in Congress for

1 Washington-Irvine Correspondence, Appendix M, p. 416.

2 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 10, pp. 83-90.

3 Journal of the House of Representatives, March 7, 1780.

4 Washington-Irvine Correspondence, Appendix G, p. 261.

5 Journals of Congress, vol. 10, pp. 371-377.

a treaty of peace with the Indians. These measures were adopted, October 15th, and delegates from Pennsylvania were permitted to attend the conference for the purpose of making the State's intended purchase.¹ But repeated attacks were made on the Western frontier in the spring of 1784, before the commissioners had even fixed upon a time and a place for holding the treaty. The people were very uneasy that nothing had been done.² Besides the dangers from incursions, the treaty was becoming urgent to satisfy the soldiers and others who wanted the lands of the Indians. The Continental commissioners were to meet in New York to organize, but failed to get together. The delay was so hazardous to Pennsylvania that its commissioners actually talked of acting independently of the United States at Tioga or Wyalusing. When in August the Continental commissioners still failed to act, the General Assembly passed a resolution that the commissioners on the part of the State should meet the Indians who claimed the unpurchased territory within its limits.³ It appears that when the original commissioners delayed so much, Congress in March, 1784, appointed others and instructed them to hasten their departure.⁴ Later another member was added and two other changes were again made, making the commission to consist finally of George Rogers Clarke, Oliver Walcott, Arthur Lee, Richard Butler, Benjamin Lincoln and Philip Schuyler. The sum of 15,000 dollars was appropriated for the purchase of goods to be used in negotiating with the Indians.⁵

The month of October was finally selected as the time

1 Journals of Congress, vol. 10, pp. 439-468.

2 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 10, pp. 264 and 266.

3 Minutes of the Assembly, August 25th, 1784.

4 Journals of Congress, vol. 11, p. 51.

5 Ibid, p. 63.

for holding the treaty, and Fort Stanwix as the place. The Continental commissioners, of whom only three were present at the sessions—Walcott, Butler and Lee—arrived on the 2nd of the month, and the Pennsylvania commissioners a day or so later. The business commenced on the 3rd and continued until the 23rd. New York had already done what Pennsylvania threatened to do—held a separate treaty with the Six Nations. In this act, we see thus early State sovereignty cropping out. It gave Washington and others great concern. He viewed with fearful apprehension the rage for speculation in Indian lands, and the disposition of the States to get as much of them as possible. "Men in these times," said he, "talk with as much facility of 50,000, 100,000 and 500,000 acres as a gentleman formerly would do of 1,000." Again, "Individual States opposing the measures of the United States, encroaching upon the territory of each other, and setting up old and obsolete claims, is verifying the predictions of our enemies, and is truly unfortunate."¹ New York, very soon after passing into the hands of the English, had secured from the Six Nations the right of protecting them and their lands, leaving to them a kind of qualified sovereignty.² But after 1754, when Sir William Johnson became the British agent in America for Indian affairs, this right of sovereignty over the Six Nations, together with whatever similar powers other colonies had in Indian affairs, passed into the hands of the mother country. But aside from this fact, Congress had organized an Indian department, and the treaties of the Revolutionary period were made by authority of Congress. Furthermore, by the treaty of 1783, the sovereignty of all the Indian countries within the prescribed limits granted

¹ Ford's Writings of Washington, vol. 10, pp. 417-425.

² Kent's Commentaries, vol. 3, p. 392.

to the United States by Great Britain, became vested in the former to the same extent as it had been exercised by the latter.¹

Had New York and other States prevailed, the Indians would have been expelled at once, and by force, if necessary, from all lands not ceded to them previous to the war. The result of this would have been another war.² Such was Washington's view, and the feeling of some of the Indians at Fort Stanwix proved that his view was correct. Red Jacket was opposed to the burial of the hatchet, even under the milder policy of Congress, as laid down at the treaty. He spoke with great eloquence in favor of the continuance of the war by the Indians on their own account.³

Another incident came up at Fort Stanwix that tested the sovereignty of the United States as against the State of New York. The latter had sent an agent there to represent her interests, instructing him to oppose and frustrate any of the proceedings of the commissioners which might eventually affect the interests of New York.⁴ One of the measures he took to obstruct the work of the commission was to sell liquor to the Indians. The commissioners had orders not to allow anything of the kind to be sold while the treaty was in progress. So they commanded the United States officer in charge to deposit all spirituous liquors in the houses of sutlers and venders within a mile of the place in the public store, not excepting New York's. The commissioners even forbade the latter to be admitted in or near the place of holding the council, or to listen or observe what was going on inside.⁵

1 Kent's Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 257.

2 Ford's Writings of Washington, vol. 10, p. 306.

3 Stone's Life of Brandt, vol. 2, p. 243.

4 The Olden Time, vol. 2, p. 412.

5 Ibid, p. 450.

The incidental matters disposed of, the commission proceeded to its work. One of the first things done was to allow General Lafayette to speak to the Indians. He was present, and wanted to leave soon.¹ The Marquis praised those who had adhered to the Americans in the war, and blamed those who had been their enemies. He advised them all most earnestly and eloquently to listen to the voice of the Americans. Their answer was full of the spirit of peace. The Mohawks, in particular, declared their repentance for the error they had committed. Yet, in the course of the council, it appeared that the Six Nations were opposed to a separate negotiation with the United States. They wanted no treaty made until all the Western Indians, who were not present, could be consulted. But the commissioners would listen to no delay.² It was largely through the efforts of the Cornplanter that the Six Nations were persuaded to relinquish a portion of their territory by compromise, rather than lose the whole by force. He saw the force of the instructions of Congress, namely, that, as the King of Great Britain had made no mention of the Indians in the treaty of peace with the Americans, he had left them to seek peace with the United States upon such terms as the latter should think just and reasonable.³ So when the following articles of peace were proposed, October 20th, the Indians signed the treaty two days later :

1. Six hostages to be delivered and kept by the United States till all prisoners, white and black, taken by the four nations at war with America, had been restored.

2. The Oneidas and Tuscaroras to keep the lands they had.

3. A line to be drawn from Lake Ontario south, about four miles east of the Niagara river, to the northern boundary of

1 Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 10, p. 346.

2 The Olden Time, vol. 2, p. 428.

3 Ibid, p. 414.

Pennsylvania, thence west to the western boundary of Pennsylvania, and thence south to the Ohio river. The lands west of this line were to be ceded to the United States; while the lands then held by them east of the line were to be secured to them in peaceful possession.

4. Upon the signing of the articles, the United States to order goods to be delivered for the use and comfort of the Six Nations.

Then followed some wholesome advice, and three days later the council adjourned. The results of the treaty were highly unsatisfactory to the Six Nations, especially to Brandt, who was not present. Captain Aaron Hill, a subordinate chief of the Mohawks, had been detained as one of the hostages, and this added to Brandt's dissatisfaction. He had gone to Quebec to complete his business with Sir Frederick Haldimand, and then to embark for England. But he immediately gave up the trip abroad for that season. He went back to his own people to look after their interests. He formed a plan, like that of Pontiac twenty years before—of forming a great confederacy of the Northwestern Indian nations. He visited the country of the upper lakes, and held a number of councils. Having done this, he embarked for England, where it was conjectured he presented matters of great importance; for that country acknowledged that it owed much to the services of Colonel Brandt during the war in America.¹

By the cession made by the Six Nations, their title to the lands across the Allegheny River was extinguished. The Pennsylvania commissioners delivered a great quantity of goods to them in consideration of the deed received, amounting to about \$25,000.² But as the Delawares and Wyandots were not at Fort Stanwix, another treaty was held at Fort McIntosh in January, 1785. There the Con-

¹ Stone's *Life of Brandt*, vol. 2, p. 249.

² *Pennsylvania Archives*, vol. 10, p. 318.

tinental commissioners secured a cession of the country on the Scioto, Miami and Muskingum from the Wyandots, Chippewas, Delawares and Ottawas.¹ However, the towns of Guadenhutten, Schonbrun and Salem were afterwards reserved for the sole use of the survivors of the Christian Delawares.² The treaty by the Pennsylvania commissioners with the Delawares and Wyandots was for the same lands in the same words and with the same boundaries as that which they made at Fort Stanwix with the Six Nations.³ Thus, after a period of about 102 years, all the Indian right of soil within the charter bounds of Pennsylvania was extinguished. It may be added, that in 1788 Pennsylvania paid 1,200 pounds for the Indian right in the lands of the triangle on Lake Erie, and that the next year a further grant was added for the same purpose.⁴

The tract of land acquired by Pennsylvania at Fort Stanwix and Fort McIntosh was known as the "Indian country" since 1768. Now it was thrown open for settlement. But the act of the Cornplanter at Fort Stanwix was a sore subject to many of the Indians of the Six Nations. After Brandt had made his visit to the western nations, the Senecas and other tribes in the "Indian country" of Pennsylvania became quite unfriendly. Even so late as 1789, the Indians came within two miles of Pittsburg and killed two men who had gone out to fish.⁵ In 1793, after the formation of the Pennsylvania Population Company for encouraging settlements in the "Indian country," the town of Presque Isle was planned for this purpose "and to afford additional security to the

1 Wither's Chronicles, p. 366.

2 Journals of Congress, vol. 10, p. 123.

3 Minutes of the Assembly, Appendix, February-April, 1785.

4 Smith's Laws, vol. 2, pp. 123-124.

5 Pittsburg Gazette, July 2nd.

frontiers thereof.”¹ As soon as possible it was put on a war footing and a garrison stationed there. Forts LeBoeuf, Machault, Venango and Franklin were all repaired and garrisoned while the Indian war in Ohio was in progress. Fourteen blockhouses in Westmoreland, Armstrong, Allegheny, Indiana and Crawford counties were erected as a protection against Indian attacks from the year 1783-1795, the year in which Wayne ended the war in Ohio and made the treaty of Fort Greenville.² The obstinacy of the Indians in this region was so great that even the people of Washington county were apprehensive of danger and stood ready for an attack.³ This discontent in the “Indian country” was not alone due to dissatisfaction with the purchase at Fort Stanwix, nor with the purchase of the triangle. The British, who still occupied the frontier posts at Niagara, Detroit, etc., intrigued with the Six Nations. It was the opinion of military men on the frontiers at that time, that peace or war with the Indians depended on being at peace or war with the English.⁴ There was much truth in this, for it was not until after the treaty of Ghent that England once and for all abandoned her demands for an Indian boundary line, for a strip of neutral Indian territory, for military and naval supremacy on the lakes and for the inclusion of the Indians as parties to treaties between her and the United States.⁵

The greatest legacy of the ten years of border warfare in Pennsylvania during the Revolution, was its share in the achievement of independence. The frontiersman by his heroic and resolute resistance to the enemy in the rear,

1 *Frontier Forts*, vol. 2, p. 555.

2 *Frontier Forts*, pp. 537-627.

3 *Pennsylvania Archives*, 2nd series, vol. 6, p. 762.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 723.

5 *McMaster's History of the People of the U. S.*, vol. 4, p. 269.

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helped to make it possible for the Continental army to bring the war for independence to a successful issue on the front. The British at critical moments, with their savage allies, repeatedly tried to break through the mountains or draw off the strength of Washington's army beyond them ; but they never succeeded.

Next in importance was the territory acquired from the Indians. Pennsylvania's share was erected into eight counties in 1800. The act of the Legislature ¹ was known as the "great county act," for by it were organized Beaver, Butler, Mercer, Crawford, Erie, Warren, Venango and Armstrong counties. The money paid for all this land was a mere trifle ; but the blood shed for it and the hardships endured cannot be over-estimated. The land has proven to be a source of immense wealth, not alone to Pennsylvania, but to other States. The oil that was hidden under the ground has made millionaires and millionaires, and has given rise to the most gigantic and powerful corporation in the world.

The war on the frontiers of Pennsylvania was also one of the beginnings of "the winning of the West." Wayne's victory at Maumee, which put the final seal on the treaty of Fort McIntosh, opened to settlement the country from Erie westward and southwestward along the "Wilderness Road." ² Two streams of population converged at Erie—one from Pennsylvania, chiefly from Dauphin county ; the other from Connecticut and New York. The Pennsylvania stream gained great accessions in Allegheny and Westmoreland counties. These settlers had to get their lands from companies organized for speculation. The Pennsylvania Company, devised by

¹ Bioren's Laws, vol. 6, pp. 115-124.

² See Map of the United States, Thorpe's Constitutional History of the American People, vol. 1, opposite p. 153.

Aaron Burr and others, received a charter from the Legislature in 1793 and purchased land-warrants covering nearly the entire triangle.¹ It offered 120 acres to each of the twenty families that should first settle "on Lake Erie territory." The Harrisburg and Presque Isle Company, originated at Harrisburg, was formed in 1796. The proceeds of its stock were to be expended in buying lots in the towns of Erie, Waterford, Franklin and others, and lands in the State of Pennsylvania, north and west of the Ohio and Allegheny rivers. Other companies had purchased land-warrants and their claims often conflicted. The Holland Land Company, a New York concern, claimed all of the triangle. Some settlers held from one company, some from another and many had no title at all. The result was a crop of law suits and bankruptcies. But the immigrants continued to come in, some to remain and others to pass on to the Ohio country. So thriving was the immigrant business, that many farm houses were converted into temporary inns.² Life, there, indeed was primitive. All the possessions that the immigrant had he carried in an ox-cart, and he began his career on the Lake Shore in a log cabin, with a bark roof and a blanket door. But there was a promise in the future. Grain and stock kept him alive; wool and flax kept him in clothes, and pearlsh paid for his land. Such was the beginning of the "winning of the West," in the great Northwest; and it was made possible by the treaties of Forts Stanwix, McIntosh and Greenville.

¹ See Map of the United States, Thorpe's Constitutional History of the American People, vol. 1, p. 212.

² Thorpe's Constitutional History of the American People, vol. 1, pp. 217-226.

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